People v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 28 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 104696,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas L. CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Arthur James Rubiner, West Bloomfield, for defendant-appellant.
William A. Forsyth, President, and Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Attorney, Grand Rapids, amicus curiae, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Douglas L. Crawford was convicted following a jury trial of possession with intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine. M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401) (2)(a)(iii). He claims error in the admission of evidence of his prior conviction for delivery of 225 to 650 grams and conspiracy to commit the same offense. Specifically, he contends that the evidence of his prior conviction should have been excluded under MRE 404(b) as improper evidence of his character or propensity to commit the charged offense. We agree that the defendant's prior conviction was improperly admitted in this case and that his conviction, therefore, should be reversed.
On September 22, 1992, Oak Park police officer Rene Gobeyn was patrolling Eight Mile Road. He noticed a man, later identified as the defendant, placing something in the trunk of a car in the parking lot of the Embassy Motel. The motel's reputation apparently caused Officer Gobeyn to suspect that criminal activity might be afoot.
Officer Gobeyn did not immediately confront the defendant, however. Instead, he watched as the car left the motel parking lot and headed west on Eight Mile Road. Gobeyn estimated that the car drove off at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit, and he tried to catch up in his patrol car. Before he could do so, he saw the defendant turn left at a "turn around lane" and head south on an intersecting street. There was a stop sign in the turn around lane, but the defendant did not heed it. Officer Gobeyn decided to stop the defendant for this violation.
On request, the defendant presented his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Gobeyn returned to his patrol car to verify those documents. As Gobeyn sat in his patrol car, he observed the defendant leaning over to the passenger side of his car. All he could see was the top left portion of the defendant's shoulder. Fearing that the defendant might be reaching for a gun, Gobeyn radioed for backup assistance.
When a second officer arrived, the two ordered the defendant to get out of the car with his hands in plain view. A patdown search produced only a beeper. Gobeyn asked the defendant if there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle. The defendant responded, "No, go ahead and look." While the second officer detained the defendant outside, Gobeyn looked around the car's front-seat area, and found a jacket in which he found a plastic baggie that contained several smaller baggies. Gobeyn thought, and this was later confirmed by stipulation at trial, that the large baggie contained cocaine residue. Further, as Gobeyn was leaving the car, he noticed a box beneath the driver's seat. Inside the box he found a digital scale.
Gobeyn arrested the defendant on the basis of the discovery of the suspected cocaine residue in the baggie. Defendant was taken to the Oak Park police station and his car was towed and impounded there. An Oak Park police officer searched the defendant's car early the next morning and found a yellow baggie that contained more than one hundred grams of cocaine hidden in the dashboard adjacent to the glove compartment. A subsequent, more careful search, found another baggie with a smaller amount of cocaine in the same area.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine. Before trial, the prosecutor advised defense counsel by letter of his intent to introduce evidence of a prior drug crime on an MRE 404(b) "other bad acts" theory. 1 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, citing People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982), 2 arguing that it A four-day jury trial was held on May 17-21, 1993. Officer Gobeyn described the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest. The officer who located the cocaine in the dashboard of the car described how he made that discovery.
was irrelevant and that, if found to be relevant, it was unfairly prejudicial. In response, the prosecutor argued that the prior conviction was relevant to show defendant's knowledge of the presence of the cocaine and his intent to deliver it, and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial judge agreed and ruled that the prosecution could introduce evidence of defendant's prior conviction, and announced his intention to read a limiting instruction to cushion the prejudicial effect on the defendant.
Over defense objection, a third officer testified in great detail about the defendant's 1988 crime. 3 He testified that he had waited with a codefendant in that earlier case until the defendant and a codefendant appeared on the scene. He said that the defendant and the third man got out of their car and entered an apartment building. The defendant was carrying a distinctive plastic bag. After a few moments, the officer was invited into the apartment. Cocaine was taken from the bag and handed to the officer. After field testing it, the officer handed $5,000 to the defendant. He then gave a prearranged signal that brought in other officers to arrest all the participants. The defendant was discovered hiding in a bedroom closet.
The defendant did not testify, but his wife did. She said that both she and the defendant were employed. They were engaged but not yet married when the defendant was arrested. The defendant had been living in the Embassy Motel temporarily, after being evicted by a grandparent with whom he had been living. Further, she provided the testimonial basis for the defense theory that the defendant had been unaware of the cocaine hidden in the car's dashboard. She testified that she had never seen the defendant use or sell drugs. He had purchased the old car in which he was arrested just five to ten days before his arrest and had loaned the car to others during that time. She had ridden in the car, but had never noticed anything hanging down from behind the dashboard.
The only other defense witness was an Oak Park police officer who searched the glove compartment and trunk of the defendant's car while it was impounded. He found no incriminating evidence. The trunk contained several garbage bags full of men's clothing. His testimony, therefore, was consistent with the defense theory that the defendant had been residing at the Embassy Motel temporarily.
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged of possessing with intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine. The trial judge imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole on June 17, 1993. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion, holding merely that under People v. Mouat, 194 Mich.App. 482, 487 N.W.2d 494 (1992), "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of prior convictions involving cocaine delivery where defendant's intent to deliver cocaine in the instant case was an issue." 4 The defendant has appealed to this Court. We reverse.
In this case we once again consider the admissibility of other acts evidence under MRE 404(b). The general rule is more easily stated than applied: evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an individual is inadmissible to prove a propensity to commit such acts. MRE 404(b). Such evidence may Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
be admissible, however, for other purposes under MRE 404(b)(1), which provides:
The decision whether such evidence is admissible is within the trial court's discretion and will only be reversed where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995).
The character evidence prohibition is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. Far from being a mere technicality, the rule "reflects and gives meaning to the central precept of our system of criminal justice, the presumption of innocence." United States v. Daniels, 248 U.S. App.D.C. 198, 205, 770 F.2d 1111 (1985). Underlying the rule is the fear that a jury will convict the defendant inferentially on the basis of his bad character rather than because he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Evidence of extrinsic bad acts thus carries the risk of prejudice, for it is antithetical to the precept that "a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury...." People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E. 466 (1930). As the United States Supreme Court recently noted in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), the problem with character evidence generally and prior bad acts evidence in particular is not that it is irrelevant, but, to the contrary, that using bad acts evidence can "weigh too much with the jury and ... so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a...
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