People v. Davis

• Decision Date: 11 October 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. F002673
• Citation: 160 Cal.App.3d 970,207 Cal.Rptr. 18
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alton Breford DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 18

207 Cal.Rptr. 18

160 Cal.App.3d 970

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.Alton Breford DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. F002673.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Oct. 11, 1984.

Hearing Denied Jan. 16, 1985.

[160 Cal.App.3d 973] Michael Thomas Woolford, Folsom, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Marshall and L. Eileen Ceranowski, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

ARDAIZ, Associate Justice.^*

FACTS

In the instant case, appellant, Alton Davis, appeals from the judgment of the lower court denying his referral to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) based upon the lower court's finding that he was not in imminent danger of addiction.(Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3051.)¹The facts before the trial court disclosed that appellant joined the United States Army at the age of 16.While in the Army, appellant was stationed in the Republic of South Korea where he was first exposed to and experienced narcotic drug usage.Appellant was exposed to heroin cigarettes at the age of 17 and, by the time of his discharge from the Army, he was addicted to the use of heroin.²As appellant attempted to support his heroin usage in civilian life, he entered a period between 1950 and 1973 of criminal activity related to maintaining his heroin habit through those years.

During the years between 1950 and 1973, appellant remained free of heroin usage only when incarcerated, sometimes withdrawing from heroin addiction with medical aid while in jail and other times withdrawing "cold turkey."

In 1974, following release from prison, until 1982, appellant was free from heroin usage (in a nonpenal setting) for the first time since 1947.Starting in 1974, appellant participated for three years in Tuum-Est, a drug rehabilitation program in Venice, California.There he gained self-cohesiveness and purpose and work skills while remaining free of heroin usage.Following Tuum-Est, appellant felt confidence and self-respect.

Between 1975 and 1977, appellant worked as a youth counselor at a health care facility and as a veterans' counselor at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Los Angeles County.

In 1977, appellant moved to Modesto, California and worked between June 1977 and October 1982 as a supervising counsel at Head Rest, Inc., a CETA funded reentry program for ex-addicts and ex-convicts.As a supervisor at Head Rest, appellant believed he had appreciable success, creating reentry programs and acting as group facilitator, dealing with ex-felons, drug addicts and recovering alcoholics.Because of cutbacks at the facility in which he worked, appellant's job was placed in jeopardy.Concerned that he was at a disadvantage in competing for the remaining jobs because of his limited education, appellant testified that he became demoralized and despondent and, as a result, returned to a pattern of substance abuse--first abuse of alcohol and then the use, by intravenous injection, of heroin.In August 1982, appellant began using heroin on a daily basis and would continue to do so up until the morning of March 7, 1983, when appellant once again found himself in court.

In October 1982, appellant had voluntarily sought aid in heroin detoxification from the Stanislaus County Department of Health methadone detoxification program due to his addiction to heroin.At that time, appellant reported using heroin on a daily basis for the preceding six months.Appellant was unable to complete this program due to his arrest in the current matter.

On March 31, 1983, appellant entered guilty pleas to the following separate charges: Penal Code section 666;Penal Code section 496, subdivision (1);Penal Code section 459, burglary in the second degree.

On April 22, 1983, appellant entered a guilty plea to Penal Code section 666.On May 11, 1983, the court made a finding that appellant was possibly addicted or in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotic drugs pursuant to the provisions of section 3051.³The district attorney was ordered to file a petition for commitment to determine whether appellant was a narcotics addict or in imminent danger of becoming one and, on May 12, 1983, the Stanislaus County District Attorney's office filed a petition in accordance with section 3051.

On May 13, 1983, appellant was arraigned on the petition for commitment and the court appointed Dr. Gary Davis(no relation) as the physician to make a personal examination of appellant.The matter was set for hearing on June 3, 1983, and at that time the court continued the hearing to allow Dr. Davis to be present to testify.

