People v. Davis
| Decision Date | 15 March 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 30403.,30403. |
| Citation | 77 N.E.2d 703,399 Ill. 265 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. DAVIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Charles E. Byrne, Judge.
Raymond Davis was convicted for armed robbery, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank A. McDonnell, of Chicago (William L. Carlin and Louis A. Rosenthal, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., of Chicago (John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe and W. S. Miroslawski, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Raymond Davis and Fred Van Meter were indicted on March 13, 1946, for armed robbery of Alberta Duncan. Both pleaded not guilty and waived a jury. The public defender was apppointed by the court as counsel for Van Meter, and Davis was represented by his own attorney. They were tried on April 25, 1946, in the criminal court of Cook County and found guilty. Van Meter was given a sentence of from three to five years' imprisonment while Davis was sentenced to prison for a term of fifty years to life. A motion for new trial and one in arrest of judgment were made by Davis, and overruled. He is here on writ of error.
The prosecuting witness testified that about 9 P.M. on the evening of January 23, 1946, while walking on Fifty-ninth Street between Wabash and Michigan Avenues in Chicago, she was accosted by Van Meter and Davis; that Davis hit her in the pit of the stomach and then the two of them forced her to accompany them down the alley; that Davis had a knife, with which he threatened her; that they stopped in back of an apartment house where Davis and Van Meter then took her fur coat, rings, wrist watch, cash and fountain pen; that Van Meter then left with her property, but Davis remained and forced her into a basement, where he raped her; that she next saw Van Meter on February 18, 1946, on an elevated train; that she and her husband had him arrested; that she saw Davis that same evening at the police station; and that she was present the following day (February 19, 1946,) when Van Meter and Davis made statements. In corroboration of her testimony, the State introduced the testimony of Richard Duncan, her husband, who trailed Van Meter with her on the night of February 18, 1946, and helped her call the police; Grace Lee Walter, who testified that she bought a fur coat, identified as belonging to Alberta Duncan, from Van Meter some time in February, 1946; and two police officers, Louis Abbott and James Foster, who testified to the circumstances surrounding the taking of statements of Van Meter and Davis. The statements were identified and introduced in evidence as confessions, over the objection of plaintiff in error.
Davis, testifying in his own behalf, denied any participation in the robbery and ravishment, and explained his written statement by saying that it was extorted from him by third-degree methods which left him weak and helpless, and fearful of his ability to withstand any further abuse. Davis presented two character witnesses, and also his mother, who testified that at the time of the robbery he was at home with her.
Van Meter, the codefendant, also took the stand, and, in the language of the record, ‘testified in his own behalf.’ The substance of his testimony is so unusual as to merit detailed attention. He first, under the questioning of his counsel, the public defender, admitted all of the facts of the robbery, and testified that Davis was with him at the time. He then admitted making a statement to the police, and said that everything in it was true, except the part about Mrs. Duncan's ravishment by Davis, concerning which he had no personal knowledge. This testimony by the codefendant apparently took Davis' counsel by surprise, and he cross-examined Van Meter carefully twice. On the first cross-examination, Van Meter stood by his story, and added only that he had been beaten and abused by the police prior to signing his original statement. The public defender then re-examined his client, and obtained a further admission of guilt, although the public defender continued to insist that Van Meter was pleading not guilty. At the request of Davis' counsel, the court then adjourned for the day, and on the following day Van Meter was again cross-examined by Davis' counsel. This time Van Meter admitted talking to the public defender about the number of years' sentence he was going to receive, but the court refused to admit testimony as to any promises which had been made by the public defender. Van Meter was, however, permitted to testify that he made his original statement to the police on the basis of an agreement that if he did so, he ‘wouldn't get so much time.’ He further testified that his previous statements from the witness stand implicating Davis were false, and were made ‘because I couldn't bring the other one that put me up to it.’ The public defender then examined him again, and elicited the further testimony that his signed statement made to the police was involuntary, although it was true as to him (Van Meter), but that it was false as to Davis' participation in the robbery.
Plaintiff in error's analysis of the evidence Van Meter gave is, that it shows there was collusion among the prosecuting attorney, the police and the public defender, by which it was sought to obtain a comparatively light sentence for Van Meter at Davis' expense. There is no doubt that plaintiff in error was taken by surprise when his codefendant, who was pleading not guilty, took the stand for the apparent purpose of admitting his guilt and implicating Davis. Van Meter's statements, however, on the second day were clearly to the effect that he had falsely testified against plaintiff in error in accordance with a bargain he had made with the police, who had promised him a light sentence.
When police officer Louis Abbott was on the stand the public defender asked him ‘As to the defendant, Van Meter, did he fully co-operate with you and with the police department at all times?’ The answer was, ‘He did.’ Van Meter testified ‘I was told in the police station to say, when I got up on the witness stand, that Raymond Davis was with me.’ On the hearing as to the dgree of punishment, Block, the public defender, stated to the court with reference to Van Meter, The court at one time during the discussion, referring to Van Meter, said, ‘It seems singular that a policeman testified that he co-operated with the police.’ In testifying with reference to the statement signed by him, Van Meter said, ...
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