People v. Cramer

• Decision Date: 31 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 53336,53336
• Citation: 51 Ill.Dec. 681,85 Ill.2d 92,421 N.E.2d 189
• Parties: , 51 Ill.Dec. 681 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Richard CRAMER, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 189

421 N.E.2d 189

85 Ill.2d 92, 51 Ill.Dec. 681

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Richard CRAMER, Appellee.

No. 53336.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 31, 1981.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1981.

Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Michael M. Mihm, State's Atty., Peoria (John X. Breslin, Deputy Director and Gray F. Gnidovec, Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, and Peter A. Carusona, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

CLARK, Justice:

This case involves the propriety of refusing a jury instruction tendered by defendant on the ground that it was not based on an offense included within the charged offense. The tendered instruction was refused by the trial court, and defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Peoria County of the offense of theft of property having a value in excess of $150. On appeal the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause for a new trial. (81 Ill.App.3d 525, 36 Ill.Dec. 803, 401 N.E.2d 644.) We granted the State leave to appeal and we now reverse.

The facts on which defendant was convicted were fully summarized in the appellate court and can be briefly restated. The indictment charged defendant with violating section 16-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(1)), in that "he did knowingly exert unauthorized control over property of T. R. Bonds, said property being, a Chevrolet truck having a total value in excess of $150, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use and benefit of said property."

The evidence was clearly sufficient to support a theft conviction, for the defendant admitted that he took the truck and drove it, although there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that defendant did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of the use and benefit of the truck. Theft of property with a value in excess of $150 is a Class 3 felony. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 16-1(e)(3).) Defendant tendered a jury instruction based upon section 4-103(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 951/2, par. 4-103(a)) a Class 4 felony (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 951/2, par. 4-108(b)), contending that the statutory provision was an included offense in theft and that the conflict engendered regarding defendant's mental state justified giving this instruction. As previously noted, the trial court refused to give the instruction and the appellate court held this refusal erroneous.

Despite the lack of a rule comparable to Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 31(c)) and the apparent lack of a prior case of this court on the issue, both sides agree that if the tendered instruction here were based on an offense included in theft, defendant was entitled to have the instruction given. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:

"Although the lesser included offense doctrine developed at common law to assist the prosecution in cases where the evidence failed to establish some element of the offense originally charged, it is now beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." (Keeble v. United States (1973), 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844, 847.)

In Beck v. Alabama (1980), 447 U.S. 625, 636 n.12, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388-89 n.12, 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 402 n.12, it was observed that "(a)lthough the states vary in their descriptions of the quantum of proof necessary to give rise to a right to a lesser included offense instruction, they agree that it must be given when supported by the evidence." Cited in support are decisions of 46 jurisdictions, including a decision of our appellate court (People v. Simpson (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 442, 15 Ill.Dec. 463, 373 N.E.2d 809) that so held, extracting the principle from cases like People v. Joyner (1972), 50 Ill.2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756, in which a defendant charged with murder was allowed to have the jury instructed on manslaughter. Accord, People v. Taylor (1967), 36 Ill.2d 483, 224 N.E.2d 266; People v. Latimer (1966), 35 Ill.2d 178, 220 N.E.2d 314.

The circumstances under which an included-offense jury instruction should be given, and the reasons for the rule, were articulated in Keeble v. United States (1973), 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844. There, an Indian charged with the commission, on an Indian reservation, of a crime enumerated in the Major Crimes Act of 1885 (Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, par. 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. secs. 1153, 3242)) was denied a jury instruction on a lesser included offense because that offense was not one of the crimes enumerated in the Act. The government conceded that the instruction tendered was a lesser included offense, but argued that there was no jurisdiction to try the defendant for the included offense, and, furthermore, that the defendant might be better off without a right to the tendered instruction because the jury, if the evidence did not warrant conviction of the crime charged, would acquit him. The court responded "(I)t is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction in this context or any other precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to commit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have convicted him of simple assault if that option had been presented. But the jury was presented with only two options: convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, or acquitting him outright. We cannot say that the availability of a third option convicting the defendant of simple assault could not have resulted in a different verdict. Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions. In view of our interpretation of the Act, those are questions that we need not face." (Emphasis in original.) (412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 844, 850.)

See also Beck v. Alabama (1980), 447 U.S. 625, 633-35, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2387-88, 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 400-01.

In view of the foregoing, we believe that the principle agreed upon by the parties is sound. "Thus, '(i)n a case where some of the elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifie(s) it, * * * (is) entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.' (Citations.)" (Emphasis added.) (Sansone v. United States (1965), 380 U.S. 343, 349, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882, 887-88; see also Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 2-9.) The United States Supreme Curt has never analyzed the included-offense doctrine, when applied to a defendant's request for an included-offense jury instruction, from the perspective of a comparison of the abstract elements of the statutes under which the crime was charged and the statute on which defendant grounded the tendered instruction, the perspective the State urges us to adopt in the instant case. In fact, the court has never even discussed that test as articulated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, or even cited that opinion or its progeny in the context of the issue presented here. Rather, as can be seen from the excerpt of Sansone quoted above, the analysis has focused upon the crime charged in order to determine whether the offense upon which an instruction is sought is included within it. (See also People v. Lewis (1966), 34 Ill.2d 211, 215 N.E.2d 283. Comment, Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses 57 Nw.U.L.Rev. 62, 62-65 (1962).) We intimate no view here upon whether the evidence as adduced at trial could support a defendant's tendered instruction where the terms of the indictment could not.

Nevertheless, the included-offense...