People v. Daugherty

• Decision Date: 05 May 1953
• Docket Number: Cr. 5366
• Citation: 40 Cal.2d 876,256 P.2d 911
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DAUGHERTY.

Page 911

256 P.2d 911

40 Cal.2d 876

PEOPLE v. DAUGHERTY.

Cr. 5366.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

May 5, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 1953.

Mancuso, Herron & Winn and John Wynne Herron, San Francisco, for appellant.

Edmund G. Grown, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier and Leo V. McInnis, Deputy Attys. Gen., and Joseph Maddux, Dist. Atty., Santa Rosa, for respondent.

CARTER, Justice.

This case comes to us by automatic appeal from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder imposing the death penalty, finding defendant sane, and from an order denying a new trial. Defendant made the twofold plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

Defendant is a man about 50 years of age. He married Florena Daugherty, the victim of the homicide, in 1933, and they had five children, Barbara, Michael, Wanda, Margaret, and Jerry. The killing occurred in the early morning house of February 28, 1952. Defendant did not testify at the trial and there was little dispute that he killed his wife Florena, the main contention being that his mind had so deteriorated from illness and the consumption of alcoholic beverages that he was incapable of premeditation or of forming the intent to commit murder.

The homicide took place at the Daugherty family home on the outskirts of Santa Rosa, California. Defendant had not been living at the home for about a month before the time of the crime, having moved to an apartment in town. Prior to the homicide the relation between defendant and Florena had been strained. Barbara, the 17 year old daughter of the couple, testified that for several years prior thereto they had engaged in constant quarrels and arguments with the defendant accusing Florena of infidelity. On one occasion in 1951, defendant struck Barbara and was arrested therefor. He had made threats against Florena, stating that 'he would come back and get us.' In December, 1951, defendant had been drinking heavily. He seemed to think his wife was disloyal to him, and while armed with a gun, went looking for her at the house of a tenant nearby his own home. He then fired some shots in the air. Early in 1952, defendant commenced a divorce action against Florena and on the morning of February 27, 1952, the day before the night of the crime, obtained an interlocutory decree by default. He attended to his business, seeming normal, and left a beauty shop owned by him at 4:30 p. m. From about 6:30 to 10:00 p. m. he was with Mrs. Case, an employee, and a friend, Oliver, at either Mrs. Case' apartment or his own, where he consumed considerable whiskey but appeared to be rational. Several witnesses saw defendant between 10:00 and 11:30 p. m., and they testified that he had consumed whiskey, some of them said he was drunk, others said that he was not drunk but was in high spirits. Between 11:00 and 11:30 p. m. he called a taxi driver by the name of Bickel from a cafe in Santa Rosa. Bickel drove him to the Daugherty home. Bickel testified that defendant was in good spirits and happy drunk but acted rationally. While he waited for defendant outside the Daugherty home, he saw the defendant and Florena in the dining room. Defendant waved a white piece of paper at her (inferentially the interlocutory divorce decree) and she tried to push him out of the house. Defendant left and on returning to the cab stated: 'The God damned dirity bitch, she thinks she is smart but I will show her' that he had gotten his 'clincher' today and he 'just went out there to show her my clincher.' Bickel returned the defendant to his apartment at about 11:30 p. m. Between 1:30 and 2:30 a. m. defendant was observed endeavoring to back his car out of his garage and the observer said he was drunk. Defendant called on Mrs. Case and she also considered him drunk. From the testimony of various witnesses and the permissible inferences therefrom, defendant then drove to the Daugherty home and parked his car. Florena, and all the children with the exception of Barbara, were at home. Defendant severed the telephone line on the outside of the house and forced an entry. Florena locked herself in the bedroom but at his insistence let him in. Defendant was holding a hunting knife in his upraised hand, evidently having come to the house armed with it, but put it in his belt at her request. She fled from the house to the yard and he followed her. While there were no eyewitnesses to the crime, he was observed kicking her while she was lying in the yard and he was standing over her. Defendant left and the children, at Florena's request, went to summon help. A neighbor responded, and saw Florena lying on her back in the yard, nude. She was alive and conscious. He drove to town for the police and on their arrival she was still alive, lying nude, her body having blood on it. An ambulance was summoned, and she was taken away. There was blood at various places in the yard and at the door of the house. There were abrasions on her thigh with particles of dirt therein, indicating she had been dragged. Her body contained numerous stab wounds, including some on the upper part of her arm, shoulder, near hip joint, abdomen and forearm. The cartilage of her nose was broken. The fatal wound was on the side of the left breast and was 3 inches wide and 6 inches deep. The evidence showed that the would had penetrated the heart and would cause death from internal hemorrage. In addition to the blood in the yard which covered a considerable area, a bloodstained hunting knife and her torn nightdress were found. A knife scabbard whose inside configuration fit the knife was found at defendant's apartment.

