People v. Crusoe

• Decision Date: 07 December 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 84017
• Citation: 449 N.W.2d 641,433 Mich. 666
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Monroe Donnis CRUSOE, Defendant-Appellee. 433 Mich. 666, 449 N.W.2d 641, 58 U.S.L.W. 2403
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 641

449 N.W.2d 641

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Monroe Donnis CRUSOE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 84017.

433 Mich. 666, 449 N.W.2d 641, 58 U.S.L.W. 2403

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 7, 1989.

Decided Dec. 7, 1989.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Donald E. Martin, Ingham County Pros. Atty. by Robert B. Ebersole, Chief Appellate Atty. and Susan L. LeDuc, Asst. Pros. Atty., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Fred E. Bell, Asst. Defender, and Jessie Olson, Research Asst., Lansing, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

BOYLE, Justice.

This Court granted leave to appeal in this case, limited to the issue whether the trial court erred in holding the defendant's confession admissible at trial. That issue requires that we determine whether the defendant's request for appointed counsel at arraignment invoked the right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and thus prohibited subsequent police-initiated custodial interrogation on unrelated charges. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in extending the no-access rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), to a charge unrelated to that for which the defendant had invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Once a defendant has been formally charged, the Sixth Amendment guarantees prohibit subsequent police-initiated post-arraignment interrogations on the charges. Michigan v. Jackson, supra. Under the facts in this case, there was no violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights ¹ because the defendant had not been formally charged with the bank robbery at the time of either interrogation.

In regard to defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and People v. Paintman, 412 Mich. 518, 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982), cert. den. 456 U.S. 995, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1292 (1982), prohibit police-initiated interrogation only after a suspect has invoked his right to counsel under Miranda during a custodial interrogation. In addition, the United States Supreme Court's most recent Fifth Amendment confession decision,Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), holds that a suspect's request for counsel during a custodial interrogation on any charge could not be circumvented by police-initiated interrogation on a new charge while the defendant remained in continuous custody.

In this case, the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel under Miranda in the context of a custodial interrogation, and thus, a subsequent police-initiated interrogation in relation to the bank robbery charge was not prohibited. Therefore, the defendant's voluntary and knowledgeable waiver of his rights under Miranda was valid, and his statements were admissible at trial.

Further, while the United States Supreme Court refused to comment on the specific issue in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, whether a defendant invokes his Sixth and Fifth Amendment right to counsel at an arraignment, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that the rationale of Roberson for extending the right to counsel under Miranda to separate investigations while an individual remains in continuous custody supports extending a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel invoked at an arraignment to postarraignment interrogations on unrelated charges.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals that defendant's statement should have been suppressed and reinstate the determination of the trial court.

I

The defendant was charged with and convicted of bank robbery ² after a bench trial in Ingham Circuit Court and was sentenced to serve from ten to twenty years in prison. ³

At the preliminary examination, defense counsel objected to the admission of defendant's statement incriminating himself in the robbery, which he made during an interrogation initiated by FBI agents on May 7, 1985. ⁴ The defendant argued he asserted his right to remain silent when Detective Miller of the Lansing Police Department questioned him on May 6, 1985, about the same robbery. ⁵

The magistrate addressed the issues regarding the effect of later questioning once a person has invoked his right to counsel and to silence ⁶ and conducted a Walker ⁷ hearing inquiring into the voluntariness of the defendant's confession and the events occurring prior to, and during both interrogations, as well as the arraignment on unrelated charges. ⁸

Detective Miller questioned the defendant regarding the bank robbery at approximately 11:30 a.m. on May 6, 1985, while the defendant was in custody on other charges. ⁹ The detective testified he advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and that the defendant signed a waiver, indicating a willingness to talk. He further testified that the defendant never said he did not want to talk or wished to remain silent, and that when the defendant denied any knowledge of the bank robbery the interview ended.

On direct examination, the defendant testified that the questioning stopped because he would not give answers to Detective Miller's questions concerning the robbery. However, on cross-examination he admitted he never said he did not want to answer questions, only that he did not wish to speak anymore after saying that he had not been involved in the bank robbery.

Later that same day, the defendant was arraigned on the charges of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, and was cited for failure to appear for trial on an outstanding bench warrant for an unrelated offense. The judge first questioned the defendant regarding the failure to appear for trial, ¹⁰ and then addressed the new charges. ¹¹ At the arraignment the defendant accepted the court-appointed counsel for the breaking and entering and assault charges.

The next day, after the arraignment, two FBI agents conducted another interrogation regarding the bank robbery. The defendant testified that FBI Agent Askin readvised him of his Miranda rights, and that he talked to the agents voluntarily and of his own free will. ¹² Agent Askin testified that while at first the defendant denied knowledge of the robbery, when she told the defendant that fingerprints had been taken from the bank, he said he would talk, but wanted other people "to go down with him." ¹³ The defendant then dictated a statement to Agent Askin implicating himself in the robbery, which he proofread before signing.

Afterwards, the trial judge agreed to accept briefs addressing the issues whether after arraignment and request for counsel a defendant can be questioned on other charges, ¹⁴ whether the indication by the interrogator that certain proofs were in existence affected the voluntariness of a defendant's subsequent statement, and whether the advice pertaining to Miranda rights given prior to the second interview were sufficient in light of the evidence that in the first interview there was some indication from the defendant that he did not want to answer any further questions.

The judge subsequently denied the motion to suppress the defendant's statement ¹⁵ and concluded the preliminary examination holding that on the basis of all the evidence, including the statement, the crime charged in the complaint had been committed, and there was probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. ¹⁶

Prior to trial, defense counsel brought motions to quash and suppress the defendant's statement. ¹⁷ On September 4, 1985, Judge Bell conducted proceedings on the matter and, in his opinion denying the motion, held in part:

"From a review of the preliminary examination transcript and testimony given on September 4, 198, before This Court it appears the evidence demonstrates the defendant at no time told Detective Miller he did not want to talk with him, that he didn't have anything to say or that he wished to remain silent. The record more clearly indicates the defendant stated he had no knowledge of the bank robbery and wasn't involved in it. The second interview by the FBI some twenty seven hours later, again, contained no evidence of defendant not wanting to talk or wishing to remain silent. Thus, the record does not support defendant's contention that he asserted his right to remain silent.

* * * * * *

"This Court is constrained to find no fifth amendment assertion took place at the first interrogation and therefore subsequent questioning was permissible. Even if it were to be assumed that the initial questioning resulted in defendant's assertion of fifth amendment rights, the scrupulous nature with which Detective Miller terminated the interview, the twenty-seven hours [sic] interval between questioning and the second giving of Miranda warnings, by itself does not render the subsequent incriminating testimony involuntary.

* * * * * *

"[W]here the defendant was charged and arraigned on unrelated charges and apparently was to receive court appointed counsel on these charges, recent caselaw would suggest he could not be interrogated as to these unrelated charges without presence of counsel, unless he initiated the conversation with the police. People v. Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich 39 (1984).

* * * * * *

"The question presented, then, is whether the defendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right to counsel on unrelated matters vitiates his waiver of fifth amendment right to remain silent on this charge. This Court does not believe that it does.

"The facts here suggest that defendants [sic] request for Court appointed counsel, or the Courts [sic] initiation of the request, was made as a routine arraignment manner [sic]. It is nowhere suggested that at the arraignment the defendant was interrogated or that an atmosphere of coercion existed. In fact quite the contrary, the evidence suggests that the sixth amendment right was conferred upon him as it...