The
defendant was charged on July 19, 2021, with common law
driving while intoxicated, VTL § 1192 (3), failure to
dim headlights, VTL § 375 (3) and refusal to take breath
test, VTL §1194 (1) (b). [1] She was arraigned on
August 18, 2021. Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions
requesting, among other things, a probable cause hearing and
a Huntley hearing. Those hearings were conducted on
April 1, 2022. Webster Police Officer Ethan Parrish, the
arresting officer, was the only witness for the People.
The
officer testified that at about 11:24 P.M. on July 19, 2021
he was traveling northbound on Bay Road in the Town of
Webster. At that time he observed a white SUV traveling
southbound on the said Bay Road. He testified that the driver
"failed to dim her headlights". In essence on
cross-examination the defense counsel inquired as to how the
officer knew the defendant was using her high beams.In
response the officer indicated that the lights "were so
bright they caused me to look away". The officer turned
his vehicle around to follow the vehicle, whereupon he
initiated a traffic stop. He approached the vehicle on the
drivers side. He obtained a photo driver license from the
driver, which permitted the officer to identify the driver as
the defendant herein. While engaging the defendant in
conversation, he was able to observe the odor of an alcoholic
beverage emitting from the vehicle and various indicia of
intoxication displayed by the defendant. During that initial
conversation, the defendant admitted having consumed an
alcoholic beverage prior to operating her vehicle. The
officer requested that the defendant exit her vehicle. The
defendant complied with that request and performed various
standardized field sobriety tests. Upon the completion of
said tests the defendant was arrested for the above offenses.
VTL
§ 375 (3) states in pertinent part as follows:
"Provided that, whenever a vehicle approaching from
ahead is within five hundred feet, ... the headlamps, if of
the multiple beam type, or the auxiliary front facing lamps
if the vehicle is so equipped, shall be operated so that
dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the
approaching vehicle...."
In the
instant case it must first be determined if the defendant
violated the above statute. This court has dealt with this
specific issue before. (See People v. Guinan, 40
Misc.3d 1236[A], 2013 NY Slip Op. 51436[U].) In that case the
court held that the officer did not have probable cause to
stop the defendant's vehicle. [2] The officer in that case
testified that as the defendant passed him from behind
"... he was blinded by the defendant's high
beams". [3] In arriving at the conclusion that the
officer did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle, this
court held that
"The failure to dim headlamps must cause more than a
mere annoyance to the other driver, including a police
officer. There must be an objective and specific adverse
affect on the other driver's ability to proceed. Simply
causing the other driver to squint or momentarily turn away
would not be enough to violate this statute. Nor would a
conclusory statement that the failure to dim high beams
without more, blinded the other driver be sufficient."
[4]
The
officer in Guinan was apparently under the
impression and belief that any failure to dim one's
headlights was a violation of VTL § 3575 (3). That is
simply not the case. For example "The Court of Appeals
has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does
not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v
Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v
Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76
N.Y.2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc.2d 19,
20 [1994])." (People v. Garlock, 29 Misc.2d
1223[A], 2010 NY Slip Op. 51968[U] *5).
Since
this courts's ruling in Guinan, the Court of
Appeals has dealt with the issue of a traffic stop based on a
mistake of law.
"In People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 123, 8
N.Y.S.3d 237, 239, 30 N.E. 3d 880 (2015), the Court of
Appeals partially abrogated the mistake of law doctrine,
holding that as long as 'the officer's mistake about
the law is reasonable, the stop is constitutional.' In so
doing, the Court reasoned that 'the relevant question
before us is not whether the officer acted in good faith, but
whether his belief that a traffic violation had occurred was
objectively reasonable (emphasis added)."
(Gerstenzang, Handling the DWI Case in New York, § 1:15
at 29 [2019-2020 ed]).
