People v. Coulter, 1-99-0432.

Citation748 N.E.2d 240,321 Ill. App.3d 644,254 Ill.Dec. 794
Decision Date30 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. 1-99-0432.,1-99-0432.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwayne COULTER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Michael J. Pelletier, Debra R. Salinger, of counsel), for Appellant.

State's Attorney of County of Cook, Chicago (Richard A. Devine, Renee Goldfarb, Barbara L. Jones, William D. Carroll, Judy L. DeAngelis, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1987, a jury convicted defendant Dwayne Coulter, an African-American, of first degree murder in the death of Michael Ridges, a white Prospect Heights police officer, and of conspiring with three other men to kill Robert Fischer. Defendant was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. The instant action follows a previous appeal in which this court held that under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), defendant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury that convicted him. However, this court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence because the State offered race-neutral and legitimate explanations for using its peremptory challenges to strike those potential jurors. People v. Coulter, 230 Ill.App.3d 209, 229, 171 Ill.Dec. 643, 594 N.E.2d 1163, 1176 (1992) (Coulter I).

Defendant filed a petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. That court found the State's explanations as to two prospective jurors "implausible" and that the State improperly used its peremptory challenges almost entirely to strike African-American jurors. United States ex rel. Coulter v. Gramley, 945 F.Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D.Ill.1996). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals modified the district court's opinion and remanded to the state trial court for a new Batson hearing. Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 922 (7th Cir.1998).

Following such a hearing, the trial court found that no Batson violation occurred. In this appeal, defendant contends that in the hearing, the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges and that the trial court failed to comply with the Seventh Circuit's instructions in Coulter v. Gilmore, among other alleged errors. Defendant also contends in a supplemental brief that the imposition of a life sentence upon the trial judge's finding of an aggravating factor violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Because we find that the trial court conducted a sufficient review of defendant's Batson claims and we find defendant's other contentions to be without merit, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

The following facts are taken from the record on appeal, our opinion in Coulter I and the subsequent federal court proceedings. Prior to jury selection for defendant's trial, the court ordered that in light of the United States Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Batson, the prosecution and the defense would be required to offer reasons in camera for their peremptory challenges as each challenge was sought. Of the 10 peremptory challenges that the State exercised, 9 were used to excuse African-American venirepersons. The relevant voir dire testimony of those nine individuals is detailed below. Eight whites, one Hispanic and three African-Americans served on defendant's jury. Two African-Americans were alternate jurors.

African-American Venirepersons Excused by the State's Peremptory Challenges

April Rhem was single and worked for two months at a temporary employment agency. Before that, she was an accounting clerk at Kraft Foods for seven months, a sales clerk at Marshall Field's for four months, and an office worker at Roosevelt University for three months. She attended Roosevelt for the previous three years as a finance major. Because it was possible that defendant would invoke an insanity defense, Rhem was asked if any family member had been treated by a psychiatrist, psychologist or mental health worker or if any friends or relatives were employed in that field. Rhem replied no to both questions. The State challenged her, stating that she had four different jobs in the last year. The defense argued that she was a student and should not be excluded for her employment record.

Marcina Adams stated that she was a licensed practical nurse and worked at Westshire Retirement Center. None of her family members had been treated for mental health problems, and she did not have friends or relatives employed in that field. The State contended she should be excused because of the medical testimony involved should an insanity defense be mounted.

Teresa Brantley stated that she was unemployed for the last 10 years, and before that, had worked at the post office for three months and at the Clock Factory for a month. The State successfully challenged her based upon her record of unemployment.

Jeanell Hicks stated that she was single and had worked at Mickey's Linen for three months. She previously worked for Oxford Speakers for six years and at Brown Motors for five years. Hicks stated that her mother's home was burglarized 25 years ago. She said none of her family members or friends had been treated for a mental health condition and no friends or relatives worked in that field. The State initially challenged Hicks because she indicated on her response card that she had been involved in an auto accident with injuries. The trial court asked, "What if she doesn't have a pending lawsuit?" The State responded, "Well, if not, she seemed very timid and was real hesitant in answering your questions, and we think that that's enough to exercise our peremptory challenge on." Subsequent questioning of Hicks revealed that she did not have a pending case.

Melvin Igess stated that he had been unemployed for about a year after working at Able Inventory for seven or eight months. Before that, he worked at a gas station for about a year. Igess had fathered one child with one woman and two children with another woman. The State successfully excused him, stating that he had "three children by two different women" and had been unemployed for about a year.

Melanie Pinkins stated that she had been a salesperson at a retail store for about three years. When asked where she lived, Pinkins said she lived with her mother, who worked at Mercy Hospital as a social worker for older patients. The State moved to excuse Pinkins because a doctor who was affiliated with Mercy Hospital earlier in his career had testified at a fitness hearing that defendant was fit to stand trial. When the defense asked that Pinkins be questioned as to what years her mother worked at Mercy, the court replied that Pinkins was excused.

Anthony Powe stated that his brother had been convicted of armed robbery several years earlier. In a sidebar, the State told the court that Powe previously had been charged with a crime.

Kevin Archibald stated that while attending Southern Louisiana University, school officials contended that he owed money to the school. Archibald stated that the school took him to court in a civil case but that he was never charged with a crime. In a sidebar, the State asserted that he had been charged with theft in Illinois.

Edward Terry stated that he had "some problems" with the death penalty and "wouldn't want to have to make a decision" but thought he "could follow the law." The State challenged him based upon those statements.

Procedural History

Following defendant's conviction and sentencing, a lengthy procedural history ensued that has resulted in the present appeal. After defendant first appealed his conviction in 1990, this court remanded to the trial court for clarification of the record concerning jury selection and for any necessary further proceedings pursuant to People v. Hope, 137 Ill.2d 430, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849 (1990),vacated, Hope v. Illinois, 501 U.S. 1202, 111 S.Ct. 2792, 115 L.Ed.2d 966 (1991). This court retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending completion of that supplemental hearing and argument on the Batson issue, in accordance with People v. Garrett, 139 Ill.2d 189, 194-95, 151 Ill.Dec. 329, 564 N.E.2d 784, 787 (1990). On remand, after hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court stated that defendant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination, and even had defendant done so, the State offered racially neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider in which defense counsel responded to the reasons the State gave for its challenges. That motion was denied.

This court then reviewed those proceedings and found that defendant had set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. Coulter I, 230 Ill.App.3d at 224, 171 Ill.Dec. 643, 594 N.E.2d at 1173. However, the court reviewed the reasons the State offered in the original voir dire in challenging nine of the African-American venirepersons. The court concluded that, based upon the record, defendant had failed to prove that the trial court's determination that no intentional discrimination occurred was clearly erroneous. Coulter I, 230 Ill.App.3d at 229, 171 Ill.Dec. 643, 594 N.E.2d at 1176. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. Coulter I, 230 Ill.App.3d at 230, 171 Ill.Dec. 643, 594 N.E.2d at 1177.

After the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, defendant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court initially denied defendant's petition on procedural grounds. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision and remanded for consideration of the merits of defendant's Batson claim. Coulter v. Gramley, 93 F.3d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1996).

On remand, the...

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