People v. Deforest

• Docket Number: 363989
• Decision Date: 12 December 2024
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH DEFOREST, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGANPlaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH DEFOREST, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 363989

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 12, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Gladwin Circuit Court LCNo. 21-011167-FC

Before: Gadola, C.J., and K. F. Kelly and Redford, JJ.

PER CURIAM

A jury convicted defendant of one count of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, one count of felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), one count of fleeing or eluding a police officer, fourth-degree, MCL 257.602a(2), and one count of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant appeals as of right.We affirm.

I.BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arise out of an incident during which defendant drove his vehicle into a field, following a high speed police chase involving Deputy Pahl and Deputy Weston of the Gladwin County Sheriff's Office.At approximately 2:55 a.m. on October 15, 2021, the deputies observed defendant's vehicle stationary in the middle of a two-lane road.Defendant began accelerating and the deputies followed.They began "pacing the vehicle at approximately 80 miles an hour," and at that point, activated their lights and sirens.As they approached an intersection, defendant began to slow down.Deputy Weston testified at trial that he used a spotlight to illuminate the inside of defendant's vehicle and immediately recognized defendant based on two previous encounters: the first, a traffic stop that resulted in a tow and the second, a search of defendant's vehicle.Once defendant turned, he accelerated again, and turned into a muddy field, eventually turning the vehicle's engine and lights off.To avoid getting stuck, the deputies approached the vehicle on foot.The deputies found "nobody in it or around" the vehicle, and observed foot tracks leading away.Deputy Weston testified at trial that he recognized the vehicle from his previous encounters with defendant.

A search warrant was later executed for the vehicle, during which firearms were removed from the passenger seat, as well as ammunition from the firearms.Detective Sergeant Cuddie of the Gladwin County Sheriff's Office, who was called in to assist Deputy Pahl and Weston the night of the incident, testified at trial that an individual who lived in Clare County, Kelley Gillis, reported a breaking and entering of his property, which resulted in several missing firearms.Gillis arrived to pick up the firearms and proved that he was the owner by matching all the firearm serial numbers to those he had written down in a booklet.Deputy Pahl later spoke with Scott Kanyo, an individual who lived close to the field where the vehicle had become stuck; Kanyo testified at trial that he knew defendant through a mutual friend, and allowed him to stay at the residence as needed.Kanyo testified that, before sunrise the day of the incident, he saw defendant leaving the residence in defendant's mother's vehicle.

The jury convicted defendant of all charges.Defendant moved for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing; after oral argument on the motion, the trial court granted an evidentiary hearing.After defendant's evidentiary hearing was held, the trial court issued a written opinion denying defendant's motion for a new trial.Defendant now appeals, arguing that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate to defendant's previous felony conviction before it was mentioned by the prosecutor at trial; the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury as to how to evaluate evidence of the felony conviction for a proper purpose and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction; defendant's right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecution presented evidence that the firearms in his truck were stolen during a breaking and entering and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of such evidence; and that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is unconstitutional.

II.ANALYSIS

A.FAILURE TO STIPULATE

Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to defendant's felony conviction before his previous judgment of sentence (JOS) was admitted and shown to the jury by the prosecutor.We disagree.

"Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law."People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 579; 640 N.W.2d 246(2002).If the trial court has held a Ginther hearing, the trial court"first must find the facts, and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel."Id.We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error.People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. 38, 47; 826 N.W.2d 136(2012).A trial court's finding "is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the whole record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."People v Dendel, 481 Mich. 114, 130; 748 N.W.2d 859(2008).

In People v Armstrong, 490 Mich. 281, 289-290; 806 N.W.2d 676(2011), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:

A defendant must meet two requirements to warrant a new trial because of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.In doing so, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's assistance constituted sound trial strategy.Second, the defendant must show that, but for counsel's deficient performance, a different result would have been reasonably probable.[SeeStrickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688; 104 S.Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674.]

"[D]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and which witnesses to call are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and we will not second-guess strategic decisions with the benefit of hindsight."People v Dunigan, 299 Mich.App. 579, 589-590; 831 N.W.2d 243(2013).Defense counsel"must be afforded broad discretion in the handling of cases[.]"People v Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 325; 521 N.W.2d 797(1994).

In Old Chief v US, 519 U.S. 172, 174; 117 S.Ct. 644; 136 L.Ed.2d 574(1997), the United States Supreme Court held that a district court abuses its discretion under FRE 403 if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior conviction "when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction."In People v Swint, 225 Mich.App. 353, 379; 572 N.W.2d 666(1997), we held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to accept defendant's stipulation that he had been convicted of felonious assault and was ineligible to possess a firearm, but that this abuse of discretion "was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial."

In the present case, during trial, the prosecutor moved to admit a JOS document that indicated that, in 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of breaking and entering with intent, MCL 750.110; his other charges, which included home invasion, second degree, MCL 750.110a(3), and three counts of unlawful possession and driving away of a motor vehicle, MCL 750.413, were dismissed.Defense counsel did not object to its admission, and the trial court allowed it to be presented to the jury.During defendant's evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that she never considered stipulating to defendant's felony conviction, and that admission of the JOS "was a very quick matter that was-that was kind of my intent there.I didn't want to draw attention to it."

In its decision on defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court began by acknowledging that, pursuant to Swint, 225 Mich.App. at 379, a "defendant may offer to stipulate to the fact that he has a felony conviction that would otherwise preclude his possession of a firearm, and a Court is bound to accept that stipulation."The trial court concluded that, however, Swint"does not require that such a stipulation be made."The trial court stated that "[t]here is no evidence provided that any juror used the other information on the judgment for any improper purpose" and that defendant's argument that admission of the JOS was prejudicial is "undoubtedly speculative."Finally, the trial court concluded that, as defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, her decision not to stipulate to defendant's felony conviction was a matter of trial strategy.

The trial court's findings were not erroneous.SeeTrakhtenberg, 493 Mich. at 47.Defendant fails to present any authority for his contention that defense counsel was actually required to stipulate to the felony conviction, only that she had the option.SeeSwint, 225 Mich.App. at 379.Defense counsel testified that she decided to not exercise that option as a trial strategy to avoid drawing attention to the conviction.We will not second-guess matters of trial strategy on appeal, seeDunigan, 299 Mich.App. at 589-590, affording defense counsel"broad discretion" in such matters, Pickens, 446 Mich. at 325.Furthermore, a "particular strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel simply because it does not work."People v Matuszak, 263 Mich.App. 42, 61; 687 N.W.2d 342(2004).Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel's performance was not sound trial strategy and failed to show that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.SeeArmstrong, 490 Mich. at 290.

Even if defense counsel's performance was unreasonable and did not constitute sound trial strategy, defendant failed to demonstrate...