People v. Davis, 81-139

Citation105 Ill.App.3d 129,434 N.E.2d 13,61 Ill.Dec. 76
Decision Date24 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-139,81-139
Parties, 61 Ill.Dec. 76 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arlin W. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Gitchoff & Wallis, John Gitchoff, Granite City, for defendant-appellant.

Donald W. Weber, State's Atty., Madison County, Edwardsville, Martin N. Ashley, Deputy Director, Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Mount Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee.

HARRISON, Justice:

On November 25, 1980, defendant Arlin W. Davis was found guilty on three counts of reckless homicide, one count of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and one count of driving while license or permit is suspended. (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1979) ch. 38, par. 9-3(a) and ch. 951/2, pars. 11-501 and 6-303.) The charges were brought as the result of an automobile collision on December 31, 1979, in which Larry Lehman and his two daughters, Stacey and Nicole, were killed. Defendant was sentenced on one count of reckless homicide to a term of three years in prison. It is from this judgment that he now appeals. We affirm the convictions, but remand to the circuit court for resentencing.

Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he charges that the trial court erred when it permitted Connie Pelat, a nurse, and Dr. Stephen Spurgeon, the emergency room physician, to testify for the prosecution. He claims that the tender of their names as witnesses violated Supreme Court Rule 412 (73 Ill.2d R.412) on Disclosure to Accused, and did not comply with a November 21st discovery deadline set by the court. He challenges the admission of their testimony because tender of its discovery was made so close to the time of trial that it effectively denied him the opportunity to prepare for cross examination. He maintains further that the November 12th listing of the names of witnesses as "any and all treating physicians", in the absence of a memorandum of the prosecutor's conversations with them, was insufficient to put him on notice that the witnesses would be called upon to testify, or that they would be asked their opinion on the issue of intoxication.

The record does not support his position. Rule 412 does not require that every conversation with witnesses during the course of investigation be reduced to writing. (People v. Abbott (1977) 55 Ill.App.3d 21, 24, 12 Ill.Dec. 663, 370 N.E.2d 286.) The memoranda submitted by the State amounted to substantial compliance and satisfied the intent and purpose of the rule.

Defendant's argument that the state's attorney's office acted in bad faith is also untenable. The prosecutor explained that he had been unable to contact certain witnesses earlier because the hospital refused to cooperate when served with a subpoena duces tecum. In attempting to meet the court's deadline, he carried his discovery material (including the names of Pelat and Spurgeon) to the courthouse at noon that day. When defense counsel did not arrive, the prosecutor then arranged to deliver the documents to his office that afternoon. In view of these facts, we agree with the trial court that the State made a reasonable and good faith effort to disclose the names of his witnesses and we see no reason to impose exclusionary sanctions.

Defendant likewise cannot claim that he had no notice that the witnesses' testimony would relate to the issue of intoxication. Included in the original discovery submitted by the State were statements made by barmaids that Davis had been drinking. Defense counsel was aware of the physical evidence at the scene of the collision. When the hospital had complied with the subpoena, he had access to the witnesses' names in the medical records. In those records, Nurse Pelat had written "smells of alcohol" on defendant's chart. During the course of trial preparation, defense counsel successfully sought to exclude the results of his client's blood alcohol analysis tests. Thus he cannot claim he was surprised that those who had an opportunity to observe him on the evening of December 31st would be asked their opinion on the intoxication issue. People v. Miller (1979) 75 Ill.App.3d 775, 777-778, 31 Ill.Dec. 581, 394 N.E.2d 783.

Finally, the argument that the court's reliance on the opinions of the medical personnel unfairly prejudiced defendant is without merit. The absence of the testimony of Pelat and Spurgeon would not have changed the outcome of the trial. A state trooper and a hospital security guard who had nine months prior experience on a de-tox unit also testified that, in their opinion, Arlin Davis was intoxicated on the evening of December 31st. The trial court, in fact, noted its reliance on the guard's opinion at the same time that it mentioned Pelat and Spurgeon. The testimony of the two officers, taken together with evidence in the record that defendant stopped and purchased drinks at three different taverns during the hours preceding the accident, constituted ample evidence on which the court could have based its decision. Thus, the exclusion of the opinions of the emergency room physician and his nurse would not have altered the outcome of this case. Of course, we do not condone delay in the filing or the exchange of discovery materials; but we do recognize that, under certain circumstances, the parties may have no choice. It is within the trial court's province to determine whether or not the dilatory party exercised good faith in his efforts to submit discovery materials. (People v. Miller, 75 Ill.App.3d 775, 779, 31 Ill.Dec. 581, 394 N.E.2d 783.) Here, the challenged testimony did not unfairly prejudice the defendant nor was the tender of its discovery made in bad faith. Having further concluded that the requisites of 412 were met, the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion by ruling that the testimony was admissible.

The second contention, that the State failed to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every charge, is likewise without merit. Defendant was found guilty on three counts of reckless homicide. Recklessness is defined as conscious disregard of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, * * *, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1979) ch. 38, par. 4-6.) The indicium of conscious disregard need not be shown solely by the maneuvering of the motor vehicle. It may include the physical condition of the driver. (People v. Boyle (1980) 78 Ill.App.3d 791, 797, 33 Ill.Dec. 623, 396 N.E.2d 1347.) Evidence of a driver's intoxication has often been held probative on the issue of recklessness. (People v. Miller, 75 Ill.App.3d 775, 777, 31 Ill.Dec. 581, 394 N.E.2d 783.) If a driver is under the influence of intoxicating liquors, and evidence shows that his driving violation caused death or great bodily harm, courts will find that the violation was "reckless" within the meaning of Ch. 38, par. 9-3(a). In short, improperly driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute reckless conduct which will convert what would otherwise be ordinary negligence into criminal conduct. (People v. Chambers (1972) 8 Ill.App.3d 430, 434, 289 N.E.2d 476.)

The record indicates several witnesses testified that, in their opinion, the defendant was intoxicated. In addition, the state presented evidence that the collision occurred in the victims' lane of traffic. A reconstruction expert stated that gouge marks in the pavement on the Lehman's side of the road were an indication to him that the impact had occurred there. Oil leaks from defendant's car dotted the victims' side of the highway. Much of the debris from the wreckage was also in the Lehman's lane. The expert stated firmly that, in his opinion, defendant had crossed the center line and driven into the path of the Lehman automobile. Thus, the element of recklessness was definitely proved by the State.

Further, after an examination of the evidence, one must conclude that defendant's reckless driving was the cause of the accident. The road that the parties traveled was straight. There were no hills, curves, bumps, or unfavorable weather conditions which could be said to have contributed to the cause of the accident. Decedent's wife testified that her husband had not been drinking prior to the accident. Thus, there is only one sound conclusion to draw: defendant drove his car recklessly, in a manner likely...

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