People v. Cruz

Decision Date22 July 1985
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Maggie CRUZ, Defendant.
CourtNew York City Court

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty., Bronx County (Susan Lee Strauss, of counsel) for People.

Plunkett, Nolas & Donnard, New York City (Billy H. Nolas, New York City, of counsel) for defendant.

BERTRAM KATZ, Judge:

This case presents a number of issues of novel impression regarding the constitutionality of a new act of the legislature intended to reduce the number of jury trials in the Criminal Court.

The defendant, Maggie Cruz, has moved for an order of this Court granting her a trial by jury, a right guaranteed, subject to complex limitations, by the Federal and State Constitutions. U.S. Constitution, 6th Amendment; Article III, Sec. 2; N.Y. Constitution, Article I, Sec. 2.

She is charged with four "A" level misdemeanors, Petit Larceny (P.L. Sec. 155.25), Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree (P.L. Sec. 140.15), Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree (P.L. Sec. 145.00) and Possession of Burglar's Tools (P.L. Sec. 140.35), all of which are triable before a judge without a jury pursuant to the recently enacted amendment to P.L. Sec. 70.15 and C.P.L. 340.40, Laws 1984 ch. 673, eff 11/1/84. The maximum sentence for each charge is six months incarceration and a $1,000 fine. The defendant has urged the Court to find the new amendment, hereinafter referred to as the "Reclassification Law," unconstitutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions. 1

The Reclassification Law

The new law 2 creates two separate classes of "A" misdemeanors. The first category of twenty-seven specifically designated misdemeanors, for which the maximum authorized penalty remains one year, must be tried before a jury. All other class "A" misdemeanors in the Penal Law, which include the four charges lodged against this defendant, are subject to a maximum penalty of six months for first offenders. Consequently, there is no right to a trial by jury for the latter group of crimes.

The intent of the new bill is set out in the Governor's Memorandum of Approval:

"This bill is an attempt to deal with the severe backlog of misdemeanor cases in the local criminal courts of the State's large cities, particularly New York City. It has been estimated that less than one half of one percent of misdemeanor cases filed in New York City are brought to trial. The resulting backlog seriously distorts the process of reaching just resolutions in cases that are not brought to trial because, as practical matter, they cannot be.

"This bill addresses this problem by providing that sentences for the Class A misdemeanors which constitute the great bulk of misdemeanor cases in the state are changed so that the maximum penalty is six months in jail. Under this bill, defendants charged with such crimes need not receive a jury trial in New York City, and several of the State's other largest cities. This change will permit many more trials to take place since they will be before a judge, not a jury. And, although the bill reduces the authorized sentence for many Class A misdemeanors, few defendants without a prior criminal record who are convicted of a Class A misdemeanor currently receive sentences in excess of six months anywhere in the State. Consequently, with respect to those defendants, the provisions of this bill do not represent a practical change."

Unconstitutionality

There are four parts to the defendant's argument in support of the bill's unconstitutionality:

1. Some of the misdemeanor charges faced by the defendant, notwithstanding the reduced sanctions, are inherently serious malem in se crimes that were indictable at common law, and as such, must be tried by a jury.

2. The possibility of a $1,000 fine takes these charges out of the category of "petty crimes" for which the state may dispense with jury trials 3. The new law irrationally discriminates between first offenders and recidivists, reducing the sentence for the former to six months, but granting the latter a trial by jury after a determination that the latter is a "second crime offender." CPL 400.14. "Second crime offenders" are subject to a maximum sentence of one year. P.L. Sec. 70.15(1)(d). It is argued that the right to a trial by jury should be based not upon the character of the offender, but upon the nature of the offense.

4. Finally, the possibility of social stigma and other collateral consequences that result from conviction mandate a trial by jury for these four "serious" misdemeanor charges.

The Presumption of Constitutionality

As with all legislative enactments, an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to the Reclassification Law. People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484, 253 N.E.2d 202 (1969). While this presumption can be rebutted, it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 209 N.E.2d 539 (1965).

The role of the nisi prius Court in this context is a limited one, since such Courts may not set aside a statute as unconstitutional except as a last resort. Bohling v. Corsi, 204 Misc. 778, 127 N.Y.S.2d 591 aff'd 306 N.Y. 815, 118 N.E.2d 823; Matter of Spielvogel v. Ford, 1 N.Y.2d 558, 154 N.Y.S.2d 889, 136 N.E.2d 856 (1956), app. dism. 352 U.S. 957, 77 S.Ct. 362, 1 L.Ed.2d 316.

It must also be presumed by the Court that the State Legislature has investigated and found the existence of a situation justifying the need for or desirability of the enactment. If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justifies the law, the Court's power of inquiry ends. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938).

The Right to Trial by Jury

The right to a trial by jury is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppressive acts by the Government, such as arbitrary law enforcement. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The jury interposes between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge, but who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government that has proceeded against him. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970).

However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the right does not attach to "petty offenses" since, at common law, such offenses were tried summarily without a jury. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624, 57 S.Ct. 660, 661, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1307, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888).

In distinguishing petty offenses from serious offenses, the Court has held that the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not, and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra. Therefore, while it was held in the case of Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966) that a sentence of six months incarceration for criminal contempt implicates a petty offense, triable without a jury, it is constitutionally mandated that a trial by jury be afforded to any defendant faced with a charge for which imprisonment in excess of six months is authorized. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886 supra. This "objective criteria", the penalty authorized for the offense, is the best gauge of the locality's social and ethical judgment on the seriousness of the offense. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628, 57 S.Ct. 660, 663 supra.

The Gravity of the Offense

However, in spite of the Cheff ruling and its progeny, it has often been held, particularly by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that offenses carrying a maximum penalty of six months are not automatically petty. See e.g. United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461 (CA9 1976). "Although the maximum statutory penalty is the 'most relevant' objective criterion in the Sixth Amendment equation ... it is not the sole criterion." United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 503 (CA6 1978). According to this analysis, one must also look to the "inherent gravity" of the crime, whether it is malem in se or merely malem prohibitum, and whether it was indictable at common law. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (CA9 1981).

In the case at bar, the defendant alleges that petit larceny and criminal trespass are both "serious" malem in se crimes, indictable at common law, and consequently all charges must be tried before a jury.

However, there are a number of difficulties with applying this Colts-Craner analysis to a New York case of this type. First, the consideration of whether a crime was indictable at common law is a meaningless one, since, as the Craner Court conceded, even the pettiest of crimes were indictable at common law. United States v. Craner, supra at 26 n. 3. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Colts and Clawans, which provide the ostensible authority for the more recent Ninth Circuit rulings, are of early vintage, and, if not explicitly overruled, have lost much of their precedential force. 3 In deciding Duncan and Baldwin, the Supreme Court used a "bright line" six month standard, and downgraded the importance of malem in se considerations or common law indictments.

Third, the Court of Appeals, in Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, infra, promulgated a New York rule that the Legislature's establishment of sentence length must be considered the determinative gauge of the inherent "gravity" of an offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. For a judge to make an independent subjective evaluation of the seriousness of the crime would be an "improper usurpation of the legislative function."...

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