People v. Cutler

• Decision Date: 17 January 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23129
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas Duane CUTLER, Defendant-Appellant. 73 Mich.App. 313, 251 N.W.2d 303
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 303

251 N.W.2d 303

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas Duane CUTLER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 23129.

73 Mich.App. 313, 251 N.W.2d 303

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 17, 1977.

Released for Publication March 21, 1977.

[73 MICHAPP 314] Dunnings & Gibson, P. C. by Stuart J. Dunnings, Jr., Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., David L. Smith, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KELLY, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and DANHOF, JJ.

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

The defendant was charged with manslaughter, contrary to M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553, in connection with an automobile accident which occurred on September 7, 1973. The defendant was tried before a jury and was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to a term of from two to fifteen years in prison and appeals by right.

During voir dire the court listed 28 prospective [73 MICHAPP 315] prosecution witnesses. Prior to the opening of testimony the defense counsel moved that all witnesses be excluded from the courtroom until after testifying. The following colloquy took place:

"Mr. Dunnings (Defense counsel) : Well, your Honor, I think under the statute it makes it discretionary with the Court, and I think the reasons are obvious why I make such a request so that one witness cannot hear the testimony of another and there would be no persuasion or anything of that nature, and I think this is a proper motion to make in a case of this importance.

"The Court : Well, I have no reason to believe that a witness would shade their testimony or not testify to the truth merely because they heard some other witness testify. The motion is denied."

The Supreme Court set forth the rules regarding sequestration of witnesses in the case of People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 424, 192 N.W.2d 215, 224 (1971):

"(R)equests to sequester should ordinarily be granted. People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 487, 12 N.W. 665 (1882). However, our cases also hold that sequestration of witnesses is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. See, for example, People v. Burns, 67 Mich. 537, 538, 35 N.W. 154 (1887), People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657, 659, 255 N.W. 373 (1934)."

This Court has adequately treated the denial of a motion to sequester in People v. Insley, 36 Mich.App. 593, 596-597, 194 N.W.2d 20 (1971), and People v. Erb, 48 Mich.App. 622, 627, 211 N.W.2d 51 (1973), in which the failure on the part of the defendant to show prejudice rendered the trial judge's abuse of discretion harmless.

The colloquy above quoted took place in the presence of the jury. The trial court's statement that he had no reason to believe that the witnesses [73 MICHAPP 316] would shade their testimony was tantamount to a vouching for the credibility of the witnesses. Was such error harmless?

Defendant's counsel argues that the testimony of the witnesses concerning the positions of the body of the deceased and the body of the defendant was in dispute. It is a close question. At least it is fair to say that the testimony was not exactly in accord with the testimony taken at the preliminary examination. Defendant urges that to require a showing that a jury would have reached a different result had the witnesses been sequestered is impossible. We agree. Under these circumstances we are prepared to presume prejudice. There were 28 witnesses, a complex factual situation, a dispute about whether the deceased was driving the vehicle or the defendant was driving the vehicle and some arguably conflicting testimony about the physical positioning of the occupants of the vehicle at the scene of the accident.

We find that the trial court's decision gave no valid reasons for refusing to sequester the witnesses and that the defendant has raised arguable questions of prejudice which we cannot say are flimsy or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse.

The next question which concerns us is whether defendant's admission was voluntarily made. The statement was made in defendant's hospital room six days after the accident. It was also the first day he was out of intensive care. The police officer who interviewed him that day said defendant told, him, inter alia, that he had five to ten "seven and seven's" between 4:30 and 9:30 p. m. on the day of the accident, and that after 9:30 p. m. he did not remember anything. The accident occurred at 11:45 p. m.

[73 MICHAPP 317] A Walker ¹ hearing was held and the judge held the incriminating statements admissible.

In reviewing a finding of voluntariness at a Walker hearing, the reviewing court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the issue of voluntariness. People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 557, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972). After reviewing this record, we have determined that the statement given was voluntary.

First, the facts indicate that the defendant was alternately coherent and incoherent during his period of hospitalization. However, there is no testimony that defendant was incoherent at the time he gave the statement. Three witnesses, including his parents, testified that the defendant recognized them and had conversations with them on the day he was questioned by the police officer. The defendant's father testified that he was present during the questioning and admitted that at no time did the defendant ask for a lawyer. The father could not recall whether the defendant was given his Miranda ² warnings.

The officer testified that he gave the defendant his Miranda warnings. He stated that the defendant spoke coherently at the time he gave the statement. The statement itself indicates some detailed recollection of the events which occurred between 4:30 and 9:30 p. m. on the day of the accident. The defendant did not recall whether the police officer read him his rights. He did recall the officer's visit and remembered being told that Craig Worthington, the accident victim, was dead. He recalled nothing else of the interview.

[73 MICHAPP 318] Thus there is no evidence that clearly contradicts that of the police officer. At most, the defendant and his father could not recall whether Miranda warnings were given.

Defendant urges that a statement taken from a seriously injured and incapacitated patient is per se invalid. In People v. Cleveland, 251 Mich. 542, 232 N.W. 384 (1930), a defendant accused of arson was interrogated in his hospital room. He was suffering from a skull fracture and was in pain. The testimony established that he was rational, although at times he would become confused. The Michigan Supreme Court held the statements taken from him were correctly determined to be voluntary.

"The conditions under which a confession is obtained should be carefully scrutinized. If it was obtained by force, duress promises, threats, or by any other improper methods, it should be excluded. * * * The mere fact that a...