The
Court of Appeals in Guthrie stated further in a
footnote that "This distinction is significant in that a
mistake of law that is merely made in 'good faith'
will not validate a traffic stop; rather, unless the mistake
is objectively reasonable, any evidence gained from the
stop-whether based on a mistake of law or a mistake of
fact-must be suppressed." [5]
In
Barr v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,
155 A.D.3d 1159, 1160, 63 N.Y.S.3d 599, 601 [3 Dept 2017] the
Appellate Division found that the testimony of a New York
State Trooper at an administrative refusal hearing
established that there was probable cause to stop the
defendant's vehicle for a violation of VTL § 375
(3). The facts of that case were that
"At the hearing, the trooper testified that he was
traveling westbound along Route 23A in Greene County, when he
observed petitioner's vehicle approximately 500 feet away
in the eastbound lane of travel with his high beams
activated. The trooper testified that petitioner's high
beams caused 'a glare to [his] vision' and affected
his driving insofar as he had to 'adjust [his] eyes.'
In our view, such testimony sufficiently established that he
had probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed a
violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 375[3]." [6]
In
People v. Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722, 724, l 547 N.Y.S.2d
435, 437 [3 Dept 1989] the court held that the trooper's
"... testimony that defendant's headlights were very
bright and dazzling and affected his vision supported a
reasonable suspicion that a violation of Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 375(3)."
In
People v. Rorris, 52 A.D.3d 869, 870, 859 N.Y.S.2d
272, 273 [3 Dept 2008] the court held that the vehicle of the
defendant was properly stopped by the trooper. The facts set
out in the court's decision were as follows:
"Here, a State Trooper testified at the suppression
hearing that on the morning in question, he was on routine
patrol heading east on a particular road. As a westbound
vehicle came within 200 to 300 feet of his marked vehicle, it
appeared that it was operating with its headlights on high
beam. The glare was so strong that the Trooper had to squint
his eyes, hold up his hand to block the glare and pull to
the side of the road (emphasis added).The Trooper
immediately turned around and initiated a traffic stop."
[7]
In
People v. Allen, 89 A.D.3d 742, 743, 932 N.Y.S.2d
142, 143-144 [2 Dept 2022] the court held that
"Here... the proof adduced at the suppression hearing
was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant's use
of his high beams affected the State Trooper's operation
of his vehicle. Although the State Trooper was caused to
squint, the defendant's high beams did not hinder or
hamper the vision of the State Trooper so as to affect
the operation of his vehicle (emphasis added)."
[8]
In
addition, the court stated that
"To establish a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 375(3), the People must show (1) the use of high beams
when an approaching vehicle is within 500 feet, and (2)
interference with the vision of that driver by reason of such
high beams (see People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 395
198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851). We agree with the
defendant's contention that in order to constitute
interference, a defendant's use of high beams must
'hinder or hamper the vision of [the] approaching
motorist' so as to actually have an effect upon the other
driver's operation of his or her vehicle (id. at
395, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851). For example, in
People v. Meola, the Court of Appeals found
sufficient proof of interference where a State Trooper
testified that the defendant's high beams caused the
officer to reduce his speed (id. at 395-396, 198 N.Y.S.2d
276, 165 N.E.2d 851)." [9]
By way
of an additional example, in People v. Yankovich, 29
Misc.3d 133 [A], Slip Op. 50530[U] *1 the court held
" A police officer may lawfully stop a vehicle based
upon probable cause to believe that there has been a Vehicle
and Traffic Law violation (see People v. Robinson,
97 N.Y.2d 341, 348-349 [2001]). The officer testified at a
suppression hearing that, as the result of defendant's
use of her high beams when her vehicle had passed his vehicle
on the road, he 'had to take some evasive action,' he
couldn't see, and 'it caused [him] to go off the
road.' This testimony was sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that there had been a violation of
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3), in that high beams
were used within 500 feet of an approaching vehicle which
usage had interfered with the vision of the driver of the
approaching vehicle (see People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d
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