People v. Crowe, 4-89-0409

• Decision Date: 22 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 4-89-0409,4-89-0409
• Citation: People v. Crowe, 552 N.E.2d 5, 195 Ill.App.3d 212 (Ill. App. 1990)
• Parties: , 141 Ill.Dec. 868 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald J. CROWE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 5

552 N.E.2d 5

195 Ill.App.3d 212, 141 Ill.Dec. 868

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald J. CROWE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-89-0409.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Feb. 22, 1990.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 1990.

Richard L. Broch, State's Atty., Douglas County Courthouse, Tuscola, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, and David E. Mannchen, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Mark T. Petty, Arcola, for defendant-appellee.

Justice LUND delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 26, 1988, defendant Donald Crowe was charged with four traffic violations. On September 12, 1988, an information was filed in the circuit court of Douglas County alleging that, based on the same incident for which he was ticketed, defendant committed the offense of reckless homicide in violation of section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-3). On April 14, 1989, pursuant to defendant's motions, the court dismissed all the cases for violations of the speedy-trial provisions of the Code. The State now appeals.

Defendant Donald Crowe was charged, on August 26, 1988, by uniform traffic complaint citations with four violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-100 et seq.) These were driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, driving in the wrong lane, and failure to wear a seat belt. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 11-501(a), 11-601(a), 11-701, 12-603.1.

On September 6, 1988, defendant, free on bail, appeared with counsel, pleaded not guilty, and filed a written demand for a speedy jury trial pursuant to section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 103-5.) The written demand was captioned only with the DUI case number. The cases were set for an October 31 jury trial.

On September 12, 1988, defendant was charged by information with committing two counts of the felony offense of reckless homicide. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-3.) Count I alleged he caused the death of another by driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and crossing the center line into oncoming traffic while he was under the influence of alcohol. Count II contained the same allegations except for the influence-of-alcohol allegation. Defendant's initial appearance was on September 27. At all times, he was free on bond.

On October 19, a preliminary hearing was held on the felony. The court found probable cause existed as to count I, but not as to count II. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and the matter was set for a jury trial on January 23, 1989. On October 28, the State requested that the traffic and felony cases be consolidated for trial. Without any objection by the defendant, it was so ordered, with trial being set for January 23.

On January 4, 1989, defendant filed a motion in the felony case, seeking to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, to exclude evidence. The motion was based on the State's failure to comply with the court's discovery order. That order, filed October 19, indicated the State was to comply within 21 days. On January 9, the State filed its answer to discovery, listing 14 possible witnesses.

On January 12, the court, upon finding the defendant would not be ready for the January 23 trial date due to the State's failure to comply with the discovery motion, continued the trial to April 24, upon its own motion.

On March 10, defendant filed a motion seeking to dismiss the DUI based upon the violation of a speedy-trial request. The court dismissed this case, but specifically held that this order did not affect the other traffic tickets. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to dismiss the remaining charges, both felony and traffic, based on the State's failure to comply with the speedy-trial demand of September 6, 1989, made in the DUI case. The court, on April 19, entered a written order dismissing all charges. The State appeals the dismissal of the felony.

The trial court, in determining all the charges should be dismissed, found that all the charges constituted a single prosecution, since they arose from the same conduct and the facts serving as a basis of the offenses were either known, or should have been known, to the State when the initial charges were commenced. It also found that the continuance of the trial from January 23 should not be attributed to defendant, since it was needed due to the State's failure to comply with the discovery order. The court concluded that all the charges constituted a single prosecution, and "defendant's written demand for speedy trial by jury filed in cause No. 88-TR-1924, being the first offense charged from the conduct, applied to all charges simultaneously filed or thereafter filed which arose from the same conduct of defendant known to the prosecution at the commencement of the prosecution." In reaching its decision the court relied on People v. Williams (1981), 94 Ill.App.3d 241, 49 Ill.Dec. 820, 418 N.E.2d 840, People v. Rodgers (1982), 106 Ill.App.3d 741, 62 Ill.Dec. 165, 435 N.E.2d 963, and section 3-3 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 3-3).

In Williams, the defendants were charged with rape and deviate sexual assault. On the 120th day following their demand for a speedy trial, the State filed nine new and additional charges against them, which necessitated a three-day continuance. These new charges arose from the same set of circumstances upon which the original charges were based. Defendant sought to have the nine new charges thrown out, as being prosecuted more than 120 days after their speedy-trial demand. The appellate court found the three-day continuance should be attributed to the State and, agreeing with defendants, dismissed the case. In so holding, it stated:

"Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges." Williams, 94 Ill.App.3d at 248-49, 49 Ill.Dec. at 826, 418 N.E.2d at 846.

In Rodgers, the court cited the above language approvingly in dismissing a case. Finally, section 3-3 of the Code provides in relevant part:

"(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.

(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act." Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 3-3(a), (b).

In the present case, the court observed that the decedent died at the scene of the accident. It therefore concluded that these facts were known to the State at the time of the traffic violations, and that all the charges should, therefore, be considered a single prosecution. The court then relied on the language in Williams, and held that the felony charge was susceptible to the same statutory limits as the traffic charges.

While the quoted language in Williams is made without citation, it appears, after review of that case and others, that this proposition is based on application of section 3-3. The paragraph which contained the earlier quoted language also includes citations to two other cases helpful to our analysis. These are People v. Parker (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 302, 16 Ill.Dec. 592, 375 N.E.2d 465, and People v. King (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 2, 288 N.E.2d 672.

In Parker, the defendant was indicted for bribery and official misconduct in March 1974. In October 1975 he was reindicted for these offenses, plus a count of theft which arose out of the same facts. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, in January 1976, of all charges for speedy-trial violations. It concluded this dismissal also applied to the theft charge since, citing King, that charge "arose from the same set of facts as the other charges, and the State knew of these facts at the time the initial indictment was returned." (Parker, 59 Ill.App.3d at 305, 16 Ill.Dec. at 595, 375 N.E.2d at 468.) Parker and Williams were cited in Rodgers for this proposition.

King appears to be the first case to address this comparable fact situation. There, defendant was placed in custody on March 4, 1968, and charged with murder. On October 4, 1968, he was indicted for unlawful use of weapons, which arose out of the same factual setting as the murder. The appellate court concluded the weapons charge should be dismissed. It relied entirely on the compulsory-joinder provisions of section 3-3(b) in arriving at that conclusion.

Thus, it appears the basis of the holdings in these cases is the compulsory-joinder provisions of section 3-3(b). If the newly charged offenses are known to the State at the time of the original prosecution, and they arise from the same set of facts, then they are subject to the speedy-trial limits that apply to the original charge regardless of when the new charges are filed. In the case at bar, it is clear that the charges arise from the same factual setting and, since the victim died at the scene, the State was aware of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution. Thus, normally, the court's decision would appear proper.

However, the case at bar has a slight factual distinction which calls for a different result. In the above-discussed cases, the original prosecution was for a felony charged by information or indictment, as were the subsequent charges. In the present case, the original charges were traffic offenses brought by uniform citation and complaint forms, and the subsequent offense...