Just prior to his arrest (about 3:00 a. m. on the day of the crime), defendant made telephone calls to several different persons to whom he stated that he had killed his wife. At the time of his arrest in his office, there was blood on his shirt and pants and about his office and car. Although defendant refused to make a formal statement to the peace officers, when he was asked what had happened at the home place, he stopped, gritted his teeth, and shook his fist at the ground, and said: 'I stood there and watched the dirty son of a bitch die; I coldn't take it any longer.' When taken to the sheriff's office and examined, he had the divorce decree on his person. He did not appear drunk and while there he told an officer, 'I told her not to push me too far; I told her not to push me too far or I would fix her and I did.' 'The slut, I fixed her.'

The foregoing summary of the evidence is clearly sufficient to establish intentional, premeditated and deliberate murder, or murder in the first degree.

As before stated, the main defense at the trial was that defendant was so deranged by alcohol and illness, that he was incapable of forming an intent or of premeditation. There was evidence, as above seen, that he was intoxicated on the night in question and evidence to the contrary. He had witnesses in his defense who testified to his intoxication then, and overindulgence in alcohol for a considerable period of time prior thereto, coupled with his suffering from Buerger's Disease and other ailments; that defendant had changed and was sullen and morose. His personal physician testified that defendant was suffering from heart disease, uncers, bladder trouble, Buerger's Disease and chronic alcoholism and, because of those things, that when he committed the offense he did not have the capacity to form the intent to commit murder. However, on rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. Toller, a psychiatrist, who testified that he did have such capacity as shown by his activities on the night in question.

Defendant relies on recent cases by this Court in support of his contention that there was insufficient evidence to establish premeditation as lately defined by this Court. The facts in those cases are not comparable to the one here presented. Defendant stresses the language in People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385, that there was no evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the killing. Here, as above outlined, we have such evidence and, together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom, it is sufficient. In People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 153 P.2d 21, a previous threat to kill was held insufficient but that was in the background of defendant's testimony that the deceased was advancing upon him when he shot him and he fired but one shot which was not immediately fatal. Here many wounds were inflicted and defendant had pursued Florena. Reliance is also placed on People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, but there the Court held the evidence sufficient. Evidence such as exists here was not present in People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 163 P.2d 8, 17, where the only 'rationale' was a 'tempestuous quarrel, hot anger, and a violent killing.' Special reliance is placed upon People v. Jiminez, 95 Cal.App.2d 840, 214 P.2d 15. In that case there was not all the evidence of threats and statements made by defendant, as well as evidence of torture, shown by the record here. The statement therein that courts are bound by the rule that where evidence is open to two equally reasonable constructions, one of which points to the guilt of defendant of a higher degree of crime, and the other to his guilt of a lesser degree, the court must adopt the theory pointing to guilt of the lesser degree, is not a correct statement of law when applied to the consideration of a case by an appellate court. That rule applies to the trier of fact only, be it jury or trial court, the same as does section 1096 which deals with reasonable doubt. The court in the Jiminez case cites section 1097 of the Penal Code which reads: 'When it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only.' But that section is in a chapter of the Code dealing with the trial...