People v. Crespi

• Decision Date: 14 December 2006
• Citation: 155 P.3d 570
• Docket Number: 04CA1597
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Debbie L. CRESPI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

155 P.3d 570

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Debbie L. CRESPI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04CA1597.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

December 14, 2006.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 22, 2007.

Certiorari Denied April 9, 2007.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Martinez Law, LLC, Esteban A. Martinez, Northglenn, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge BERNARD.

Defendant, Debbie Crespi, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding her guilty of manufacture of a controlled substance, § 18-18-405(1), (2)(a)(I), (3)(a)(I), C.R.S.2006; possession of a controlled substance, § 18-18-405(1), (2)(a)(I); and possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies, § 18-18-405(1), (2)(a)(I).We affirm.

I.Background

The following facts are undisputed.On January 29, 2003, an anonymous informant contacted police about the alleged operation of a methamphetamine lab at a motorcycle repair shop owned by defendant's ex-boyfriend, Ken Moore.Following extensive surveillance, police obtained a warrant to search the shop.Defendant was present at the shop when police executed the warrant on April 11, 2003.

Police found numerous items consistent with the operation of a methamphetamine lab, including empty cold medicine packages and blister packets, fuel, acetone, empty bottles of HEET (antifreeze), coffee filters, lye, iodine crystals, bottles containing solvents and matchbook striker pads, a heating element, and a coffee grinder containing ground ephedrine.Police also found a three-page letter written to "Ken" from "Debbie," indicating, among other things, a romantic relationship between them.

An officer conducted a pat-down search of defendant and found in her waistband a small tin box containing sixteen Ziploc baggies of methamphetamine.A search of defendant's purse revealed a to-do list including "seven cases of matches" and two receipts: the first, dated April 8, 2003, listed the purchase of four bottles of HEET; the second, dated April 10, 2003, listed the purchase of seven cases of matchbooks.The words "Thank you, Debbie Crespi" were printed on the April 10 receipt.

Defendant was taken to the police station, where she was interviewed by a detective.Defendant told the detective she thought Ken Moore was making methamphetamine, but that she did not participate.She also said Moore gave her lists of things to purchase, and she would pick up those items.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the aforementioned counts.

II.Double Jeopardy

Defendant contends her convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies violate double jeopardy.We disagree.

Under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions, an accused may not be punished twice for the same offense.U.S. Const. amend. V;Colo. Const. art. II, § 18.This protection includes a guarantee the accused will not be subject to multiple punishments in the same criminal prosecution for statutory offenses proscribing the same conduct.Patton v. People,35 P.3d 124(Colo.2001).

Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies, both pursuant to § 18-18-405(1)(a).That section provides, in relevant part: "[I]t is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, possess, or to possess with intent to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute a controlled substance ... or possess one or more chemicals or supplies or equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance."

In People v. Abiodun,111 P.3d 462(Colo.2005), the supreme court held § 18-18-405 defines a single offense and therefore, a defendant may not be convicted twice under that section unless he or she commits a successive offense.In such a situation, "[a]s long as each legally distinct offense has been charged with sufficient specificity to distinguish it from other offenses, and the evidence at trial is sufficient to support convictions of each charge, general verdicts of guilt will be adequate to support multiple convictions."People v. Abiodun, supra,111 P.3d at 471(citations omitted)."Factors like proximity in space and time, intervening events, and volitional departures remain significant in assessing when transactions or occasions are sufficiently distinct...."People v. Abiodun, supra,111 P.3d at 471.

In People v. Flowers,128 P.3d 285(Colo. App.2005), the defendant argued his convictions of both possession and distribution of a controlled substance violated double jeopardy.Applying People v. Abiodun, supra, a division of this court held the defendant's convictions were based upon factually distinct conduct and thus, there was no double jeopardy violation.The division reasoned that although the information did not allege the factual basis for each charge, both the prosecution and the defense argued the possession charge based on the cocaine found in the defendant's car, and argued the distribution charge based on the cocaine his friend sold to a police informant.

In this case, the information did not allege the factual basis for the possession of a controlled substance and possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies charges.However, both the prosecution and the defense argued the possession of a controlled substance charge was based on the quantity of methamphetamine found in defendant's waistband on April 11, 2003.Both argued the possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies charge was based on the todo list including "seven cases of matches" and the two receipts found in defendant's purse: one dated April 8, 2003, listing her purchase of four bottles of HEET; the other dated April 10, 2003, listing her purchase of seven cases of matches.

Thus, we conclude defendant's convictions of possession of a controlled substance and possession of manufacturing chemicals or supplies were based on factually distinct conduct.Hence, we conclude her convictions do not violate double jeopardy.

III.Admission of the Letter

Defendant raises several arguments regarding the admission into evidence of the letter allegedly written by her that was found in the search of Ken Moore's motorcycle repair shop.We reject them in turn.

A.Authentication

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the letter without making a threshold finding of authentication.We disagree.

The requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied if there is evidence sufficient to support a finding the item is what its proponent claims.CRE 901(a);People v. Lesslie,939 P.2d 443(Colo.App.1996).CRE 901(a) is identical to Fed.R.Evid. 901(a).

This requirement may be satisfied by the item's appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances.CRE 901(b)(4);People v. Gilmore,97 P.3d 123(Colo.App.2003).The absence of handwriting analysis is not a bar to a document's admission.United States v. Scurlock,52 F.3d 531, 538(5th Cir.1995).

Whether a proper foundation has been established is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.People v. Huehn,53 P.3d 733(Colo.App.2002).

The authenticity of the letter was addressed in defendant's motion in limine to exclude it.The prosecution presented evidence the letter was found at Ken Moore's place of business, it was written to "Ken" from "Debbie," and it contained numerous details consistent with defendant's situation, including the end of her relationship with Moore, her plans to leave town, and her possession of a Buick.The trial court ruled: "As far as the letter is concerned, I think it [lack of authentication] goes to the weight of the information.You can certainly argue that she never wrote it, they haven't proved any authentication to it whatsoever and move on from there, if you want to."

Defendant argues the trial court improperly left the jury to decide whether the letter was authentic.We do not agree.

Here, the trial court found there was evidence sufficient to support a finding of authenticity.It ruled the evidentiary weight of the letter was for the jury to decide, but permitted defendant to argue she did not write it and the jury should disregard it because there was insufficient proof of its authenticity.The court also rejected defendant's other objections to the letter, finding there was sufficient evidence to support a finding she wrote it.

Although this is an issue of first impression in Colorado, other jurisdictions have held the requirement of showing authenticity is a question of relevancy, dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact, governed by the procedure set forth in Fed.R.Evid. 104(b).United States v. Jones,107 F.3d 1147(6th Cir.1997);United States v. Reilly,33 F.3d 1396(3d Cir.1994);United States v. Carriger,592 F.2d 312(6th Cir.1979);Johnson v. Commonwealth,134 S.W.3d 563(Ky.2004);seeFed.R.Evid. 901 advisory committee note.

CRE 104(b), which is identical to its federal counterpart, states: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."

Thus, under CRE 104(b), the "condition of fact" to be established for the purposes of authenticating a document pursuant to CRE 901(a) is whether the document is what the proponent claims it is.United States v. Reilly, supra;Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra.

In determining the admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence, the trial court does not evaluate and weigh the credibility of the proffered evidence, but examines it to...