People v. Crabtree

• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 22SC589
• Decision Date: 01 July 2024
• Citation: People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40, 550 P.3d 656 (Colo. 2024)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Charles James CRABTREE, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

550 P.3d 656

2024 CO 40M

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

v.Charles James CRABTREE, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SC589

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 10, 2024

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 1, 2024

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of AppealsCase No. 20CA629 Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Respondent: Mallika L. Magner, Crested Butte, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOURdelivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE SAMOURdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

[1]¶1 Stare decisis may be likened to a traffic sign prohibiting U-turns except in very limited and well-defined circumstances.This judge-made doctrine prevents courts from doing a volte-face on preexisting rules of law unless there are sound reasons to do so—i.e., we must be clearly convinced that (1) the preexisting rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and(2) more good than harm will come from departing from that rule.Not surprisingly, adhering to stare decisis principles, courts are quite reluctant to depart from preexisting rules.Today, however, we make a rare jurisprudential U-turn because we conclude, on the first issue we confront, that there are sound reasons to change course on an aspect of our recent holding in Linnebur v. People,2020 CO 79M, ¶ 2, 476 P.3d 734, 735.But having made that U-turn, we decline to make a second.Instead, as it relates to the second issue before us, we stay the course set by our case law.¹

¶2 In Linnebur,we held that the fact of a defendant’s relevant convictions in a felony DUI trial is an element of the offense that "must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt," not a sentence enhancer that "a judge may find by a preponderance of the evidence."²¶ 2, 476 P.3d at 735.Because the trial court there treated the fact of Linnebur’s relevant convictions as a sentence enhancer, not as an element of felony DUI, the prosecution didn’t have to prove that fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.Id. at ¶¶ 4–5, 476 P.3d at 735–36.And because Linnebur was subsequently sentenced for felony DUI, a crime that differed from the one on which the jury’s guilty verdict was based (misdemeanor DUI), we concluded that his felony DUI conviction and corresponding sentence had to be reversed.³Id. at ¶ 32, 476 P.3d at 741.In so doing, we impliedly, but necessarily, determined that the error that occurred was a structural one requiring automatic reversal.Id. at ¶¶ 32–33, 476 P.3d at 741–42.

¶3 The error that occurred in Linnebur’s trial has reared its ugly head again.But we now make a U-turn and hold that a Linneburerror is not structural and is, instead, a trial error.And because this trial error was not preserved here, we review for plain error.Therefore, the division of the court of appeals below correctly applied the plain error standard of reversal, even if it did so without explanation or justification for deviating from the remedy meted out in Linnebur.SeePeople v. Crabtree,2022 COA 73, ¶¶ 41–52, 519 P.3d 415, 423–25.

¶4 But the division went on to hold that where, as here, a trial court’s decision was clearly correct at the time it was made but becomes plainly erroneous due to an intervening authoritative legal decision by the time of appeal, it suffices that the error is obvious at the time of appellate consideration.Id. at ¶¶ 47–51, 519 P.3d at 424–25.The division anchored its holding to jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court.Id.We, however, have employed a different analytical framework in applying our plain error rule, Crim. P. 52(b), than the one the Supreme Court uses in applying the federal plain error rule, Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).As relevant here, we have repeatedly said that the plainness of an error for purposes of plain error review must be judged at the time the error is made.⁴

[2]¶5The defendant, Charles James Crabtree, nevertheless nudges us to follow in the division’s footsteps and cherry-pick one part of the Supreme Court’s plain error methodology—the time-of-appeal rule adopted in Henderson v. United States,568 U.S. 266, 273, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 185 L.Ed.2d 85(2013), for determining the plainness of an unpreserved error.⁵In Henderson,the Court held that, so long as an error is obvious at the time of appeal, it doesn’t matter whether the law was settled or unsettled at the time of trial.Id. at 273–75, 133 S.Ct. 1121.

