People v. Corlew, Docket No. 124461
| Decision Date | 17 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 124461 |
| Citation | 186 Mich.App. 320,463 N.W.2d 243 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis CORLEW, Defendant-Appellant. 186 Mich.App. 320, 463 N.W.2d 243 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[186 MICHAPP 321] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., William A. Forsyth, Pros. Atty., Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., and Helen V. Brinkman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Lannen & Trusock by Patrick J. Lannen, Grand Rapids, for defendant.
Before WEAVER, P.J., and SAWYER and NEFF, JJ.
Defendant pled guilty of prison escape. M.C.L. Sec. 750.193; M.S.A. Sec. 28.390. He was sentenced to a prison term of one to five years. Defendant now appeals and we affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash under the 180-day rule and the right to a speedy trial. We disagree. On October 21, 1988, defendant signed out of the Grand Rapids Corrections Center and failed to return. An escape warrant was issued, on October 25, 1988, and the matter was referred to an absconder recovery unit to investigate and apprehend defendant. Defendant was thereafter apprehended in Tennessee. A letter dated December 28, 1988, was sent to the Corrections Center indicating that defendant was available for return to Michigan. Defendant was returned and arraigned on June 6, 1989. Defendant pled guilty to the charge of prison escape on October 24, 1989.
On appeal, defendant argues that prosecution [186 MICHAPP 322] was barred because of a violation of the so-called 180-day rule. M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1) provides that the prosecutor must make a good-faith effort to have the defendant brought to trial within 180 days. However, the statute was amended by 1988 P.A. 400, effective March 30, 1989, which added subsection (2). M.C.L. Sec. 780.131(2); M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1)(2) states as follows:
This section does not apply to a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint arising from either of the following:
(a) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility while incarcerated in the correctional facility.
Since the crime of prison escape obviously occurred while defendant was incarcerated, subsection (2) would render the 180-day rule inapplicable to this case. We must decide, however, whether the amended statute should be applied since it did not become effective until after defendant's apprehension.
While not directly on point, we conclude that this Court's recent decision in People v. Russo, 185 Mich.App. 422, 463 N.W.2d 138 (1990), is instructive. In Russo, this Court considered the applicability of an amendment to the statute of limitations which extended the deadline for bringing criminal sexual conduct charges. The amendment was enacted subsequent to the offense, but prior to the expiration of the period of limitation in effect at the time of the offense. The charges were brought after the original period of limitation would have expired, but prior to the expiration of the period of limitation under the amended statute.
This Court held that the amended limitation period applied to any charge which was not yet [186 MICHAPP 323] time-barred at the time of the enactment of the amendment. Russo, supra, at 428-429, 463 N.W.2d 138. Although the present case does...
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People v. Conner
...The amended version of the statute became effective on March 30, 1989. M.C.L. § 780.131; M.S.A. § 28.969(1); People v. Corlew, 186 Mich.App. 320, 323, 463 N.W.2d 243 (1990). Both parties cite and treat as applicable the amended version of the statute in their appellate briefs. Although the ......