People v. Culhane

• Decision Date: 14 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 61415,61415
• Citation: 340 N.E.2d 63,34 Ill. App. 3d 158
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Daniel CULHANE, Sr., Petitioner-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 63

340 N.E.2d 63

34 Ill.App.3d 158

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Daniel CULHANE, Sr., Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 61415.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Nov. 14, 1975.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Cook County, Chicago (Donald Paull, John Thomas Moran, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Raymond J. Prosser and Eugene J. Rudnik, Jr., Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for respondent-appellee.

BARRETT, Presiding Justice.

Defendant was charged by indictments in December, 1965 with three murders in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 38, section 9--1 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 38, par. 9--1). On February 21, 1966, following a hearing, defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and was remanded to the Illinois Department of Mental Health. On January 24, 1974, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments based upon Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. In Jackson, the court addressed the issue of whether a state may indefinitely commit a defendant adjudicated an incompetent to await a future finding of competency without denying him due process. The court concluded that:

'(A) person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.'

In the instant case, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges and defendant appeals from the ruling.

Defendant relies upon Jackson to support two propositions: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictments under circumstances similar to those presented in Jackson, and (2) that based upon Jackson and the 'Right to Remedy and Justice' provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.Const., art. I, Sec. 12 (1970)), this court must provide a remedy by permitting an appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court. The State responds to defendant's contentions by suggesting that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the matter. We agree with the State.

'[2-4] Appellate courts, subject to statutory exceptions, are without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees which are not final.' Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371.) A trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss criminal charges is not a final order of judgment, nor is it an interlocutory order appealable as a statutory exception. (People v. Miller, 35 Ill.2d 62, 219 N.E.2d 475.) 'To be final and appealable, a judgment or order must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so that, if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of the judgment.' Willage of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371.

We believe the case of People v. Miller, 35 Ill.2d 62, 219 N.E.2d 475 presents circumstances analogous to those in the instant case and is therefore dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. In Miller, defendant appealed from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss two counts of rape. With respect to defendant's right to appeal from a trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss an indictment, our Supreme Court stated:

'The order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order. Therefore, unless specific authority can be found authorizing an appeal from such an order the appellate court was without jurisdiction to consider it. The...