People v. Daoud

• Decision Date: 20 July 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113994, Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 462 Mich. 621,614 N.W.2d 152
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mahir Ghanin DAOUD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

614 N.W.2d 152

462 Mich. 621

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mahir Ghanin DAOUD, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 113994, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 9, 2000.

Decided July 20, 2000.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Anica Letica, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, MI, for the people.

Robyn B. Frankel, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for the defendant-appellee.

Brian Mackie, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, MI, amicus curiae for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion

YOUNG, J.

We consider in this case the trial court's decision to suppress defendant's voluntary confession on the ground that defendant did not "knowingly and intelligently" waive his Miranda¹ rights. We conclude that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in assessing the validity of defendant's Miranda waiver. Moreover, we conclude that the waiver was valid. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision suppressing defendant's confession.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On May 21, 1994, defendant flagged down Detroit Police Officers Nevin Hughes and Linda Dickinson, who were on routine patrol in a marked vehicle, and blurted out that he had just confessed to a 911 operator that he had killed his mother, Teriza Daoud. As it turns out, in 1985, the victim's body had been discovered in a dumpster in Toledo, Ohio. The victim's body was "hog-tied" with electrical cord and burned. An autopsy report indicated that the victim died as a result of multiple blunt-force injuries to her head. The victim had also been exposed to some source of carbon monoxide before her death. Ironically, the case had remained unresolved until defendant's decision to approach the police nine years later.

In response to defendant's roadside outburst, Officers Hughes and Dickinson pulled their patrol car to the curb, approached defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. Officer Dickinson testified at defendant's preliminary examination that defendant proceeded to waive his Miranda rights and tell the officers that he "took a lug wrench and he cut it in half and he hit his mother several times in the head and then he choked her and then he wrapped her up in a blanket, tied her up with some wire and he took her out to a[n] area near a school in Troy."

The officers drove defendant to the Detroit Police Department's 9th Precinct station where defendant was advised of his Miranda rights a second time. Defendant again waived those rights and repeated what he had previously told the officers.

In response to defendant's statement that the murder took place in Troy, Officer Dickinson immediately notified the Troy Police Department. Troy Police Detective Mitch Lenczewski testified at the preliminary examination that he and Sergeant Mark Tuck² went down to the Detroit Police Department on May 21 and interviewed defendant.³ Defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights a third time. Defendant then gave a taped confession in which he explained that he repeatedly struck his mother in the head and choked her to get her to stop screaming. After killing her, defendant wrapped his mother's body in blankets and placed it in the trunk of his uncle's car. He then drove the car to a nearby school, and parked it there. Defendant returned to his mother's house, took her car, and drove it to the Oakland Mall in Troy to make it look like she had been shopping there.

After getting a ride from some "guys" at the mall, defendant returned to the school where he had left his uncle's car. Defendant bought a gasoline container, filled it, and drove to Toledo with the victim's body in the trunk. There, defendant threw his mother's body into a dumpster and set it afire. Defendant then returned to Michigan and, with apparent success, went about concealing his crime. Following the interview with Detective Lenczewski, defendant signed a waiver form and provided a written statement in which he again confessed to his mother's murder. All defendant's statements were admitted at the preliminary examination.

After defendant was bound over for trial on June 10, 1994, he filed a notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that defendant be examined by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Following a September 1994 competency hearing, the trial court determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Michigan Department of Mental Health for treatment.⁴ Upon defendant's request, the trial court further ordered that defendant be examined "relating to the issue of competency to understand his constitutional and Miranda rights prior to making a statement to the police...."

Defendant was eventually examined by three experts, Drs. Robert Mogy, Charles Clark, and Thomas Grisso, all of whom submitted reports. Walker⁵ hearings were held on September 25, 1996, and February 7, 1997, during which the trial court heard testimony from all three doctors pertaining to the validity of defendant's confession. The doctors disagreed with respect to defendant's ability to understand his Miranda rights. Dr. Mogy believed that defendant was delusional in that he believed that God controlled the police and would set him free if he confessed and that this delusion made him unable to appreciate the fact that the police would use his statements against him. In contrast, Dr. Clark testified that there were no clear indications that defendant's confession was the product of any delusion or that defendant did not understand that the police would use his statement against him.

In light of the contradictory opinions rendered by Drs. Mogy and Clark, Dr. Grisso was hired to perform yet another examination. Dr. Grisso testified that defendant literally understood that the police intended to put him in jail; however, due to his religious "delusions and preoccupations," defendant was unable to use that information and "relate it to his own situation."

Relying on the testimony given by Drs. Mogy and Grisso, the trial court suppressed defendant's statements on the ground that defendant did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. The trial court found that defendant was delusional at the time of his contact with police, in that he "believed that he had no need of any protective rights as God would be releasing him from jail as a reward for confessing to his mother's murder." The court reasoned that this delusion "prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issue—his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination."

The prosecution sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals. That Court reversed the trial court's decision to the extent that it purported to suppress all defendant's statements.⁶ The Court explained that defendant's initial statements made before he was transported to the police station were not the product of custodial interrogation and thus were outside the scope of Miranda. However, the Court left standing the trial court's decision suppressing defendant's later recorded confession.

This Court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. 461 Mich. 873, 603 N.W.2d 267 (1999).

II. Standard of Review

In People v. Cheatham, 453 Mich. 1, 30, 551 N.W.2d 355 (1996), this Court set forth the standards for our review of the trial court's decision in this case:

Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, see People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 338, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965), this Court does not disturb a trial court's factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights "unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous." [People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 448, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant's level of comprehension, and the trial judge is in the best position to make this assessment.

Although we review for clear error the trial court's factual findings regarding a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, we agree with the prosecution that the meaning of "knowing and intelligent" is a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15, 24, 597 N.W.2d 148 (1999).

III. Admissibility of Confessions: An Historical Perspective

The United States Supreme Court originally followed the common-law rule pertaining to the admission of confessions: that a confession was admissible as long as it was freely and voluntarily made. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-585, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884).⁷ Then, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), the Court for the first time found the voluntariness requirement to be grounded in the Fifth Amendment's command that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, the voluntariness requirement was limited to cases in federal court. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908), the Court held that "exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution" (emphasis added).

Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), the Court introduced due process as a basis for excluding involuntary confessions in criminal proceedings occurring in state courts.⁸ It was held that fundamental unfairness in violation of due process exists "when a coerced confession is used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt." Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-237, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the test for admissibility...