People v. Dalton

• Decision Date: 16 August 1979
• Docket Number: Cr. 20550
• Parties: , 598 P.2d 467 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Freddie DALTON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 497

157 Cal.Rptr. 497

24 Cal.3d 850, 598 P.2d 467

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Freddie DALTON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 20550.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 16, 1979.

Quin Denvir and Paul Halvonik, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, B. E. Bergesen III, Michael G. Millman, Philip A. Schnayerson and Gail R. Weinheimer, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian and Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Joseph Freitas, Jr., Dist. Atty., San Francisco, Daniel H. Weinstein, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., John J. O'Brien and Carol M. Hehmeyer, Asst. Dist. Attys., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

This court must decide whether the warrantless search of closed boxes in the trunk of a car was lawful after the driver was under arrest and handcuffed.

I

Around 2:30 p. m. on March 4, 1976, Officer Ellis of the California Highway Patrol observed a white Cadillac bearing Arizona license plates proceeding about 65 miles per hour southbound on Highway 280. He followed the car a short distance and signalled the driver to stop. The Cadillac left the freeway and stopped.

Appellant, the driver, stepped out of the car. Officer Ellis noticed two knives in his belt. When appellant was unable to produce any identification or vehicle registration, the officer requested and received the driver's license of appellant's passenger. A backup unit was requested and Officer Peterson arrived three or four minutes later. While questioning the passenger, Officer Peterson saw what he believed to be the butt of a gun wedged between the seat and an armrest that bisected the front seat. The gun was removed. Appellant and his passenger were arrested for carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle (Pen.Code, § 12025, subd. (a)), and both were placed in handcuffs and seated on the curb until transported to the police station.

The officers radioed for assistance because they suspected the vehicle might be stolen. Officer Hertogs responded. Another officer, who happened to be passing by, also stopped. Officer Hertogs ascertained that the identification number on the engine of the car was the same as the number on the car's frame, but not the same as the number on the car's doorplate. A further check revealed that the vehicle associated with one of those numbers was possibly stolen.

The passenger was informed that she and appellant would be transported to the police station and she was asked if she wanted anything from the car. She requested the suitcase and a box of Pampers. Unable to find them in the passenger compartment, Hertogs was told by the passenger that they were in the car's trunk. He opened the trunk with a screwdriver because the trunk lock was "punched."

Inside he observed two empty shoulder holsters, two suitcases, a box of Pampers, a large silver colored metal box and various tools. Since only one weapon had been located inside the car, the officer began to search for another weapon to go with the second shoulder holster. One suitcase and a box of Pampers were removed, and a brown leather box was found beneath the suitcase. On the top was written "Longines, the world's most honored watch." Officer Hertogs opened the box and found a disassembled sawed-off shotgun. Next to the leather box was a silver-gray metal box. Hertogs removed it and opened it with a screwdriver. Inside were plastic bags with a white powder subsequently identified as amphetamine, a small caliber revolver, some small packets containing a brown powder later identified as heroin, and narcotics paraphernalia. The suitcases were also searched, but they contained no contraband.

The highway patrol officers radioed the San Francisco Police Department for assistance and an officer from the narcotics detail arrived. The large metal toolbox was removed from the car and its padlock hammered off. Inside were packets of the white powder, mortar and pestle, a scale, a grinder, and plastic bags. Appellant and his passenger were transported to the police station and charged with possession of controlled substances for sale (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11378, 11351), auto theft (Veh.Code, § 10851) and various weapon offenses (Pen.Code, §§ 12020, 12021, 12025, subd. (a)).

A motion to suppress was made and denied at the preliminary hearing. Neither appellant nor his codefendant testified. That motion was renewed in superior court based on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Following its denial, appellant pled guilty to possession of heroin for sale and auto theft. ¹ This appeal followed.

II

This court must decide whether a warrantless search may be made in the field of closed personal effects found in the trunk of a car when the car's occupants have been taken into custody.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals privacy in their persons, homes, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it protects against searches conducted without a judicially issued search warrant. As the Supreme Court has recently stated, "In the ordinary case, therefore, a search of private property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to a properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the Fourth Amendment." (Arkansas v. Sanders, (1979) --- U.S. ----, ----, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590, 61 L.Ed.2d 235.)

The high court has repeatedly held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few carefully circumscribed and jealously guarded exceptions. (Jones v. United States, (1958) 357 U.S. 493, 498-499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514; Katz v. United States, (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; Mincey v. Arizona, (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, --- U.S. at p. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2586.) If the warrantless search of the boxes found in the trunk of the car is to be upheld, it is the state's burden to show that the search falls within one of those exceptions. (McDonald v. United States, (1948) 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153; Badillo v. Superior Court, (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23.)

Respondent contends that neither appellant nor his passenger had any protectible privacy interest in the boxes because they were in the trunk of a stolen automobile. A warrantless search of closed containers found within an automobile involves considerations separate from those involved in a warrantless search of the interior of the automobile, and it must be justified by some recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, --- U.S. at p. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2586; People v. Minjares, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 410, 423, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514; see also United States v. Chadwick, (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538.)

The considerations involved in a search of closed personal effects were explored in United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476. In Chadwick the Supreme Court held invalid a delayed warrantless search of luggage, believed to contain contraband, which was removed from an automobile. The court noted that at the time of the search the luggage had come under the exclusive control of federal agents since the suspects had been placed in custody. Therefore, the search could not be characterized as incident to an arrest. (Id., at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476.)

The court emphasized that individuals have a greater privacy interest in the contents of closed luggage than in the interior of an automobile. It went on to note that luggage is easier to secure while seeking to obtain a warrant than is an automobile. (Id., at p. 13, fn. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2476.) Chadwick held that once luggage comes under the exclusive control of law enforcement officers, a warrantless search is permissible under the federal Constitution only if both probable cause and actual exigent circumstances are present. (Id., at pp. 15-16, 97 S.Ct. 2476.)

In People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410, 423, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514, this court applied the reasoning of Chadwick and held that luggage, found in an automobile which was at the stationhouse and in the exclusive control of police, may not be searched without a warrant absent exigent circumstances. Subsequent to this court's decision in Minjares, the Supreme Court held in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2586 that a warrant is also required to search luggage when it is removed from an automobile in the field. (--- U.S. at p. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2586.) Paralleling this court's reasoning in Minjares, the Supreme Court in Sanders reiterated the distinctions drawn in Chadwick that individuals have a greater privacy interest in closed luggage and that luggage, by its nature, may be more easily reduced to the control of police. "(A)s we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the search after the police have seized the object to be searched and have it securely under their control. See 433 U.S., at 13 (,97 S.Ct. 2476.) Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken. Accordingly, as a general rule there is no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places." (--- U.S. at p. ----, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2593, fns. omitted.)

Under both Minjares and Sanders, respondent must show not only that probable cause existed for the search of the boxes in this case, but also that exigent...