People v. Cristel
| Decision Date | 12 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5-15-0463,5-15-0463 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY L. CRISTEL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
Decision filed 08/12/19. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton County.
¶ 1 Held: Where defendant failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim because there was no per se conflict of interest with his appointed attorney; because he could not show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's lack of knowledge that a 10-year-old conviction had been vacated; and because he did not establish that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, we affirm the trial court's order summarily dismissing the pro se postconviction petition.
¶ 2 Defendant appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his first stage postconviction petition. In his underlying criminal case, defendant was convicted of one count of burglary after reaching a negotiated plea with the State. He was sentenced to three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). Defendant's direct appeal was dismissed. Defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition. The trial court summarily dismissed defendant's postconviction petition finding that it was frivolous and patently without merit. For the reasons that follow in this order, we affirm.
¶ 4 The State charged the defendant with two counts of burglary on May 12, 2014. The information alleged that on May 8, 2014, defendant entered a building owned by Nathan Jackson on Parkview Drive in Trenton with the intent to commit a theft in violation of section 19-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 2012)) (count I). The information also alleged that on May 8, 2014, the defendant entered a building owned by Jesse Barton on Parkview Drive in Trenton with the intent to commit the offense of obstructing justice by knowingly concealing physical evidence of a theft in that building in order to prevent his apprehension or to obstruct his prosecution in violation of section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (id. § 31-4(a)(1)) (count II). Both felonies were categorized as Class 2 felonies. The State alleged with both counts that defendant was subject to an extended term sentence pursuant to section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2012).
¶ 5 Defendant made his first court appearance without counsel on May 12, 2014. He requested that an attorney be appointed on his behalf. The trial court stated that it would appoint attorney Stewart Freeman to represent the defendant. The following exchange occurred between the court and the defendant.
¶ 6 At this same initial hearing, the trial court asked the State for the defendant's criminal history. The State replied that the defendant had an extensive criminal history including a prior robbery conviction, which was a Class 2 felony, and which formed thebasis for the State's belief that the defendant was eligible for an extended term sentence in this case. The defendant informed the State and the court that the robbery charge had been "dropped." The court informed the defendant that the record reflected that he was sentenced on a robbery charge.
¶ 7 The defendant's second appearance was on May 28, 2014, at which he informed the court that he could not afford to hire his own attorney. The court reminded the defendant that he was previously advised "that if you could not afford a lawyer, I would appoint the public defender, Mr. Freeman, to represent you." The defendant then asked the court to appoint Stewart Freeman as his attorney. The case was then set for a preliminary hearing on June 3, 2014.
¶ 8 On the date of his preliminary hearing, the defendant opted to plead guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea. In exchange for a three-year sentence in the IDOC, the State's dismissal of count II, and the promise not to pursue any further charges stemming from the offense in count I, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to count I. The trial court asked the defendant if he understood the plea terms and whether he had had enough time to discuss the plea terms with his attorney. The court stated: In response, the defendant responded that he had put "that" behind him. To confirm, the trial court asked him if he was "able to get past that." The defendant answered affirmatively and stated that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation. The court then asked attorney Freeman if he had had an opportunity to go over the policereports with the defendant. Attorney Freeman stated that he had only gotten the discovery within the past hour, but that he had gone over it, and then informed the defendant what it contained. He further stated that the defendant decided to accept the State's offer as he had "been through the system."
¶ 9 The trial court then admonished the defendant about his rights and the processes associated with entering a plea of guilty. The defendant responded that he understood that by pleading guilty he would not have a trial of any kind, and that he still wanted to plead guilty. The trial court then inquired about the police reports since there was not much time for his attorney to review the reports. The defendant indicated his understanding that his attorney had not had much time to investigate the case. Thereafter, the trial court advised the defendant about the charge and the possible sentence, including the fact that a Class 2 felony has a minimum sentence of 3 years and a maximum sentence of 7 years, but that because the State determined that he was extended term eligible that he could be sentenced for as much as 14 years. The defendant stated that he did understand the sentencing range and that he still wanted to plead guilty.
¶ 10 The trial court and the State's representative then had a discussion about the defendant's criminal history to determine if he should be charged as a Class X felon, or if he would be eligible for extended term sentencing. The State noted that the defendant's prior Class 2 felony was in 2002 and that he was "barely eligible" for extended term, stating that "because of the time he spent in custody, I think he would be eligible for extended term."
¶ 11 The trial court sentenced the defendant to the minimum sentence of three years in the IDOC plus two years of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 12 The defendant appealed the conviction on June 25, 2014. On July 25, 2014, the trial court issued a notice that the defendant had failed to first file a motion to withdraw his plea or to modify his sentence before filing the notice of appeal. This court dismissed the defendant's direct appeal on October 29, 2014.
¶ 13 On September 10, 2015, the defendant wrote the circuit clerk a letter about the "old robbery charge." He stated:
¶ 14 The defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition on October 2, 2015. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on October 14, 2015, finding that the defendant waived any claims of conflict of his appointed attorney and any errors due to the attorney's lack of time spent to investigate whether he was eligible for extended term sentencing. The court also found that the defendant's extended-term issue was moot because he was sentenced to the minimum sentence for a Class 2 felony.
¶ 15 The defendant timely appeals from the order dismissing his postconviction petition. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (.
¶ 17 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) provides a three-stage...
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