People v. Cummins

• Citation: 47 Mich. 334,11 N.W. 184
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 05 January 1882
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CUMMINS.

11 N.W. 184

47 Mich. 334

PEOPLE v. CUMMINS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 5, 1882

Larceny involves a taking with felonious intent and is impossible where the existence of such intent is impossible.

Where a jury was empanelled for the trial of joint offenders but a separate trial was ordered, it is immaterial that they were sworn before the order was entered, if sworn for the trial of one only.

Where a person on trial for crime voluntarily offers himself as a general witness, it is discretionary with the trial judge to allow him to be cross-examined as to whether he has been arrested before, or has not been in the state prison.

One cannot be guilty of larceny whose mind cannot comprehend all the essential ingredients of the offence and recognize their existence; and an instruction that one who knows he has been taking property that did not belong to him is sane enough to commit the offence, is error.

Respondent in a criminal prosecution is entitled to have the theory of his defence clearly recognized in the charge.

Where the defence of temporary insanity proceeds upon the theory that it was induced by the operation of strong drink upon a mind rendered unsound by an injury to the brain, it is error to leave the question of criminal responsibility to be determined upon the facts of injury and mental unsoundness alone, or upon the effect of intoxication apart from the other facts.

Exceptions from recorder's court of Detroit.

Brennan & Donnelly, for plaintiff.

J.J Van Riper, for defendant.

GRAVES J.

Cummins was convicted in the recorder's court of Detroit on a charge of larceny from the person and he comes here for a review on exceptions. He was charged jointly with Murphy, but on the election of the prosecuting attorney a separate trial was ordered by the court. The jurors were however put upon their oaths before the order for separate trial was formally entered in the record and this is made a ground of exception. The point is devoid of merit and it is needless to multiply reasons in refutation. The swearing of the jury and the actual entry of the order occurred at the same stage and if necessary the law would give the same effect to the entry as though in the progress of the proceedings it had been first made. Hubbardston Lumber Co. v Covert, 35 Mich. 254, 262, 263; Rash v Whitney, 4 Mich. 494.

The jury were in truth sworn for Cummins' separate trial. When the prosecution rested he took advantage of the law of 1881 (Public Acts, 245) and exercised the privilege of being a general witness in his own behalf and testified as fully as he desired. In the course of the cross-examination the court overruled his counsel's objections and allowed him to be questioned as to whether he had been arrested previously and whether he had not been imprisoned in the state prison. It is not material to inquire respecting the power to compel answers. The point was not raised. We think it was quite within the discretionary authority of the trial judge to permit the questions. The defendant had voluntarily offered himself to ...