People v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 20 December 1967
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 67--60
• Citation: People v. Curtis, 90 Ill.App.2d 231, 232 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. App. 1967)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Charles CURTIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 457

232 N.E.2d 457

90 Ill.App.2d 231

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Charles CURTIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 67--60.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 20, 1967.

Maynard Minteer, John G. Ames, Moline, for defendant-appellant.

Richard Stengel, State's Atty., Rock Island, for plaintiff-appellee.

STOUDER, Presiding Justice.

Edward Curtis, Defendant-Appellant, was found guilty of burglary by a jury. This is an appeal from the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County.

Defendant's first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the People's evidence. Defendant argues that the evidence of identification was insufficient. After the motion for directed verdict was overruled Defendant presented evidence of an alibi including his own testimony and that of a corroborating witness. On the authority of People v. Washington, 23 Ill.2d 546, 179 N.E.2d 635, and People v. Slaughter, 29 Ill.2d 384, 194 N.E.2d 193, we believe Defendant, by electing to present evidence in his own behalf, waived any possible error in the ruling of the court on the motion for directed verdict. Sec. 115--4(k), Chap. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, although enacted after the Washington and Slaughter cases, supra, does not purport to make any change in the law as theretofore existing and offers no support for Defendant's contention that the principles of Washington and Slaughter, supra, should be overturned.

Defendant next argues that the court erred in failing to grant his motion for the separation of witnesses. It appears from the record that Defendant requested the court to enter an order prohibiting the witnesses who had testified from communicating with witnesses who had not yet testified, asserting that the credibility of the witnesses could be tested only in the absence of such communication. While the trial court refused to enter a formal order to this effect it does appear that counsel was ordered to control the witnesses. We believe that the directions of the court were sufficient to protect the rights of the Defendant. Furthermore the record fails to show that in fact such direction was violated by communication by or among the witnesses or that if any communication took place the rights of the Defendant were prejudiced thereby.

Defendant next argues that the court erred in the giving of an instruction relating to the possession of burglary tools. Each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case. Defendant based his defense on that of alibi. No claim is made that the jury was improperly instructed on this defense and we do not believe that the instruction in question was prejudicial to the assertion of such defense.

Lastly, Defendant argues that the evidence fails to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Several police officers testified Defendant was discovered and apprehended in a burglarized dry cleaning store. Forcible entry had been made into the premises and according to the officers, Defendant was discovered hiding under a rack of suits with burglary tools at his side. Defendant directs our attention to inconsistencies in the testimony of the officers such as differences in estimates of distance from the safe to the point where the Defendant was allegedly discovered and differences in the location of the...