People v. Cuevas

• Decision Date: 10 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. S147510.,S147510.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Saul Garcia CUEVAS, Defendant and Appellant.

187 P.3d 30

79 Cal.Rptr.3d 303

44 Cal.4th 374

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Saul Garcia CUEVAS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S147510.

Supreme Court of California.

July 10, 2008.

Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Oakland, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanka, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Lawrence M. Daniels, Kristofer Jorstad, Lance E. Winters and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

Negotiated plea agreements may include a sentence "lid," which constrains the maximum sentence a trial court may impose but is less than the maximum exposure the defendant would otherwise face absent the agreed-upon lid. In People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290 (Shelton), we held that when a plea agreement specifies a sentence lid, "a challenge to the trial court's authority to impose the lid sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a certificate of probable cause." Absent such certificate, a defendant may not later complain that the imposed sentence lid violated Penal Code¹ section 654's proscription against multiple punishment, which in substance is a challenge to the plea's validity. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 769, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290.)

In this case, the defendant and the prosecution negotiated a plea by which certain charges would be dismissed or reduced, and the defendant agreed that the maximum possible sentence for the remaining charges would be 37 years eight months. After the trial court sentenced him to a term within that maximum, the defendant attempted to raise a section 654 challenge to the sentence in the Court of Appeal. Arguably, the negotiated sentence here was not technically a sentence lid. In Shelton, we described a sentence lid as ordinarily less than the maximum possible sentence the trial court may lawfully impose for the offenses admitted by the defendant's guilty or no contest plea. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 767, 768, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290.) "If the maximum sentence authorized by law were at or below the specified sentence lid, the lid provision would be superfluous and of no benefit to the defendant." (Id. at p. 768, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290.)

Instead, the stated sentence here was what the parties agreed was the maximum for the charges to which the defendant pleaded no contest. It was, however, significantly less than the sentence he faced under the original charges, which included two life sentences. The issue here is whether Shelton governs this case despite this factual difference. We conclude that Shelton and related cases apply here, and compel the conclusion that a certificate of probable cause is required.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached a contrary conclusion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Saul Garcia Cuevas was charged with 27 counts of robbery, one count of grand theft, one count of attempted robbery, and two counts of kidnapping for robbery. (§§ 211, 487, subd. (c), 664, 209, subd. (b)(1).) The information also alleged that he used a firearm in the commission of each of these 31 offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)

Between December 2001 and March 2002, defendant, armed with a BB gun, entered approximately 18 businesses and demanded money and/or personal property from the employees. As relevant here, on eight occasions, defendant took or attempted to take both personal property from the employees and money from the store's safe or cash register. He was charged with two counts of robbery (or in one instance, robbery and attempted robbery) for each of these incidents, one count for taking money from the employee out of the cash register and the other for taking personal property from the same employee.

In exchange for defendant's plea of no contest, the prosecution agreed to reduce the two aggravated kidnapping counts (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) to simple kidnapping (§ 207), and to drop the 31 charged allegations under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and instead add one section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) allegation. Based on the terms of the plea agreement (as discussed in greater detail below), defendant agreed to a maximum possible sentence of 37 years eight months. After the prosecution advised him of the consequences of his plea, defendant pled no contest to 27 counts of second degree robbery, two counts of simple kidnapping, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of grand theft. He admitted one allegation that he used a weapon during commission of these offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).

The trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years eight months, calculated as follows: the upper term of eight years on one kidnapping count; 27 consecutive one-year terms for each robbery count; and a consecutive term of eight months for grand theft. The court imposed concurrent terms for the attempted robbery count and second kidnapping count, and struck any remaining allegations under section 1385. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause, seeking reversal of his convictions on grounds that his defense attorney was ineffective in developing a defense to the charges and in providing advice about the consequences of his plea. The trial court denied the certificate.

After examining the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071, the Court of Appeal requested supplemental briefing on the effect of both Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (Blakely), and section 654 on defendant's sentence. While agreeing with the Attorney General that defendant's "failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause precludes this court from addressing the validity of his plea to these counts" (see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 (Panizzon)), the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant was not procedurally barred from challenging the duplicative robbery and attempted robbery counts under section 654. It did not reach defendant's Blakely claim. We granted and held this case for Shelton, which had not yet been decided, and later transferred the case back for reconsideration after our decision in Shelton had become final.

On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal identified the issue as "whether the rule articulated in Shelton applies when the plea agreement does not specify a lid, but the court, in taking the plea, advises the defendant of the maximum sentence available for the charges and proceeds to impose a sentence within that theoretical maximum." In such a case, the Court of Appeal held, the defendant and the prosecution have not agreed to any specified maximum sentence, and any challenge to the sentence does not affect the validity of the plea, which would otherwise require a certificate of probable cause under Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th 759, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290.

Addressing the merits of defendant's claims, the Court of Appeal held that he was improperly sentenced for 15 counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery, because on these counts defendant "was sentenced twice for robbing a single store employee victim of personal property and the store's money during the course of a single robbery. Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act or indivisible course of conduct." The Court of Appeal remanded the case for resentencing directing the trial court to stay the sentences on the eight duplicative counts. Pursuant to People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 534, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant's claims that the imposition of the upper term and consecutive sentences violated Blakely.

We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.²

DISCUSSION

A defendant may not appeal "from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere," unless he has obtained a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5, subd. (b); see People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, 69 P.3d 420 (Buttram) [§ 1237.5's purpose is "to weed out frivolous and vexatious appeals from pleas of guilty or no contest, before clerical and judicial resources are wasted"].) Exempt from this certificate requirement are postplea claims, including sentencing issues that do not challenge the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B); Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 766, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290; Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 776, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, 69 P.3d 420; Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 74-75, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061.) For example, "when the claim on appeal is merely that the trial court abused the discretion the parties intended it to exercise, there is, in substance, no attack on a sentence that was `part of [the] plea bargain.' [Citation.] Instead, the appellate challenge is one contemplated, and reserved, by the agreement itself." (Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 786, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, 69 P.3d 420.)

In Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th 759, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290, we addressed the related issue whether a defendant may challenge the trial court's authority to impose a sentence lid on the ground that the sentence violated the multiple punishment prohibition of section 654.³ In exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a sentence lid of three years eight months, defendant Shelton pled no contest to one count of stalking in violation of a protective order and one count of making a criminal threat. The trial court explained the plea agreement's sentencing provision as follows: "`And the lid is three years eight months. Which means that the agreement is that I cannot sentence you to more than three years and eight months and you...