People v. Davis

• Decision Date: 24 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07CA0595.,07CA0595.
• Citation: 218 P.3d 718
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dawna DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

218 P.3d 718

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dawna DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07CA0595.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

December 24, 2008.

Certiorari Denied August 17, 2009.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Sean A. Moynihan, Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan P. Fero, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Stephen Arvin, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.

Defendant, Dawna Davis, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and furnishing alcohol to a minor. We affirm.

I. Background

On the evening of September 24, 2005, Davis picked up her fourteen-year-old daughter, B.W., and B.W.'s seventeen-year-old friend, M.S. Davis testified that she stopped to purchase rum for herself and for her friends, whom she intended to have over the following day. M.S. testified that B.W. asked Davis to stop and purchase alcohol. He also said that B.W. gave Davis money for the alcohol and that Davis purchased liqueur, beer, and possibly other alcohol. B.W. denied that she gave Davis money for the alcohol and testified that Davis had only purchased rum that evening.

M.S. further testified that Davis had provided him alcohol on two previous occasions at her house and that "usually we drink when I go over there," referring to Davis's home.

Davis testified that upon arriving home, she had one drink of the rum, then went to bed, and fell asleep. Thereafter, B.W. invited other friends to the house. All but one of the friends were minors. The minors sat outside the house, near Davis's hot tub, and consumed alcohol. The one adult, Brian Reynolds, purchased additional alcohol, which the minors consumed.

Davis testified that she awoke at around 1:30 a.m., went downstairs, and saw strangers in her kitchen and bottles of alcohol that she had not purchased on the counter. She said she and B.W. went upstairs to talk, and that she told B.W., "you have got to stop this," and "you need to get rid of the alcohol." She fell back asleep after deciding to deal with the incident the next day.

Davis testified that she awoke at 4 a.m. and went to work. Later that morning, one of the minors, M.S.'s sister, had not returned home. Their parents called B.W., looking for the missing girl. When the parents learned that the minors had consumed alcohol at Davis's house, they notified the police. Davis and Reynolds were charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Reynolds pleaded guilty, but Davis went to trial.

On November 28, 2006, a jury found Davis guilty of the class four felony offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, for inducing, aiding, or encouraging M.S., a minor, to violate the minor-in-possession law. The jury also found Davis guilty of a misdemeanor for furnishing alcohol to a minor.

II. Statutory Interpretation

Davis contends that the trial court erred in allowing the People to charge her with contributing to the delinquency of M.S., pursuant to section 18-6-701(1), C.R.S.2008. She argues that the Colorado Liquor Code, sections 12-47-101 to -1002, C.R.S.2008, as it existed at the time of her offense, prohibited the People from prosecuting her under the criminal code. We disagree.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Colo.2000). We construe statutes so as to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991); People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986).

To discern the legislative intent, we first look at the language of the statute and give statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. If the language is unambiguous and the intent appears with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. If the language is ambiguous or conflicts with other provisions, we may look to the legislative history, the prior law, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme to determine legislative intent. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo.2002); see also Larimer County Comm'rs v. Sec. of State, 911 P.2d 698, 701 (Colo.App.1995) (using subsequent legislative history to interpret statutory provisions).

We read the statute as a whole "to give `consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all of its parts,'" in accordance with the presumption that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 593 (Colo.2005) (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Colo.2004)). We avoid constructions that are at odds with the legislative scheme. Klinger v. Adams County School Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006).

We presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result. Luther, 58 P.3d at 1015. We avoid interpretations that lead to an illogical or absurd result. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.2004); Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Colo.1996); Martin v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 186 P.3d 61, 65 (Colo. App.2007) (cert. granted June 30, 2008).

Penal "statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of a defendant." People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849, 850 (Colo.1982). However, this rule should not be used to defeat the intent of the General Assembly. Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo.1991) (citing Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 922).

A person commits the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor if he or she "induces, aids, or encourages a child to violate any federal or state law, municipal or county ordinance, or court order." § 18-6-701(1).

Davis argues that under the plain language of the 2005 version of the liquor code, she could not be prosecuted for the felony of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under section 18-6-701(1). We are not persuaded based on the prior law, the consequences of Davis's statutory interpretation, and the 2007 legislative history.

A. Prior Law

"[A] single act may violate more than one criminal statute." People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 114 (Colo.2002); People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233, 1237-38 (Colo.1983); People v. Westrum, 624 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1981). However, the enactment of a specific criminal statute precludes prosecution under a general criminal statute when the statutory language "clearly indicates that the legislature intended to limit prosecution to the specific statute." Stewart, 55 P.3d at 115; People v. Smith, 938 P.2d 111, 115-16 (Colo. 1997); Westrum, 624 P.2d at 1303.

In People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1987), the defendant filed an application requesting issuance of a hotel and restaurant liquor license and falsely indicated that he had not had a prior interest in any Colorado liquor license. The district court dismissed the information charging the defendant with a class five felony offense of offering a false instrument for recording, concluding that the alleged conduct would constitute a misdemeanor violation of the Colorado Liquor Code. The supreme court affirmed, stating that the broad language of the liquor code indicated that in adopting specific penal provisions of the code, the General Assembly exercised the full police power of the state, considered the full range of possible sanctions in selecting those most appropriate for violations of the liquor code, and thoroughly considered all aspects of the licensing process, including the fashioning of appropriate sanctions. Given these circumstances, the court concluded that "[t]he designation of a very few violations as matters to be prosecuted under provisions of the Criminal Code strongly indicates a legislative determination that all other violations of the Liquor Code shall be prosecuted as provided by the penal provisions of the Liquor Code itself." Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062.

In other words, a prosecutor must charge prohibited conduct under the liquor code, rather than under a similar provision of the criminal code, unless criminal prosecution is otherwise authorized by the legislature.

In People v. O'Donnell, 926 P.2d 114 (Colo. App.1996), the People charged the defendant with a class four felony, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, for inducing, aiding, and encouraging a child to possess alcohol. The People argued that Bagby had been limited by the General Assembly's reenactment of both the general statute prohibiting conduct contributing to the delinquency of a minor and the liquor code. A division of this court rejected the People's argument, holding that, contrary to the People's contention, the reenacted statute was not materially different from the provision in the liquor code in effect when Bagby was announced, which then prohibited the same conduct. As to the reenactment of the liquor code, the division held that if the General Assembly wanted the criminal code proscription of contributing to the delinquency of a minor to supplant the liquor code proscription against providing alcohol to a minor, and thereby transform the class two liquor code misdemeanor into a class four felony, it would have done so. O'Donnell, 926 P.2d at 116.

In 1997, the General Assembly did so. In reaction to the O'Donnell decision, it amended the liquor code to expand liability under the criminal code for certain violations of the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute. This amendment gave prosecutors the discretion to charge certain violations either as a felony under the criminal code or as a misdemeanor under the liquor code. As revised, the 1997 statute provided:

12-47-903. Violations—penalties. (5) Any person violating WHO KNOWINGLY...