People v. Dehart
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 353422 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN MICHAEL DEHART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 18-006637-01-FC
Before: Rick, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and Letica, JJ.
Defendant appeals as on leave granted the trial court's order denying his motion for destruction of his biometric data and arrest record. On appeal, defendant argues that MCL 28.243(14)(c) is unconstitutional because it violates a defendant's right to equal protection, treating those acquitted of sex offenses disparately from those acquitted of other offenses without a rational basis for doing so, and violates an acquitted defendant's right to the presumption of innocence. Defendant further argues that an acquitted defendant has a common-law right to the return of biometric data and arrest records that the Legislature did not clearly abrogate by enacting MCL 28.423(14). We affirm.
Defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b) (), and arraigned. After two subsequent jury trials ended in hung juries and mistrials, a third jury found defendant not guilty and the trial court entered an order of acquittal.[1] Four days later, defendant filed a form motion requesting destruction of his biometric data and arrest record. SCAO Form MC 235 (June 2019). Defendant asserted that after he was found not guilty of CSC-I, the arresting agency or Michigan State Police "ha[d] not destroyed the biometric data and arrest record as required by law," even though "one of the crimes listed in MCL 28.243(14)" was not involved. The prosecution denied that defendant was entitled to the destruction of his biometric data and arrest record because his acquittal did indeed pertain to crimes listed in MCL 28.243(14), namely, the commission of a crime against a child under 16 years of age, MCL 28.243(14)(a), and criminal sexual conduct (CSC) in any degree, MCL 28.243(14)(c).
At the hearing on the motion, defendant recognized that the plain statutory language precluded the destruction of his biometric data and arrest record. Nevertheless, defendant maintained that the allegation against him was false and he orally argued that MCL 28.243(14) violated his constitutional right to equal protection. Defendant also argued that he was "innocent until proven guilty," and, despite the jury's not guilty finding, the statute treated him differently than other defendants found not guilty on the basis of the nature of the allegation against him. In response, the prosecutor disagreed with defendant's characterization of the allegation against him as false: [2] The prosecutor further asserted the statutory language was clear and defendant was not entitled to the destruction of his biometric data and arrest record. The trial court agreed with the prosecution, but did not specifically address defendant's constitutional arguments.
Defendant moved for reconsideration, asserting that "[t]he jury and many of the panel members of the mistrial juries believed the charges may have been fabricated." Defendant again argued that MCL 28.243[3] disparately treated individuals who were acquitted of a CSC offense compared to all other offenses. Defendant also raised a new argument-the trial court possessed "common law powers to grant the relief sought[.]" More specifically, defendant asserted that in addition to its statutory authority to return the fingerprints, the court had ancillary jurisdiction to order their return as well as the equitable power to order return of the biometric data and arrest record. The trial court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration.
Defendant then filed an application for delayed leave to appeal with this Court, which we denied for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v DeHart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 28, 2020 (Docket No. 353422). Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the matter to this Court to consider as on leave granted. People v DeHart, 506 Mich. 964 (2020).[4]
Constitutional issues and questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v Idziak, 484 Mich. 549, 554; 773 N.W.2d 616 (2009).
In Michigan, when a person is arrested for a felony, his biometric data must be collected by the arresting law enforcement agency and forwarded to the state police. MCL 28.243(1). Biometric data includes fingerprint and palm print[5] images, digital images of a person's face and body[6] during arrest or booking, and "[a]ll descriptive data associated with identifying marks, scars, amputations, and tattoos." MCL 28.241a(b)(i)-(iv). If the arrestee is released without being charged with an offense, the biometric data and arrest card[7] must be destroyed. MCL 28.243(7).[8]But if the arrestee is charged and the charge or charges are dismissed before trial:
See also MCL 764.26a. Finally, if the arrestee is found not guilty following a trial, his or her biometric data and arrest card must be destroyed, MCL 28.243(10), unless an exception under MCL 28.243(14) applies. In full, MCL 28.243(14) reads:
This "statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it bears a heavy burden of rebutting that presumption." Idziak, 484 Mich. at 570 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The federal and state Constitutions guarantee every person equal protection under the law. U.S. Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2; People v Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich.App. 345, 367; 869 N.W.2d 651 (2015). "The equal protection clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions are coextensive." Idziak, 484 Mich. at 570. "In a challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant must show that he . . . was treated differently than other persons who were similarly situated and that there exists no rational basis for such disparate treatment." Konopka, 309 Mich.App. at 367 (citations omitted). In the absence of a "fundamental" right or a "suspect" classification, "[t]he burden is on the person challenging the classification to show that it is without reasonable justification." People v Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, 331; 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990) (quotation omitted).
To prevail under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute. Rational-basis review does not test the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation, or whether the classification is made with mathematical nicety, or even whether it results in some inequity when put into practice. [Idziak, 484 Mich. at 570-571 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Applying the plain language of MCL 28.243(14)(a) and (c), defendant is not entitled to the destruction of his biometric data and arrest record because the offense he was charged with committing, arraigned upon, and later acquitted of, was a crime against a child under 16 years of age as well as a CSC in any degree. When, however, a statute is inconsistent with the federal constitution, the constitution must prevail. Mays v Governor, 506 Mich. 157, 189; 954 N.W.2d 139 (2020). Thus, if, as defendant claims, the statute precluding the destruction of the biometric data and arrest record for those charged with and acquitted of certain offenses violates the Equal Protection Clause or the presumption of innocence, it must be struck down.
Twenty-five years ago, this Court addressed these same questions in People v Cooper (After Remand), 220 Mich.App. 368 559 N.W.2d 90 (1996). This Court first analyzed whether MCL 28.243 "violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution by precluding a person who is acquitted of criminal sexual conduct charges from obtaining the return of the person's fingerprint cards, arrest card, and description...
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