People v. Coty

• Decision Date: 04 June 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 123972
• Citation: 449 Ill.Dec. 220,2020 IL 123972,178 N.E.3d 1071
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. William COTY, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2020 IL 123972

178 N.E.3d 1071

449 Ill.Dec. 220

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.William COTY, Appellee.

Docket No. 123972

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed June 4, 2020

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Daniel T. Mallon, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this appeal, the State challenges the appellate court's determination that the circuit court's imposition of a discretionary, 50-year sentence for this intellectually disabled defendant amounts to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, violative of Illinois's proportionate penalties clause ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ). The appellate court held that the characteristics of the intellectually disabled, identified in Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), mitigate culpability and should have been, but were not, adequately considered by the circuit court when defendant was resentenced. 2018 IL App (1st) 162383, 425 Ill.Dec. 47, 110 N.E.3d 1105. In a cross-appeal, defendant argues that his sentence also violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution or, in any event, that the sentence is excessive. We reject defendant's contentions and reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, William Coty, who is intellectually disabled, was found guilty of one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, one count of criminal sexual assault, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse for conduct committed against the six-year-old victim, K.W.¹ Because the defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault perpetrated on a nine-year-old victim, pursuant to section 12.14.1(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(b)(2) (West 2004)),² the circuit court had no discretion but to sentence defendant to the statutorily prescribed term of mandatory natural life in prison.

¶ 4 After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2004) ), alleging that his mandatory natural life sentence was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) and the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ). The defendant argued that the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced was facially unconstitutional because it categorically forbade the sentencing judge from considering his intellectual disability³ and the circumstances of his offense. In the alternative, defendant asserted that the statutory scheme, as applied to him, violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ). The circuit court dismissed the defendant's petition, and the defendant appealed.

¶ 5 In a nonprecedential disposition filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (eff. July 1, 2011), the appellate court reversed in part, holding the mandatory sentencing statute unconstitutional as applied.⁴ People v. Coty , 2014 IL App (1st) 12-1799-U. The circuit court's order dismissing the defendant's section 2-1401 petition was vacated, and the cause was remanded for resentencing. The appellate court found that the circuit court had improperly dismissed the defendant's petition, sua sponte , on the basis of timeliness. On the merits, the appellate court held that, while the circuit court was correct that the defendant had failed to properly state a facial challenge to the mandatory sentencing scheme under which he was sentenced to natural life in prison, it erred in finding that the defendant had also failed to state an as-applied challenge to that sentencing scheme on the basis of the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court remanded for resentencing, noting, inter alia , that defendant's "crime comprised * * * a single, brief and limited encounter with the [six-year-old] victim." Id. ¶ 77. In other words, the fact that defendant placed his finger in the vagina of a six-year-old for only a minute was, in some sense, mitigating. The appellate court also opined that defendant had "confessed and expressed remorse for his conduct."⁵ Id. ¶ 6 On remand, given the appellate court's holding that section 12-14.1(b) of the Criminal Code, as applied to the defendant, violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the sentencing judge turned to other applicable sentencing statutes. Specifically, as a Class X offender, the defendant was punishable by a sentencing range between 6 and 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2004). In addition, because the victim was under 18 years of age, the defendant was further eligible for an extended-term sentence of up to 60 years' imprisonment (id. § 5-5-3.2(c)).

¶ 7 On August 10, 2016, the matter came before the circuit court for resentencing. At the outset, the court acknowledged that the cause was remanded for resentencing because of defendant's intellectual disability. The court stated:

"I will indicate, first of all, * * * that I was tendered a large volume of materials both by the State and Defense that included, among other things, the transcript of the original trial, and the sentencing that occurred, including the testimony of a Doctor who testified regarding William's intellectual difficulties or disabilities. I am taking all that into account."

¶ 8 Defense counsel asked the court to "take the expert opinion into account that was given at the motion to suppress statement, a copy of the transcript also." The court responded, "I have reviewed that also." Thereafter, the court noted that it had received a new presentence investigative report (PSI) and asked if there were any corrections or deletions to that. The State and defense both indicated there were none. The parties responded similarly when asked if they were calling witnesses. The court advised the parties: "Obviously I'm familiar with the case. I'm familiar with his background."

¶ 9 For her part, the prosecutor noted, even though the appellate court characterized the sexual assault as "a single brief act of penetration, it was very disturbing and emotionally upsetting both for the victim and especially for the victim's family, her mom in particular." The prosecutor continued:

"This Defendant, there really—the fact that his IQ is in the 55 to 65 range, under prevailing social norms, his culpability was less than a person with normal cognitive capacity according to the Appellate Court. Nevertheless, the Defendant knew what he was doing in that he told the victim he was very careful in how he approached her and told her not to tell anyone and then left immediately when she went up to call for assistance or to tell somebody what had happened. So clearly he was aware what he had done and what he had done was wrong."

¶ 10 On behalf of defendant, defense counsel emphasized the brevity of the encounter and suggested the encounter was not "preplanned or orchestrated. It seemed simply impulsive * * *."⁶ She further observed:

"Given both the nature of the crime and his disabilities, the Appellate Court found that the natural life sentence was so disproportionate as to violate the moral sense of our community, and that is a direct quote. Judge Toomin found and the Appellate Court agreed that my client suffered from, and the specific finding was that my client was mildly mentally retarded."

Counsel noted "[t]here were expert opinions elicited at the motion to suppress statements, and there was a family member who testified at his sentencing" that defendant had been "retarded since he was a baby." Counsel opined "due to some of his intellectual shortcomings, [defendant] is, in fact, less culpable than others might be." She asked the court, "in keeping with the Appellate Court opinion, that you give him a term of years that allows him upon sufficient punishment to resume some sort of life following incarceration."

¶ 11 Prior to pronouncing sentence, the circuit court stated:

"I'm going to consider today the evidence presented at trial, the pre-sentence report, the evidence offered in aggravation, mitigation, the statutory factors in aggravation, mitigation, the financial impact of incarceration, the arguments the attorneys just made here moments [a]go, and the assertions relative to the mother of the victim indicating that she still takes this case seriously, this was a serious case, and this was an offense committed by somebody whom this was not the first. He was previously sentenced to a period of natural life."

With that prologue, the court sentenced defendant, who was then 52 years old, to 50 years in prison. The sentence was to be served at 85%, and defendant was given credit for 3553 days. The term of incarceration was to be followed by a period of three years to life of mandatory supervised release.

¶ 12 Thereafter, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, inter alia , that (1) the sentence was excessive in light of the defendant's background and the nature of the offense, citing the proportionate penalties clause, (2) the circuit court improperly considered in aggravation matters that were implicit in the offense, and (3) the State failed to prove eligibility for an enhanced penalty or extended term. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contended, first, that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a 50-year,...