People v. Dale
| Decision Date | 18 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 31411,31411 |
| Citation | 92 N.E.2d 761,406 Ill. 238 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. DALE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Ferlic & Gannon, of Chicago (Charles A. Bellows, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, of Springfield (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and James C. Murray, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Harold A. Smith, and Albert E. Jenner, Jr., both of Chicago (John Paul Stevens, Calvin P. Sawyier, and Edward I. Rothschild, Chicago, of counsel), for amici curiae.
This case, here on writ of error, involves the validity of the Post-Conviction Act which the criminal court of Cook County held unconstitutional. Frank Dale, plaintiff in error, was convicted in that court August 22, 1933, under the Habitual Criminal Act and sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for his natural life. Alleging that he had been deprived of due process of law in the prior proceeding, he filed a petition September 6, 1949, seeking relief under the act entitled: Ill.Rev.Stat., 1949, chap. 38, pars. 826-832.
The People moved that the petition be stricken and the proceedings dismissed on the grounds that the statute upon which the petition was based is contrary to the State constitution, which invests the Supreme Court of Illinois with final appellate jurisdiction and which forbids the legislature from adopting class legislation, i. e., legislation which allows appeal to one prisoner and not to another; that said constitution precludes the lower court from exercising jurisdiction to review questions that have been, or could have been, raised upon a prior review of the case by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and for the further reason that said statute violates article III of the State constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats., which provides for separation of the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial departments. The motion contained the further ground that the petition was insufficient in law, in that the matters and things alleged did not present a violation of plaintiff in error's constitutional rights.
The court sustained the motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition for the reason that the statute under which it was brought is unconstitutional, and did not pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition. The act in question being short, we set it out in full:
' § 2. The petition shall identify the proceeding in which then petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of the final judgment complained of, and shall clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. The petition shall identify and previous proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of authorities shall be omitted from the petition.
' § 3. Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.
' § 4. If the petition alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the court may order that the petitioner be permitted to proceed as a poor person. If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel.
' § 5. Within thirty days after the filing and docketing of the petition, or within such further time as the court may fix, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. No other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or on that of either party. The court may in its discretion grant leave, at any stage of the proceeding prior to entry of judgment, to withdraw the petition. The court may in its discretion make such orders as to amendment of the petition or any other pleading, or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or extending the time of filing any pleading other than the original petition, as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided in Rule 8 of the supreme court and section 46 of the Civil Practice Act.
' § 6. The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper.
As indicating lack of due process, plaintiff in error alleged that the trial court appointed counsel contrary to law; that counsel was incompetent; that he was denied due process by being compelled to go to trial immediately after the return of the indictment; that he was not permitted to summon witnesses to testify in his behalf; that the court lost jurisdiction and that he was denied due process generally.
The State's Attorney, to sustain his position that the act is unconstitutional, argues that present remedies in Illinois are adequate for presentation of post-conviction constitutional claims; that by the act in question the legislature has encroached upon the power of the judiciary by making it mandatory that a nisi prius court take jurisdiction of a previously adjudicated cause, whereas the constitution makes the power of the Supreme Court final; that a statute which requires a court to accept the opinion of an affiant on a given matter is unconstitutional; that in its attempts to exercise power over trial courts and appellate practice the legislature is subject to the provisions of the constitution; that an act which attempts to bestow a remedy upon only certain persons in prison and deprived of their liberty is an unreasonable classification and therefore unconstitutional.
The Attorney General and the plaintiff in error both take the position that the act in question is constitutional. The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association take the same position and have filed a brief herein as amici curice. The Attorney General, however, urges that the judgment be affirmed because of the insufficiency of the petition filed in the lower court. Had that court held the petition insufficient, plaintiff in error doubtless would have been permitted to amend it in an attempt to obviate the charge leveled against it. The court not having passed upon the sufficiency of the petition, we will not now affirm the judgment on the ground urged.
It will be noted from a reading of the act that its purpose is to provide a single procedure by which persons within the class specified can obtain a hearing upon on the question of whether they were denied due process of law. The act does not replace any of the three existing remedies of habeas corpus, statutory coram nobis or writ of error. The fact that those three remedies exist furnishes no reason or basis as to why the legislature could not properly provide another remedy if in its wisdom another were needed or desirable. The legislature does not look to the State constitution for its authority to act. It looks to that document and to the Federal constitution only for restrictions upon its power to act. Fenske Bros., Inc., v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318; Nielsen v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill. 301, 161 N.E. 768; Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Winslow, 317 Ill. 25, 147 N.E. 401. Every subject within the scope of civil government which is not within some constitutional inhibition may be acted upon by the General Assembly. Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Winslow, 317 Ill. 25, 147 N.E. 401; Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N.E. 562.
The question of the legality of the statute is therefore narrowed to an inquiry as to whether or not it contravenes any constitutional provisions. No specific constitutional restriction upon the power of the legislature to enact the statutory provision in question has been shown, and we know of none. The party who challenges the constitutionality of a legislative act has the burden of clearly showing wherein ...
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Miller v. State
...Carolina post-Conviction Hearing Act is modeled on the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which is set forth in full in People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761. It is not designed to add to the law's delays by giving an accused two days in court where one is sufficient for the doing ......
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...judgment, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence." Citing People v. Dale (1950), 406 Ill. 238, 247, 92 N.E.2d 761; People v. Lewis (1952), 413 Ill. 116, 120, 108 N.E.2d 473, and People v. Thomas (1970), 45 Ill.2d 68, 73, 256 N.E.2d ......
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