People v. Corrales

Decision Date05 April 1962
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Louis CORRALES, Defendant.
CourtNew York Court of General Sessions

Louis Corrales, in pro. per.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., of New York County--Asst. Dist. Attys ., Richard Kuh and Frank Ferony, of counsel, in opposition.

JAMES E. MULCAHY, Judge.

This is a motion for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate a conviction by voluntary plea of guilty to the indictment charging the crimes of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree, assault in the second degree, criminally carrying concealed a loaded pistol and criminally possessing a pistol, after prior conviction. The Court, Capozzoli, J., sentenced the defendant for a term of not less than ten years nor more than fifteen years in State Prison under the robbery count and suspended sentence on the remaining four counts.

The moving papers assert that defendant and another co-defendant, Joseph Lough, the brother-in-law of Louis Corrales, desired to plead guilty to robbery in the third degree, an offer made to them by the District Attorney, but were frustrated in doing so by a co-defendant, Lionel Corrales, a brother of the defendant who insisted on proceeding to trial. The claim is made that as a result of Lionel Corrales' obstinacy, the defendant and Joseph Lough were forced to trial and were penalized by being required to plead guilty to the entire indictment at the end of the People's case. Thereafter, after a witness testified on behalf of Lionel Corrales' case, the District Attorney permitted Lionel Corrales to plead guilty to robbery in the third degree.

The defendant states that this was the original offer that had been made by the District Attorney to all three defendants.

On October 20, 1955, the defendants Louis Corrales and Joseph Lough, being arraigned for sentence, applied for a withdrawal of their earlier pleas of guilty to the entire indictment because of the foregoing facts. The District Attorney consented in permitting Joseph Lough to withdraw his guilty plea and plead guilty to robbery in the second degree. However, the District Attorney opposed defendant's application to withdraw his plea of guilty to the indictment and be permitted to plead guilty to a lesser charge. The Court noted its concern with the different pleas but stated that since the District Attorney opposed the recommendation, the Court could not allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.

The defendant alleges that his complaint is based upon the District Attorney's 'paradoxical action in permitting Lionel Corrales to plead to third degree robbery after he had earlier promised, represented and stipulated' that * * * 'no reduced plea would be forthcoming or extended to any defendant unless all three defendants so pleaded.'

The defendant attacks the manner in which the conviction was secured and implies that such proceedings cast a blemish of fraud.

This, is taken by the defendant, in his interpretation, to mean * * * 'that in the event a plea to a reduced crime was later accepted by Lionel Corrales, deponent would be allowed to withdraw his plea'.

There has been submitted in opposition to this motion the affidavit of the Assistant District Attorney who handled the trial of this matter, in which he denies having given any promise as indicated by the defendant.

The Courts have held that under coram nobis, upon a plea of guilty and sentence having commenced, ther is inherent power 'to reopen its judgment where the same was based upon trickery, deceit, coercion or fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the plea upon which the judgment was based.' Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 26, 47 N.E.2d 425, 429, 146 A.L.R. 1422; or upon a mutual mistake by all the parties concerned. People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641, 163 N.E.2d 869.

The Courts have also permitted withdrawals of pleas of guilty where there was an unfulfilled promise of the Court (People v. Sullivan, 276 App.Div. 1087), or of the District Attorney (People v. Freeman, 7 App.Div.2d 960, 182 N.Y.S.2d 146.)

Therefore, in view of the record of this case, can the Court say that there was a promise, the nature of which comes within the expanding ambit of coram nobis? (See: People v. Hill, 9 App.Div.2d 451, 195 N.Y.S.2d 295, Affirmed No Opinion at 8 N.Y.2d 935, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172, 168 N.E.2d 841.)

Here, the defendant in pleading to the entire indictment might very well have expected a lower sentence than the one imposed, but such surprise standing alone is not such 'manifest injustice' as to require a vacatur of judgment. United States v. Parrino, C.A.N.Y ., 212 F.2d 919, certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 840, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 663. Also see: United States v. Shillitani, D.C.N.Y., 16 F.R .D. 336.

The defendant alleges that his plea was induced by fraud and trickery by the District Attorney; however, the record conclusively refutes such a position. The defendant's own counsel, at the time of sentence (See Minutes of Sentence) acknowledged that the District Attorney had offered to accept...

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