People v. Davis

• Citation: 233 Ill.2d 244,909 N.E.2d 766
• Decision Date: 21 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 105092.,105092.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jermaine DAVIS, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

909 N.E.2d 766

233 Ill.2d 244

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jermaine DAVIS, Appellant.

No. 105092.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 21, 2009.

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defenders, Douglas R. Hoff, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Judy L. Deangelis and Amy Watroba Kern, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Defendant, Jermaine Davis, was charged with aggravated battery, armed robbery and first degree murder. The first degree murder charge was brought under three different theories—intentional murder, knowing murder (also called strong probability murder), and felony murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004). The intentional and strong probability murder counts each alleged that defendant and his two codefendants—Maurice Thomas and Edward Durant—beat and killed the victim "with their fists, feet and a board." The felony-murder count alleged that defendant and the others beat and killed the victim "with their fists, feet and a board during the commission of a forcible felony, to wit: aggravated battery." The aggravated battery count likewise alleged that defendant and the others beat the victim "with their fists, feet and a board." A jury in the circuit court of Cook County returned a general verdict of guilty against defendant on the first degree murder charge, as well as a guilty verdict on the offense of aggravated battery. Defendant was sentenced to serve 25 years in prison.

Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that (1) the cause must be remanded for a hearing under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), because the trial court improperly collapsed the three-step Batson process and allowed the State's peremptory challenge of an African-American venire member without engaging in the third stage of the analysis, and (2) because the conduct forming the basis of his aggravated battery was inherent in the murder, the trial court erred in instructing the jury it could convict him of felony murder predicated on aggravated battery. The appellate court rejected those claims and affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. No. 1-05-1251 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

On our initial consideration of this case, we agreed with defendant that the trial court impermissibly collapsed the three-step Batson process. Accordingly, we remanded the cause for a full Batson hearing, beginning with the prima facie stage and with the understanding that it was possible that the Batson inquiry could end there if defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See People v. Davis, 231 Ill.2d 349, 369, 326 Ill.Dec. 21, 899 N.E.2d 238 (2008). We also urged the trial court to make a proper record with findings of fact and conclusions of law, while at the same time we recognized that some determinations might be difficult to make now that several years had elapsed since the voir dire proceedings. See Davis, 231 Ill.2d at 364, 366, 368-69, 326 Ill.Dec. 21, 899 N.E.2d 238.

On January 16, 2009, the trial court conducted the hearing required by our remand and then entered a written order, specifying its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ultimately concluded that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The case now comes back to us for our resolution of the Batson issue in light of the proceedings conducted below and the trial court's findings. We also now address the remaining pending issue related to the felony-murder instruction.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts prior to remand were fully set forth in our previous opinion. We will reiterate the necessary facts so as to provide a proper framework for our disposition, including facts relative to the issue that resulted in remand.

Defendant's trial began on February 20, 2004, with voir dire. Defense counsel questioned venireman Robert Hicks in the course of selecting the jury. That questioning revealed that Hicks was a retired janitor, who had lived in Chicago since 1970. When asked if he could be a fair juror if selected, Hicks said, "I think so." Defense counsel followed this up by asking if Hicks was "comfortable [that he could] be fair." Hicks responded, "I am comfortable." The prosecutor did not ask any questions of Hicks.

Voir dire proceeded, and after one additional prospective juror was questioned, the prosecutor announced that he would exercise a peremptory challenge to Hicks. At that point, defense counsel requested a discussion with the court off the record. Upon returning to the record, the trial court decided to conduct its own inquiry into whether the State had committed a Batson violation in its challenge to Hicks.

During its inquiry, however, the trial court did not follow the methodical three-step approach delineated by Batson and required by our case law as follows: (1) the defendant must make out a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for excluding the juror in question; and (3) the trial court then weighs the evidence and determines if the defendant proved purposeful discrimination. People v. Easley, 192 Ill.2d 307, 323-24, 249 Ill. Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975 (2000); People v. Munson, 171 Ill.2d 158, 174, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265 (1996). The trial court did not consider the first step and made no finding that a prima facie case had been established. Instead, the trial court jumped to the second step, found that the State's proffered rationale for excluding Hicks was race neutral, and then ended its analysis there.

Voir dire was eventually completed and the case proceeded to the evidentiary portion of the trial, where it was established that a group of men beat Demetrius Thomas unconscious on October 10, 1999, near a Chicago housing project. A Chicago Housing Authority police officer responded to a call about the incident and found Demetrius Thomas lying in a garbage dumpster. The victim was taken to a hospital and remained in a coma for two months before he died of an infection that resulted from the brain injuries he suffered in the beating.

Quincy Campbell was a key witness that testified on behalf of the State. He had a criminal record and was a suspect in the case until he gave a statement to police. At trial, he stated that he witnessed a group of men beat the victim. Campbell had difficulty at trial, however, with names and events, claiming that he did not remember any of the names of the people involved in the beating. But he did acknowledge at trial that he had given a written statement to police on January 3, 2000, about the incident. According to Campbell's written statement, he knew from the neighborhood four of the five men who beat the victim. They were Maurice Thomas, Pee Wee (a.k.a. Edward Durant), Hip Hop, and Kevin. Campbell identified defendant as Hip Hop at trial.

Campbell's written statement further indicated that during the encounter, Pee Wee struck the victim with a stick three times. Campbell described the stick used to beat the victim as a piece of cut lumber. At one point, the victim got on his feet and ran. But Thomas, Pee Wee, Kevin and defendant chased him around a building, where the others began beating him again. When the victim fell to the ground, defendant began striking him with his feet. At one point, Pee Wee went through the victim's pockets. While Campbell was watching the beating, Thomas asked Campbell to act as a lookout for police, but Campbell refused. When the beating ended, defendant picked up the victim by the collar and pants and tossed him into a garbage dumpster. Campbell denied participating in the beating and denied that the victim's sister, Samara Sadler, was present.

Other evidence presented revealed that police conducted a lineup on January 22, 2000, in which Campbell identified defendant. Later that day, police confronted defendant with the fact of that identification. Defendant then gave a written statement to an assistant State's Attorney in which defendant admitted his involvement in the incident. According to that statement, defendant was "hanging out" in the area when he saw Maurice Thomas bring the victim outside from the building. The victim broke free of Maurice's grasp, ran around the back of the building and entered a hallway on the first floor. Maurice ran after him, and Maurice and Pee Wee proceeded to beat the victim. Defendant "kept watch" from about two feet away to make sure no one saw what was going on or tried to interfere. After Maurice and Pee Wee finished the beating, the victim was lying face down and unconscious. Defendant then grabbed him by the back of his pants and shirt and threw him into a dumpster.

Samara Sadler, sister of the victim, testified for the defense. She observed the victim come out of the building with Campbell and Maurice Thomas. Campbell and Maurice then began hitting the victim. She knew both Campbell and Maurice from the neighborhood. The group ran around the building and Sadler followed. When she got there, she observed the victim lying on the ground and unconscious. Two or three men were around the victim, and she did not know if one of them was defendant. She knew defendant from the neighborhood, but testified that she did not see defendant strike the victim at any time.

During its closing argument, the State argued that it was not necessary that it prove defendant intended to kill the victim, but only that defendant or one for whom he was...