People v. Crutchfield
| Decision Date | 11 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 21335,1 |
| Citation | 62 Mich.App. 149,233 N.W.2d 507 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David E. CRUTCHFIELD, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
George Stone, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Appellate Chief, Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before R. B. BURNS, P.J., and KELLY and O'HARA, * JJ.
Defendant was charged with and convicted of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle. M.C.L.A. § 750.413; M.S.A. § 28.645. His appeal is of right.
The defendant and Gary Clemmons were caught in the act of attempting to steal a motor vehicle from the Ford Motor Company parking lot in Dearborn. Clemmons, because of his age, qualified for status under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, M.C.L.A. § 762.11 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.853(11) Et seq. He was assigned to the status of youthful trainee before trial of the instant case. Clemmons agreed to testify against the defendant while the disposition of the charge against Clemmons was pending. Clemmons was in fact the principal witness against defendant at trial. The questions on appeal arise out of the treatment of the accomplice's testimony.
Defendant first claims that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give the jury a special cautionary instruction on the credibility of the accomplice. In general, a trial court is not required to give such instructions Sua sponte. People v. Maybee, 44 Mich.App. 268, 205 N.W.2d 244 (1973). In People v. McCoy, 392 Mich. 231, 240, 220 N.W.2d 456, 460 (1974), the majority stated:
'For cases tried after the publication of this opinion, it will be deemed reversible error * * * to fail upon request to give a cautionary instruction concerning accomplice testimony and, if the issue is closely drawn, it may be reversible error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even in the absence of a request to charge.'
Obviously that makes the mandate prospective from August 2, 1974. The crime charged here took place November 21, 1973 and the jury returned a verdict on January 29, 1974. We observe also that the issue is not closely drawn here.
Ten police witnesses testified, as did the three other occupants of the car and three plant security guards. Under the circumstances we cannot say that the failure to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that 'testimony of accomplices must be carefully scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received with caution', United States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313, 1317 (CA 10, 1971), quoted at People v. McCoy, supra, at 238, 220 N.W.2d at 459, was error.
The defendant and Clemmons were apprehended as a result of concerted police action. Apparently there was cause to believe that systematic thefts had occurred from the parking lot. A Ford security man with binoculars was stationed in a nearby building to watch the parking lot. Surveillance teams of officers in two or more groups had the lot under scrutiny. The defendant and Clemmons were observed from the time they came into the parking lot, went through the process of selecting the car of their choice and then backed up against it. Defendant was seen getting out of his car to get the snatch bar from the trunk, Clemmons took the bar and with it pulled out the ignition, started the vehicle with a screwdriver and was apprehended by command of the police officer just as he started to drive away. Defendant driving his own car attempted to flee and stopped after a 12-gauge shotgun was fired at the rear tire.
Clemmons' status as he was undergoing cross-examination was such that his petition under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act had been granted and the trial judge had the option to have him placed on probation or to have him committed to the Department of Corrections for custodial supervision and training. M.C.L.A. § 762.13; M.S.A. § 28.853(13).
Defense counsel sought to impeach Clemmons' credibility by revealing the Holmes Act proceedings. The trial judge ruled that the petition by Clemmons did not constitute a conviction and refused to permit such cross-examination, holding that reference could be made only to arrests resulting in conviction. Defendant now claims that he was prevented from showing the bias and interest of the witness.
The trial judge was correct in concluding that the petition of Clemmons was not a conviction. M.C.L.A. § 762.14; M.S.A. § 28.853(14) specifically provides 'An assignment of a youth to the status of youthful trainee, as provided in this chapter, shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime * * *'. The court in People v. Falkner, 389 Mich. 682, 695, 209 N.W.2d 193, 199 (1973), said:
'We hold that in the examination or cross-examination of any witness, no inquiry may be made regarding prior arrests or charges against such witness which did not result in conviction; neither may such witness be examined with reference to higher original charges which have not resulted in conviction, whether by plea or trial.'
The Falkner rule very clearly limits cross-examination to convictions. In the context that trial counsel urged that he be allowed to pursue this line of questioning the court's adverse ruling was correct. Defense counsel argued:
'Your Honor, this procedure and posture was set up right before this trial started and I feel it's unfair.'
'He is not (subject to the Holmes Act) right now.'
'Maybe he has been arrested and convicted of something else.'
Obviously it was defense counsel's belief that he should have been allowed to attack Clemmons' credibility and impeach his character by revealing, before the jury, the serious charge against him, in accordance with the pre-Falkner state of the law in this respect. Before Falkner such impeachment was allowable, not after.
We have a much narrower question here. The question here is: When one who was originally a co-defendant but who has received favorable treatment in any way, E.g., by petition under a juvenile statute or youthful trainee act, by pleading to a lesser offense, or by any similar type of arrangement, whether consummated or pending, should that information be allowed before the jury to show interest, bias or prejudice? We think the answer to that question should be in the affirmative. However it was never perceived in this context at trial and we...
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...Mich.App. 592, 611, 329 N.W.2d 435 (1982); People v. Johnston, 76 Mich.App. 332, 336, 256 N.W.2d 782 (1977); People v. Crutchfield, 62 Mich.App. 149, 155-156, 233 N.W.2d 507 (1975); cf. People v. Monasterski, 105 Mich.App. 645, 307 N.W.2d 394 (1981). In particular, a claim that the denial o......
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