People v. Cruz
| Citation | 13 Cal.4th 764,55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117,919 P.2d 731 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S046075,S046075 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
| Parties | , 919 P.2d 731, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5843, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9471 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kermit Vargas CRUZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Roger A. Stoll, Kentfield, and J. Bradley O'Connell, San Francisco, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Ronald E. Niver and Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The question before us is whether proof that the defendant suffered a 1992 conviction for first degree burglary adequately proved the truth of a serious felony enhancement allegation as defined by Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18) (section 1192.7(c)(18)). 1 Section 1192.7(c)(18) defines serious felonies for the purpose of sentence enhancement as including "burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building...." The quoted language duplicated the definition of first degree burglary in effect at the time section 1192.7(c)(18) last was amended in 1986. (Stats.1986, ch. 489, § 1, p. 1809 [section 1192.7(c)(18) ]; Stats.1982, ch. 1297, § 1, p. 4787 [section 460--differing only in its use of the word "the" before "inhabited portion"].) In 1989, however, the Legislature added the phrase "burglary of ... [a] vessel ... which is inhabited and designed for habitation" to the definition of first degree burglary in section 460. (Stats.1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476, eff. Jan. 1, 1990.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that proof of a first degree burglary conviction under section 460, based upon a burglary committed after the effective date of the 1989 amendment, does not prove adequately that a defendant has previously committed a serious felony for the purpose of sentence enhancement under section 1192.7(c)(18), because of the divergence between the two sections that began with the 1989 amendment. We disagree. As we shall explain, the phrase "inhabited dwelling house" is a broad, inclusive term that includes an inhabited vessel. The circumstance that the Legislature amended the statutory definition of first degree burglary in section 460, to include explicitly burglary of an inhabited vessel, does not require us to interpret the broad, inclusive term "inhabited dwelling house" in a narrow fashion when the term appears in section 1192.7(c)(18). We conclude that proof that the defendant was convicted of a 1991 first degree burglary, a crime that may include burglary of an inhabited vessel, adequately proves the truth of a serious felony enhancement based upon a previous conviction for "burglary of an inhabited dwelling."
In 1993, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b) [now subd. (c) ] ), and one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegations that defendant used a firearm in committing the robberies. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, a second jury found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction in 1992 for a first degree burglary that occurred in 1991. (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1192.7(c)(18).) In a separate proceeding, another jury convicted defendant of one count of escape (involving custody for a felony; § 4532, subd. (b)), an escape that occurred after defendant was arraigned on the robbery charges. In yet another separate proceeding, the court revoked defendant's probation for the 1992 first degree burglary conviction (§§ 459, 460). He was sentenced on all matters simultaneously, receiving a total term of twelve years and eight months in state prison, which included a five-year enhancement for the 1992 first degree burglary conviction.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal granted his motion for consolidation of the separate proceedings below. Defendant claimed on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1192.7(c)(18), and that the trial court had failed to instruct the jury fully on the elements of this enhancement. He argued the prior conviction could have been for burglary of a vessel under section 460, a crime he claims would not be a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(18). He also claimed there was instructional error at trial.
The Court of Appeal agreed that proof of the 1992 first degree burglary conviction provided insufficient evidence that the prior conviction involved a burglary as defined by section 1192.7(c)(18). The court vacated the five-year enhancement imposed under section 667, subdivision (a), and remanded the matter for resentencing, without reaching defendant's claim of instructional error. 2
The People petitioned for review, claiming substantial evidence supported the jury's finding on the sentence enhancement allegation under a proper reading of the relevant statutes.
Section 667 provides for a sentence enhancement for defendants who previously have been convicted of a serious felony. Section 667, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that "any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately." Subdivision (a)(4) of section 667 provides that: "As used in this subdivision, 'serious felony' means a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7."
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c), provides in pertinent part: "As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the following: [p] ... (18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building."
The crime of burglary is divided into degrees. For some years, section 460 provided in pertinent part that: "Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building committed in the nighttime ...." is burglary of the first degree, and that "[a]ll other kinds of burglary are of the second degree." (Stats.1978, ch. 579, § 23, p. 1985.) Indeed, since 1923 our law has provided, with other qualifications including that the crime be committed in the nighttime, that burglary of an "inhabited dwelling house" is a first degree burglary. (Stats.1923, ch. 362, § 1, p. 747.) In 1982, the Legislature removed the qualification that first degree burglary must occur in the nighttime. (Stats.1982, ch. 1290, § 1, p. 4774; Stats.1982, ch. 1297, § 1, p. 4786.) Of particular import to this case, in 1989 the Legislature again amended the section, effective January 1, 1990. As amended, the section added a reference to inhabited vessels. Thus, at the time defendant committed the 1991 offense of burglary, section 460 provided in pertinent part: (Stats.1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476, italics added.) 3
The Court of Appeal properly noted that enhancement allegations must be pleaded and proved. (People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 312, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77; People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 208, 249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013.) A judgment of conviction establishes the necessarily adjudicated elements of the crime involved in the conviction, for the purpose of enhancement allegations. The trier of fact, however, may look beyond the judgment to the entire record of the prior conviction to determine whether the previous offense involved conduct required to establish the truth of the enhancement allegation. (People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 354, 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.)
Applying these rules, the Court of Appeal held that proof of defendant's conviction for a 1991 violation of section 460 did not adequately prove a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(18). The Court of Appeal observed that in 1991, when defendant committed first degree burglary, section 460 defined the crime as specifically including burglary of an inhabited vessel. 4 The Court of Appeal pointed out that the applicable definition of burglary as a serious felony under section 1192.7(c)(18) did not state specifically that it included burglary of an inhabited vessel. The statutory definition of first degree burglary under section 460, the court reasoned, is broader than the definition of the serious felony of burglary under section 1192.7(c)(18). Accordingly, proof that defendant has suffered a prior first degree burglary conviction may prove the commission of a crime that is not included in the narrower definition of burglary contained in section 1192.7(c)(18). As such, proof of the burglary conviction does not necessarily demonstrate that defendant committed the offense referred to in section 1192.7(c)(18).
The Court of Appeal also considered the record to determine whether there was other proof that defendant had committed an offense as defined by section 1192.7(c)(18). It noted that at the trial on the prior felony conviction allegation, the prosecutor offered the clerk's...
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