People v. Deegan

• Citation: 69 N.Y.2d 976,516 N.Y.S.2d 651,509 N.E.2d 345
• Parties: , 509 N.E.2d 345 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Kenneth DEEGAN, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1987
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 651

516 N.Y.S.2d 651

69 N.Y.2d 976, 509 N.E.2d 345

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Kenneth DEEGAN, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 7, 1987.

Ronald Goldstock, Deputy Atty. Gen. (Arthur G. Weinstein and Martin Marcus, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Vincent A. Malito, Hauppauge, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, 121 A.D.2d 461, 503 N.Y.S.2d 150, the indictment reinstated and the matter remitted to the trial court for further proceedings.

The limited issue before us on this pleading motion is the facial sufficiency of the indictment. Even if the alleged coconspirator's declarations were excluded, for present purposes the remaining evidence before the Grand Jury is sufficient to support an inference that defendant, an elected official, changed his vote on a proposed rate increase for waste removal services in exchange for a promise of future campaign contributions from members of the affected industry. The lower courts, which both held the evidence insufficient, erred in referring to a need to exclude "to a moral certainty" every hypothesis but guilt where the proof is, as here, wholly circumstantial. In invoking that standard, the trial court relied on People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 129, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 138 N.E.2d 794, which was recently expressly overruled (People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115, n. 2, 512 N.Y.S.2d 652, 504 N.E.2d 1079).

As we held in People v. Jennings, supra, at 114-116, 512 N.Y.S.2d 652, 504 N.E.2d 1079, the proper standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment is "legal sufficiency," which is defined in CPL 70.10(1) as "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged" (see, CPL 190.65[1] ). In other words, "[i]n the context of the Grand Jury procedure, legally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002, 1004, 374 N.Y.S.2d 609, 337 N.E.2d 124).

As applied to a case involving wholly circumstantial evidence, this standard limits the reviewing court's inquiry to determining whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from the facts is irrelevant on this pleading stage inquiry, as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference; the standard that every...