People v. Crawford

• Citation: 106 A.D.3d 832,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03340,964 N.Y.S.2d 636
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Meldon CRAWFORD, appellant.
• Decision Date: 08 May 2013
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

106 A.D.3d 832

964 N.Y.S.2d 636

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03340

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Meldon CRAWFORD, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 8, 2013.

Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Frances A. Gallagher of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Adam M. Koelsch of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), rendered December 4, 2009, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

“The decision as to whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion” ( People v. Jacob, 94 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 942 N.Y.S.2d 627;seeCPL 220.60[3]; People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 483–484, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802). “Generally, a plea of guilty may not be withdrawn absent some evidence of innocence, fraud, or mistake in its inducement” ( People v. Smith, 54 A.D.3d 879, 880, 863 N.Y.S.2d 818;see People v. Jacob, 94 A.D.3d at 1143, 942 N.Y.S.2d 627).

“When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry ‘rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made’ and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances” ( People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782, quoting People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544;see People v. Smith, 54 A.D.3d at 880, 863 N.Y.S.2d 818). “Where, however, the record raises a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea, an evidentiary hearing is required” ( People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d at 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty without conducting a hearing. The defendant's postplea assertions regarding his innocence and the documents cited in support of his motion were insufficient to warrant withdrawal of his plea or a hearing ( see People v. Friedman, 39 N.Y.2d 463, 467, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 883;People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d 1092, 1093, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324;People v. Dazzo, 92 A.D.3d 796, 796, 938 N.Y.S.2d 446). Furthermore, the defendant's claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty is belied by his statements under oath acknowledging that he was voluntarily pleading guilty, and that nobody had made any threats or forced him to enter his plea ( see People v. Dazzo, 92 A.D.3d at 796, 938 N.Y.S.2d 446;People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d at 1093, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324;see also People v. Kosse, 94 A.D.3d 908, 908, 941 N.Y.S.2d 847).

The defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record and, in part, on matter outside the record, and thus constitutes a “ ‘mixed claim[ ]’ ” of ineffective assistance ( People v. Maxwell, 89 A.D.3d 1108, 1109, 933 N.Y.S.2d 386, quoting People v. Evans, 16 N.Y.3d 571, 575 n. 2, 925 N.Y.S.2d 366, 949 N.E.2d 457,cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 325, 181 L.Ed.2d 201). In this case, it is not evident from the matter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( cf. People v. Crump, 53 N.Y.2d 824, 440 N.Y.S.2d 170, 422 N.E.2d 815;People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852, 410 N.Y.S.2d 287, 382 N.E.2d 1149;People v. McClurkin, 96 A.D.3d 784, 785, 945 N.Y.S.2d 718;...