On June 7, 1983, a further hearing was held on Dr. Davis' report.At the conclusion of Dr. Davis' testimony, counsel for appellant requested that the court appoint an additional physician based upon counsel's contention that Dr. Davis' testimony was equivocal and of little value because of his alleged inexperience.The court denied appellant's request to appoint a second physician and appellant was then called by his counsel to testify.At the conclusion of the testimony, the court made the finding that appellant was not addicted to the use of narcotic drugs or substances and was not in imminent danger of becoming addicted.The court then ordered criminal proceedings resumed and the petition under section 3051 dismissed.Appellant was then sentenced to state prison for a total term of three years and eight months.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the trial court should have referred him to the CRC for drug treatment pursuant to section 3051.Appellant maintains that failure to refer him to the CRC on these facts was an abuse of discretion.Appellant further contends that the trial court should have appointed a second doctor at his request to determine if the first doctor was correct that he was "not in imminent danger of addiction."It is appellant's position that failure to appoint a second doctor at his request was an abuse of discretion and violative of appellant's due process rights.

Appellant acknowledges and respondent contends that People v. Salcido(1980)112 Cal.App.3d 994, 169 Cal.Rptr. 597, Second District, Division 2, is directly in point on these facts.In Salcido, supra, the petitioner stood convicted of burglary.At his request, the superior court referred the petitioner for examination pursuant to section 3051 to determine if the petitioner was addicted or in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics.The court appointed a qualified psychiatrist who reported to the court that the petitioner was not addicted within the meaning of section 3051.The petitioner then requested and received the appointment of a second psychiatrist who reached a conclusion that the petitioner fell within the provisions of section 3051.The district attorney then advised the court that he could not establish petitioner's addiction beyond a reasonable doubt and offered the opinion that the second doctor was neither credible nor reliable.The court dismissed the petition.The defendant appealed, alleging, among other contentions, that dismissal of the petition was contrary to legislative intent and a denial of due process.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court and found no due process violation.The Salcido court stated:

"... the California Rehabilitation Center is not maintained as a place of refuge for anyone who, for various personal reasons, not the least of which may be the avoidance of prison confinement, desires to be admitted.In short, no one has a right to be declared an addict and, as such, be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center."(People v. Salcido, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d 994, 999[169 Cal.Rptr. 597], emphasis in original.)

The Salcido court confronted the argument that the second doctor's opinion should be considered in the context of the Legislature's amendment of section 3051 to require one doctor instead of two.⁴

"The amendment means to us that the Legislature now feels that the California Rehabilitation Center should not be available to those persons whose addiction cannot be discerned by at least one physician.As a protection for the individual, the Legislature has provided that a person may not be involuntarily committed on the basis of a single medical opinion that he is an addict without being given the opportunity to refute that opinion by an opinion of a second doctor that he is not addicted.

"That is the only logical interpretation of the amendment.It is totally illogical to assume that the Legislature had in mind a situation where a person would desire to have a doctor appointed to corroborate the opinion of the first doctor that he was addicted--that would be a redundancy.On the other hand, in line with the Hendricks rationale, it cannot be inferred that the Legislature intended to afford an opportunity for a person, through the appointment of a second doctor, to prove his own addiction when the first doctor's opinion was negative.

"If the court here committed any error it was in appointing the second doctor to examine the defendant after the first doctor had rendered a negative report."(Salcido, supra, at pp. 1000-1001, 169 Cal.Rptr. 597, emphasis in original.)

Salcido relied substantially upon Hendricks v. Superior Court(1978)81 Cal.App.3d 950, 146 Cal.Rptr. 798 which confronted the issue of calling additional doctors under section 3051 when two doctors appointed under the predecessor to the present section 3051 found the petitioner not addicted.We are not confronted with a request to appoint or call additional doctors after the second doctor referred to in section 3051 has been called at the defendant's request.We, therefore, do not find the factual situation in Hendricks, supra, or its conclusion applicable to the instant case.

In our view, Salcido directed its reasoning toward the conclusion that a defendant confronted with a CRC...