People v. Curry, Docket No. 29471

Decision Date19 July 1977
Docket NumberDocket No. 29471
Citation77 Mich.App. 85,257 N.W.2d 751
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean CURRY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Raymond Walsh, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MAHER, P. J., and KAUFMAN and BORCHARD, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of the armed robbery of Moore's Grocery in Detroit on April 28, 1975, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797, and appeals by right. We reverse.

The case was given to the jury for deliberations on May 19, 1976 at 11:07 a. m. An hour-and-a-half later, the jury requested a meeting with the trial court. The jury was then brought into the court room and the following colloquy ensued:

"THE COURT: I think you indicated that you had some question.

"JUROR McKERCHER, SEAT 12: Yes, sir. We have one individual

"THE COURT: Well, one minute. You don't have to be all that specific.

"JUROR McKERCHER, SEAT 12: O.K.

"THE COURT: What is the problem?

"JUROR McKERCHER, SEAT 12: The problem is that we cannot come to a unanimous decision.

"THE COURT: Well, that figures. That's no big problem. Just keep on talking.

"JUROR McKERCHER, SEAT 12: Because of a religious conviction.

"THE COURT: Some juror has a religious conviction that prevents him or her from participating as a juror, and he or she didn't bring it out at the time of the voir dire is that what you are saying?

"JUROR McKERCHER, SEAT 12: That is apparently the case, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Who is that juror? Will you stand and give your name?

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: My name is McClenton Morton.

"THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Morton?

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: That's not he didn't state it he didn't finish it clearly.

"THE COURT: It's what?

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: He didn't make the statement clearly. As I was discussing back there, I understand that we are supposed to use our own understanding, to speak on this case, see whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty according to our knowledge and our understanding. So that's what I mean. I said the man wasn't guilty because

"THE COURT: Well, wait. I don't want to know how you voted.

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: Oh.

"THE COURT: All I am trying to do is find out whether or not there is some religious conviction that you have that you didn't disclose to us that now stands in the way of your function as a juror.

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: No, that's not really.

"THE COURT: It's just I think the only thing to do is to send you back, then, to continue your deliberation.

"Or are you telling me that you have already made up your mind and no arguments are going to change your mind is that what you are saying? Just yes or no.

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: No, sir. I am not saying that.

"THE COURT: Do you think some further discussion might be helpful?

"JUROR MORTON, SEAT 6: Some more discussion might convince.

"THE COURT: All right. The jury will retire. We will excuse you to go to lunch at 1:15. You will be kept as a group and you will still be with the officer and your lunch will of course be paid for by the Court.

"But you will go back now and continue your deliberations. Don't be despondent if you don't reach a verdict right away. It takes a little time. But you should be patient and hear each person out. And the person who is in the minority should be prepared to at least listen to those who are in the majority. And those who are in the majority, don't feel that just because you have a majority you have got to be right. You ought to be prepared to listen to the person that's in the minority. That's the way you arrive at a verdict.

"All right. The jury will go back."

While we are positive that the trial court meant well, nevertheless it inadvertently discovered how the jury voted and who was the lone dissenter. These facts were also made known to the assistant prosecutor, defense counsel and defendant. Following the instructions to the jury quoted above, the trial court inquired if there was any comment, whereupon defense counsel stated:

"Yes, Your Honor. I would ask that you re-instruct the jury. And I can't cite to you the exact instruction, but I believe there is an instruction which says that the that a juror has a right to an opinion and he has a right to hold that opinion despite any odds, or that despite the numbers against him.

"I'm afraid the impression that was left with the jury at this point with this juror was that further discussion and listening to the majority one way listening to the majority would end if the majority says, 'Well, I think the man's guilty,' that this man should change his decision. And I think it should be made clear that they have a right to hold that decision no matter what the odds are against him if he feels that that is his conviction."

The court reinstructed the jury properly; however, it did not give a curative instruction to the charge, supra.

In People v. Sullivan, 392 Mich. 324, 341-342, 220 N.W.2d 441, 450 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded:

"Although the majority of state and Federal jurisdictions still approve an Allen -type supplemental charge, an increasing number of courts have found an inherent danger in the possibility that the charge may be coercively worded and applied in some cases. In order to insure fair trials generally and fewer retrials, the better practice has been deemed by many to be that found in ABA standard jury instruction 5.4. We agree in that conclusion and in the proclivity of the various courts to adopt the standard for future use.

"Concluding from the standards generally approved by both Federal and state courts and by Michigan precedent, we cannot find the supplemental charge given herein coercive per se. Nor can we objectively say that it was applied coercively in this case or resulted in a coerced verdict. In fact, the great care insured by the trial judge and the extensive thought evidenced by the jury in asking for re-instructions as to particular verdicts produced a verdict quite appropriate to the admitted facts. The totality of this long trial based upon the state of the law at that time precludes any finding...

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2 cases
  • People v. Holmes
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 1 Julio 1980
    ...reversal in the absence of coercive impact upon the jurors. We find the instant case substantially different than People v. Curry, 77 Mich.App. 85, 257 N.W.2d 751 (1977), in which the trial court unintentionally discovered how the jury had voted and the identity of the lone dissenter. That ......
  • State v. George
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 7 Enero 1986
    ...court was advised by the jury how it was numerically divided with the same adverse result. Defendant also refers to People v. Curry (1977), 77 Mich.App. 85, 257 N.W.2d 751 and State v. Randall (1960), 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054. Both of these cases addressed the so-called Allen instructio......

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