People v. Crane

• Decision Date: 06 October 1970
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket No. 8519,1
• Citation: 27 Mich.App. 201,183 N.W.2d 307
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William CRANE, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 307

183 N.W.2d 307

27 Mich.App. 201

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William CRANE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 8519.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Oct. 6, 1970.

Released for Publication Feb. 15, 1971.

Charles T. Burke, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Angelo A. Pentolino, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LESINSKI, C.J., and HOLBROOK and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. After drinking whiskey for three full days, defendant William Crane went to an after-hours drinking establishment ('blind pig') in order to gamble and drink more liquor. An argument ensued at the gambling table, defendant pulled out a gun, and the complaining witness was shot through the chest. Following a non-jury trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, M.C.L.A. § 750.82 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 28.277). Defendant appeals as of right arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove that he possessed the requisite specific intent to commit the crime.

Plaintiff concedes that the trial court correctly ruled that felonious assault is a specific intent crime. In addition, both parties agree that defendant voluntarily embarked upon the drinking spree which culminated in his arrest. However, defendant argues that the following statement by the trial court was based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation of existing law:

'The court, however, moreover holds that in the absence of being able to make a determination from the testimony as to what defendant's specific intent is, can (sic) garner the intent of the defendant from the fact taht he voluntarily engaged in drinking, knowing he had those propensities, which is why I specifically asked him those questions.'

We agree with defendant.

In People v. Kelley (1970), 21 Mich.App. 612, 625, 176 N.W.2d 435, 441--442, this Court reviewed the law concerning the availability of the intoxication defense in specific intent crimes:

'The judge's charge that the intoxication defense is unavailable if the jury finds that the defendant knew while sober that when he drinks he may commit a crime, any crime, means that a defendant's knowledge of a propensity to commit when drunk, say, the crime of blasphemy, or gambling, or gross indecency, or murder, would eliminate the defense even if the crime actually charged is, say, armed robbery or some other crime of specific intent. That is not the law. Prior knowledge of a propensity to commit some crime cannot be made the basis of a finding by a jury that a defendant while sober entertained the requisite specific intent to commit a particular...