People v. Day

• Decision Date: 22 November 1949
• Docket Number: No. 31108.,31108.
• Citation: People v. Day, 404 Ill. 268, 88 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. 1949)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DAY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

404 Ill. 268

88 N.E.2d 727

PEOPLE

v.DAY.

No. 31108.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 22, 1949.

Lawrence Day was convicted in the Circuit Court of Du Page County, Win G. Knoch, J., of grand larceny, and he sued on a writ of error.

The Court, Daily, J., held that the indictment was sufficient particularly after plea of guilty, and that no error had been shown and affirmed the judgment.Lawrence Day, pro se.

Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, and Lee E. Daniels, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Robert J. Scott, of Glen Ellyn, and Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

DAILY, Justice.

This cause is brought here by plaintiff in error, Lawrence Day, pro se, on the common-law record, to review a judgment of conviction against him, entered on a plea of guilty to a charge of grand larceny in the circuit court of Du Page County.

The record shows that the indictment, which was returned June 11, 1945, consisted of four counts. The first charges theft of a motor vehicle; the second grand larceny of the same vehicle; the third count charges tampering with the vehicle without the owner's consent; and the fourth charges driving it without the owner's consent. Plaintiff in error appeared in court on July 2, 1945, and was furnished a copy of the indictment and a list of witnesses. At the same time the court appointed Burtram E. Rathje as defense counsel. Arraignment was continued to July 16, 1945, and on that date was again continued to August 20, 1945. However, on August 6, 1945, plaintiff in error again appeared in court, along with John S. Woodward of the law firm of Rathje and Woodward, who acted as his defense counsel, and on arraignment pleaded guilty to the second count of the indictment. He persisted in the plea after admonishmentby the court, who thereafter sentenced him to the penitentiary for a term of three to ten years. Counts one, three and four of the indictment were stricken on motion of the State's Attorney.

The first contention made in this court is that the indictment was faulty because the date alleged in count 1 was at variance with the dates alleged in the other three counts. Where time of commission of an offense is not of essence, precise allegation and proof of the time is not necessary except that it must fix the crime at any time before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations. People v. Taylor, 391 Ill. 11, 62 N.E.2d 683;People v. Angelica, 358 Ill. 621, 193 N.E. 606. Here the indictment was returned on June 11, 1945. The date alleged in the first count was May 27, 1945, while the date in the remaining counts was May 24, 1945. The dates alleged were sufficient to meet the requirements of law; moreover, a plea of guilty is an admission of every fact properly...