People v. Crayton
| Decision Date | 03 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-87-0885,4-87-0885 |
| Citation | 175 Ill.App.3d 932,530 N.E.2d 651 |
| Parties | , 125 Ill.Dec. 493 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Edward CRAYTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Lawrence J. Essig, Asst. Deputy Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Donald M. Cadagin, State's Atty., Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Denise M. Ambrose, Staff Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant Paul Edward Crayton was charged by information in the circuit court of Sangamon County with first-degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)). The information alleged that the defendant, without lawful justification and with intent to kill, burned Nyanda Johnson by setting her on fire, thereby causing her death. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the charged offense and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to 30 years' incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections and 3 years' mandatory supervised release, with credit for 136 days spent in custody awaiting trial and sentencing. Defendant now appeals arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce: (1) the testimony of a rebuttal witness regarding defendant's prior criminal conduct toward the decedent; (2) evidence and argument that its chief witness was credible because the witness had given authorities prior consistent statements; (3) hospital photographs and autopsy slides of the decedent; and (4) statements made by the decedent inculpating the defendant, as a dying declaration and a spontaneous declaration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The record before us reveals that on July 25, 1987, 25-year-old Nyana Johnson suffered massive burns to her body during a gasoline fire which occurred at the Springfield residence of her 43-year-old boyfriend defendant Paul Edward Crayton. On July 28, 1987, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant charging him with attempt (murder) based on probable cause that he had poured gasoline on Johnson while she was sleeping and then set her on fire. Johnson died 19 days later and on August 21, 1987, defendant was charged by information in the circuit court of Sangamon County with first-degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)). The information alleged that on July 25, 1987, the defendant, without lawful justification and with intent to kill, burned Nyanda Johnson by setting her on fire, thereby causing her death.
A jury trial commenced on October 27, 1987. A hearing was held at the onset of the trial on the defendant's motions in limine to preclude the State from introducing into evidence the decedent's statements, and photos and autopsy slides of the decedent. Following an offer of proof on the decedent's statements, both motions were denied. The defendant also moved to declare prosecution witness Vernon Gragg incompetent and preclude the State from calling him as a witness. The court conducted a competency hearing during which Gragg testified on direct examination to his date of birth, age, and present address and he acknowledged that two years earlier he had been under the care of psychiatrists in Jacksonville and Springfield, Illinois, mental facilities. Gragg further testified that he was blind in his left eye and had bad vision in his right eye. Gragg stated that he could read. Finally, Gragg stated that he did not know what an "oath" was but he understood that when in court he was to tell the truth. The court denied defendant's motion, finding Gragg's alleged defective memory, limited opportunity or capacity of perception, and impaired ability to convey and communicate what he had seen did not necessarily disqualify him as a witness but, instead, were matters of credibility for the jury to decide.
Opening statements were then given. During the State's opening statement the prosecutor referred to several statements Gragg gave to the police shortly after the incident.
The State's first witness was Dennis Aherin. Aherin testified that he lived next door to the defendant and had known him two to three years. According to Aherin, he was at home on the evening of July 25, 1987, and the defendant came to his door and asked him to call the fire department because defendant's house was on fire. Aherin entered his house and placed a call to 911. Aherin then went back outside and the defendant informed Aherin that his "$4,000 stereo" was inside the house and was "burning up." Aherin indicated that he saw Johnson lying on the grass beside his house and asked the defendant if she was burned. The defendant stated: "Yeah." That was the first time the defendant had mentioned to Aherin that Johnson had been injured. Aherin then overheard the defendant inform a fireman that "the woman had poured gasoline in his house and was trying to burn it down, * * *." The defendant also told the fireman that he was standing outside of his house working on his car at the time the fire started. In speaking with the defendant, Aherin noticed that the defendant was unusually calm and that his hair and mustache were singed.
The State's next witness was Springfield police officer Richard Wayne Daley. Daley testified that on July 25, 1987, at approximately 6:40 p.m. he was dispatched to the defendant's residence. After he arrived, Daley spoke with the defendant and was told that the defendant "and Nyana Johnson had been arguing all day." The defendant further indicated to Daley that Johnson had been living with him for approximately one year and the two were arguing "over him having another, girl friend, and [Johnson] had come outside and said if she couldn't have him, nobody would have him, and she picked up [defendant's] gas can and went back inside [defendant's] house. The defendant told Daley that he was outside his house, working on his car at that time. Daley estimated that the defendant was located approximately 10 feet from the front door of his house. The defendant further told Daley that he thought Johnson was "bluffing" but then heard her pouring gas inside the house and lighting a lighter. The defendant did not tell Daley that anyone had been injured in the fire. Daley noticed that the defendant's facial hair and the hair on his head seemed to be "either graying or singed." Further, the defendant appeared "very calm."
The next witness to testify for the State was Steve Melton, a battalion chief with the Springfield Fire Department. Melton testified that on July 25, 1987, his fire brigade was summoned to the defendant's residence. When he arrived he spoke with the defendant and noticed he was "very calm, just as if nothing was going on." In Melton's opinion "he was too calm." The defendant informed Melton that there had been a fire in the back hallway but did not inform him that anyone had been injured. Melton subsequently observed Johnson "being led around the back of the house into the driveway area." Melton testified that "some young fellow, black fellow was with her, had her by the arm," and she was naked and burned. Melton then asked the defendant what was going on, explaining:
The defendant then stated to Melton that he and Johnson were fighting and she "took gas and poured it all over the hall and herself and lit her lighter." The defendant further stated to him that at the time the fire started, he was outside working on his car and he could see Johnson through the window of the front door. The defendant also told Melton that Johnson had been running through the house naked, taunting him, and was naked when she set herself on fire. Melton testified that he inspected the residence and found that the major fire damage was located in the rear hallway, extending partially into the kitchen. He further found a red cigarette lighter located approximately six inches inside the bedroom door off the hallway. He also found a two-gallon red gas can lying along the kitchen wall and adjoining the hallway. Additionally, Melton stood where the defendant claimed to have been when the fire started but was not able to see down the hallway from the front door.
Over defense counsel's objection, the State called Kim Conn, a registered nurse at Memorial Medical Center's Regional Burn Center in Springfield. Conn testified that she was called into work early on the evening of July 25, 1987. When she arrived at work at approximately 8:30 p.m., Johnson was receiving treatment in the Burn Center's "temp room." Conn stated that residents were doing an initial assessment "going through the IV's * * * and tubbing her." Conn indicated that it was routine procedure for the medical personnel to take photographs of the burns as part of the assessment "when the burn victim was burned as badly as [Johnson]." Seventeen color photographs depicting an overall view of Johnson's burns and closer views of particular areas of her body were used in explanation of Conn's testimony and were admitted into evidence. Conn testified that Johnson sustained burns "essentially everywhere" except her feet, perineum, buttocks, and some of her face. The third-degree burns to Johnson's body were evident on her abdomen, back, chest, right upper thigh, left flank, left upper arm, and the back of her left hand. She sustained second-degree burns to her left forearm, left leg, back of her right leg, and a portion of her right palm.
Conn next testified that she began to participate in the treatment of Johnson at approximately 8:30 p.m. and spent the whole evening...
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