People v. Cruz

• Decision Date: 16 June 1960
• Citation: 202 N.Y.S.2d 556
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Estanislao CRUZ, Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of General Sessions

Page 556

202 N.Y.S.2d 556

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Estanislao CRUZ, Defendant.

Court of General Sessions, New York County.

June 16, 1960.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., New York City (by Charles J. McDonough, New York City, of counsel), for the People.

Estanislao Cruz, in pro. per.

THOMAS DICKENS, Judge.

Defendant presents this coram nobis motion for relief, as he states, 'primarily for the reason that the Court; District Attorney's Office; and Counsel, via directive questioning, fraud and misrepresentation, coerced Defendant-Petitioner into pleading guilty to the crime of Murder in the Second Degree * * *'. See Defendant's Petition, page 2.

This statement is conclusory, and so are the similar statements wherever else defendant talks about coercion and misrepresentation in his petition. Unless fortified by supporting proof, allegations in such bare form carry no weight in law as sustaining props, and hence, are insufficient for judicial acceptance. People v. White, 309 N.Y. 636, 132 N.E.2d 880, certiorari denied 77 S.Ct. 69, 352 U.S. 849, 1 L.Ed.2d 60; People v. Palazzola, 18 misc.2d 619, 621, bottom, 189 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 bottom, affirmed 10 A.D.2d 844, 200 N.Y.S.2d 358; People v. Wurzler, 280 App.Div. 1020, 116 N.Y.S.2d 756.

Supporting proof, however, is entirely missing. The minutes of March 18, 1955, and those of June 1, 1955, attest to this drawback. Nowhere in these minutes does anything appear in fact to indicate that either the judge or the district attorney did or said anything in conflict with the prohibitive rule that official coercion by means of fraud or other illegal means used to induce a plea of guilty, will cause the plea to become invalidated when attacked successfully for such illegality. See People v. Brim, Gen.Sess. 199 N.Y.S.2d 744.

Actually, defendant exculpates the judge and the district attorney from any involvement in the charge--the former by the statement that 'nor could the Court have known that Defendant-Petitioner had been coerced and misrepresented into pleading guilty * * *' (Petition p. 9); and the latter by the statement, in substance, that it was his counsel who proceeded to coerce him into succumbing to a guilty plea after counsel recounted to him what the district attorney had said. See Petition, page 3. Representations by counsel, whether true or not, do not, however, come within the classification of official deception or trickery so as to have the effect of nullifying a judgment of conviction. See People v. Brim, supra.

Nonpossession of the capacity 'to understand English to the extent of comprehending the meaning of the degree of guilt' (Petition, page 2) was a contributing cause to the effectiveness of the coercion, urges defendant. Being a matter that appears on the face of the record, this profession of ignorance must be held to be a subject that is unavailable for coram nobis relief. See People v. Brim, supra; People v. Green, Gen.Sess., 201 N.Y.S.2d 206. Nonetheless, even if it were available, defendant could, in the light of the record, have no meritorious justification for complaint. The minutes of March...