People v. Danielson

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LUCAS; MOSK; KENNARD
• Citation: People v. Danielson, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 3 Cal.4th 691, 838 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1992)
• Decision Date: 22 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. S004730,No. 25937,S004730,25937
• Parties: , 838 P.2d 729 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Wayne DANIELSON, Defendant and Appellant. Crim.

Page 1

13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1

3 Cal.4th 691, 838 P.2d 729

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Wayne DANIELSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S004730.

Crim. No. 25937.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 22, 1992.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 30, 1992.

[3 Cal.4th 701] [838 P.2d 732] Fern M. Laethem, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Philip M. Brooks, Bruce E. Cohen and Victor J. Morse, Deputy State Pubic Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungern, Attys. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart and George Williamson, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., John H. Sugiyama and Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dane R. Gillette

and David Lew, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

By amended information filed in Mendocino County Superior Court, defendant Robert Wayne Danielson was charged with the burglary, robbery, kidnapping and murder of an elderly couple, Benjamin and Edith Shaffer. The information alleged both murders were in the first degree, based on alternative theories of felony-murder-robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 189, 211; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated), and willful, premeditated murder ( § 189), as to each victim. The information further alleged three special circumstances: felony-murder-robbery ( § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)), felony-murder-kidnapping (id., subd. (a)(17)(ii)), and multiple murder (id., subd. (a)(3)).

The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, determining the murders to be of the first degree, and finding true the special circumstance allegations. The jury subsequently returned a death verdict, and the trial court sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic. ( § 1239, subd. (b).)

As will appear, we reject defendant's claims of prejudicial error and affirm the judgment in its entirety. (Defendant previously had filed with us a petition for habeas corpus, alleging incompetence of his trial counsel. In November 1991, we denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause.)

II. FACTS

The guilt phase evidence established that in the summer of 1982, defendant and his girlfriend, Lanora Johnson, hitchhiked from Oregon to a trailer park in Mendocino County, California. Lacking funds, the two discussed robbing and killing someone. They chose as their victims an elderly couple, Mr. and Mrs. Shaffer, with whom they had earlier conversed. One morning in July 1982, Johnson and defendant (who displayed and pointed a handgun) forced their way into the Shaffer camper, which was parked nearby. While Johnson stood guard over the Shaffers in the camper, defendant drove their adjoining truck to a wooded area. At defendant's direction, Johnson tied up the Shaffers, and then left the area to walk the Shaffers' dog.

While walking the dog, Johnson heard several gunshots. She returned to the camper and found that both Mr. and Mrs. Shaffer had been shot in the head and were lying on the ground. Defendant told Johnson he had to shoot Mrs. Shaffer twice in order to kill her. After defendant disposed of the bodies by rolling them down an embankment, the couple ransacked the Shaffers' camper, removing their travelers checks, credit cards, and other property.

Thereafter, defendant and Johnson drove to Nevada in the Shaffers' camper, using their credit cards and travelers checks for various purchases along the way. On one occasion in Nevada, defendant admitted to an acquaintance, Terry Brown, that he had shot and killed the Shaffers. For nearly two years, the disappearance of the Shaffers remained unsolved and their bodies went undiscovered. In early 1984, Johnson implicated defendant in the crimes and led police officers to the murder scene, where the Shaffers' remains were discovered. In April 1984, defendant was arrested in Odessa, Texas. He was ultimately charged with the present offenses in Mendocino County Superior Court.

The primary guilt phase evidence was the testimony of Johnson, who had been granted immunity from prosecution. Her testimony was corroborated by circumstantial evidence linking defendant to the murders, and by the testimony of Terry Brown, an associate of defendants, who claimed that defendant made a detailed confession of the Shaffer murders. The defense focused primarily on attempting to impeach or contradict the incriminating testimony of Johnson and Brown.

At the penalty phase, the People introduced defendant's record of prior felony convictions for drug possession, firearm possession, voluntary manslaughter, and forgery. In addition, the People introduced evidence of defendant's unadjudicated prior violent acts, including a robbery-murder, and a robbery-attempted murder. The defense at the penalty phase consisted of testimony from defendant and others describing his troubled childhood, prison experiences, drug use and depression, good conduct in jail, and remorse for his crimes. Defendant read a statement to the jury explaining his conversion to Christianity, the extent of his remorse, and his hope the jury would render a "fair judgment."

III. GUILT AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUES

A. Granting Hardship Excuses

Defendant contends his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury drawn from the vicinage were violated by the trial court's policy of excusing all prospective jurors claiming hardship caused by residing more than an hour and a half from the Mendocino County courthouse in Ukiah. (See Cal.Stds.Jud.Admin., § 4.5(d)(2).) In defendant's view, he was entitled to jurors from the "immediate vicinity of the crime scene." We reject defendant's argument.

First, as the People observe, defendant made no vicinage challenge to his jury; his only objection to the court's excusal rulings was that they prevented "getting jurors from all over the county," an objection which failed to invoke defendant's present "crime scene"/vicinage argument. (See former § 1060.)

In any event, defendant was not denied his vicinage right. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law...." Included in this constitutional guarantee is the right to a trial by a jury residing in the vicinage, applicable in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 96, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1903, 26 L.Ed.2d 446; Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713, 721-724, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547 [Hernandez ].)

We have held, however, that for purposes of Sixth Amendment challenges to prosecutions in California courts, "the boundaries of the vicinage are coterminous with the boundaries of the county." (Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 729, fn. omitted, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547.) Thus, our decision in Hernandez is dispositive of defendant's federal constitutional claim, for he does not assert that the jurors in his case were drawn from outside the county wherein the murders were committed.

Defendant contends that ex post facto or due process principles would preclude application of Hernandez to his case, which was tried before Hernandez was decided. Had defendant raised a vicinage challenge at time of trial, based on pre-Hernandez law, the foregoing issue would be squarely raised. But as we have seen, no such challenge was presented.

Defendant also asserts a violation of his right under the state Constitution to a jury drawn from the vicinage. Although the California Constitution does not contain an explicit vicinage requirement, it nonetheless does provide an independent guarantee of the right to a jury drawn from the vicinage. (See Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 721, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 935, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917; People v. Powell (1891) 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481.) However, for purposes of state constitutional challenges to the proper selection of jurors in criminal trials in state courts, the boundaries of the vicinage are also coterminous with the boundaries of the county. (People v. Powell, supra, 87 Cal. at pp. 354-357, 25 P. 481.) Thus, our decision in Powell is dispositive of defendant's state constitutional claim.

We note defendant has asked that we take judicial notice of the contents of a standard map of Mendocino County. Although such a countywide map is a proper subject of judicial notice (Evid.Code §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a)), this evidence is unnecessary in light of our conclusion that vicinage covers the entire county.

B. Denial of Continuance

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying a requested three-day continuance to establish the underrepresentation of various minority groups on the panel of prospective jurors. The request for continuance was made near the completion of the jury selection process and was denied on the ground defendant failed to use reasonable diligence in marshalling the evidence supporting the motion. We find no abuse of discretion.

The gist of defendant's claim was that Blacks and Hispanics (among other identified groups) were potentially underrepresented by reason of the trial court's liberal hardship excusal policy, and that a continuance was needed to allow defendant's expert, Dr. Bronson, additional time to evaluate the statistical data extracted from the jury questionnaires. Dr. Bronson opined in his declaration that although he could not confidently assert that any unconstitutional underrepresentation occurred, the "limited data I have examined does tend to support that conclusion." Dr. Bronson observed that although only 51 percent of White venirepersons he had examined thus far had been excused, 75 percent of "minority" venirepersons had been excused.

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