¶6 But on this point, we stand steadfastly by our case law and decline to follow Henderson for three reasons: (1) the rationale for embracing the time-of-appeal rule was partially based on a concern that is irrelevant in Colorado state courts(the unfairness of treating defendants in different federal circuits unevenly based on the state of the law in each circuit at the time an error occurs), seeid.;(2) unlike the federal system, Colorado has a postconviction vehicle to address a "significant change in the law" during the pendency of a direct appeal, seeCrim. P. 35(c)(1); and (3)the Supreme Court allayed concerns about the prospect of opening the " ‘plain error’ floodgates" by relying on, among other things, the screening criterion that’s part of the federal plain error standard but absent from Colorado’s plain error standard (Olano’s fourth prong), Henderson,568 U.S. at 276, 133 S.Ct. 1121.As these differences underscore, plucking a single piece of the federal plain error standard while disregarding the rest of the standard is fraught with peril.Because our time-of-trial rule was not originally erroneous and continues to be sound, there is no basis to stray from principles of stare decisis and switch to a time-of-appeal rule.

¶7 What about replacing our plain error standard under Crim. P. 52(b)in its entirety with the Supreme Court’s plain error standard under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)?After all, in the past, we’ve endeavored to construe our state rules in conformity with the federal courts’ interpretations of our rules’ federal counterparts—at least where, as here, the rules in question are substantively similar.Indeed, this is avowedly our general preference.We carefully considered that option here.In the end, however, we heed the wisdom of the aphorism "if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it."Our plain error standard has served us well for many years, and neither the parties in this case nor the wider bar have expressed interest in the federal approach, much less identified deficiencies warranting a complete rebuild of our methodology.Such an overhaul would inevitably be terribly disruptive—unnecessarily so given the postconviction remedy available under Crim. P. 35(c)(1).

¶8 Looking at the unpreserved trial error here, we agree with the parties that it was not obvious at the time it occurred.Therefore, we conclude that it cannot be considered plain and that Crabtree is not entitled to relief under Crim. P. 52(b).Accordingly, we. reverse the division’s judgment and remand this case with instructions to return it to the trial court for reinstatement of Crabtree’s felony DUI conviction and sentence.

I.Facts and Procedural History

¶9 A tow truck driver called the police to report that the driver of a car he was intending to tow seemed to be intoxicated.An officer responded and found Crabtree sitting in the front seat of a running car drinking a beer.Crabtree had bloodshot, watery eyes and Struggled to understand what the officer said to him.As Crabtree exited the car at the officer’s request, he could not maintain his balance.The officer smelled alcohol on Crabtree’s breath, and Crabtree admitted he’d consumed an alcoholic beverage earlier in the day.Two other officers responded later, and they confirmed that Crabtree had bloodshot, watery eyes and that his breath smelled of alcohol.Crabtree refused to perform roadside sobriety tests and declined to take a chemical test to measure the percentage of alcohol in his blood stream.

¶10The People subsequently charged Crabtree with felony DUI—three or more relevant convictions (i.e., convictions "arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes" for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, or "any combination thereof’).See§ 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S.(2023).At trial, the jury was asked to decide whether Crabtree was guilty of DUI.But the jury was not told of Crabtree’s relevant prior convictions and was not asked to determine whether he had incurred those convictions.Instead, in a separate hearing held after the jury found Crabtree guilty of DUI, the trial judge found that the People had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Crabtree had been convicted of the four alcohol-related driving offenses listed in the complaint.The judge’s finding elevated the jury’s guilty verdict from a misdemeanor to a class four felony, Seeid.

¶11 At the time of Crabtree’s trial, there was only one published appellate decision in Colorado addressing whether the fact of a defendant’s relevant convictions in a felony DUI case is an element of the offense that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.SeePeople v. Gwinn,2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 39–56, 428 P.3d 727, 736–39.In Gwinn, a division of the court of appeals answered the question in the negative, concluding that this fact was merely a sentence enhancer that could be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the Evidence.Id. at ¶ 39, 428 P.3d at 736.The decision in Gwinn explains why the trial court proceeded as it did here without any objection from Crabtree.

¶12 Then, ten months after the trial in this case, another division of the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion.SeePeople v. Viburg,2020 COA 8M, ¶ 28, 477 P.3d 746, 751("Viburg I")("[W]e conclude that the fact of a prior conviction is an essential...