People v. DeLisle

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: HOOD
• Citation: People v. DeLisle, 202 Mich.App. 658, 509 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. App. 1993)
• Decision Date: 06 December 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 133172
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence J. DeLISLE, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 885

509 N.W.2d 885

202 Mich.App. 658

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence J. DeLISLE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 133172.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Aug. 11, 1993, at Detroit.

Decided Dec. 6, 1993, at 9:50 a.m.

Released for Publication Jan. 27, 1994.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

State Appellate Defender by Peter Jon Van Hoek, for defendant on appeal.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and HOOD and B.A. JASPER, ^* JJ.

HOOD, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree premeditated murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, and one count of attempted first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.91; M.S.A. § 28.286, following the highly publicized drowning deaths of his four children and the near death of his wife when the family's station wagon plunged into the Detroit River. Defendant received five concurrent life sentences, and appeals as of right. We affirm.

Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence of intent. We disagree.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979). The question is whether the evidence presented at trial, together with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find each element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This Court may not interfere with the jury's resolution of credibility disputes. People v. Vaughn, 186 Mich.App. 376, 380, 465 N.W.2d 365 (1990).

First-degree murder is the intentional killing of another, done with premeditation and deliberation. People v. Coddington, 188 Mich.App. 584, 599, 470 N.W.2d 478 (1991). The length of time necessary to "measure and evaluate a choice before it is made is incapable of precise determination"; all that is necessary is enough time to take a "second look" at the actions contemplated. Id. at 599-600, 470 N.W.2d 478. Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances, including the defendant's behavior before and after the crime. Id. at 600, 470 N.W.2d 478.

Here, the evidence showed that defendant drove to the site of the crash on the previous evening and earlier on the night of the crash. It also showed that, after stopping at a drugstore, defendant turned toward the river instead of toward his home, that he accelerated in a straight path toward the river, not braking and not hitting any parked cars that might have impeded his progress, and that, after about seven seconds, he managed to drive between the posts of a barrier at the end of the street (a difficult accomplishment) and plunged into the river about forty feet from the bank. The evidence also showed that defendant surfaced quickly after the crash, which was inconsistent with his claim that he had a leg cramp. His quick exit from the car also tended to show that he had anticipated the crash and had planned to escape without pausing to help his family. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with intent to kill formed after premeditation and deliberation. There was therefore sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions.

Next, defendant argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.

We review a denial of a motion for a new trial based on a great weight of the evidence argument under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Harris, 190 Mich.App. 652, 658-659, 476 N.W.2d 767, 476 N.W.2d 767 (1991). The question is whether the verdict was manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 659, 476 N.W.2d 767. A verdict may be vacated only when it "does not find reasonable support in the evidence, but is more likely to be attributed to causes outside the record such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some extraneous influence." Nagi v. Detroit United Railway, 231 Mich. 452, 457, 204 N.W. 126 (1925). A new trial may therefore be granted when the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See MCR 6.431(B); see also M.C.L. § 770.1; M.S.A. § 28.1098.

The evidence presented at trial did not clearly weigh in defendant's favor. Rather, although his claim that there were mechanical problems with the car was supported, these mechanical problems were not shown to consistently cause the car to accelerate out of control. The evidence therefore presented a credibility contest regarding whether the car had indeed malfunctioned and whether defendant really had a leg cramp, and also regarding defendant's intent. As noted by the trial court, resolving credibility questions is the exclusive province of the jury even where the trial court would have reached a different result. See Nagi, supra at 457, 204 N.W. 126; see also King v. Taylor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 184 Mich.App. 204, 210, 457 N.W.2d 42 (1990). The trial court properly refused to vacate the verdict on this ground.

Defendant next argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal in denying his motion for a change of venue based upon pretrial publicity. We again disagree.

The denial of a motion for a change of venue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Passeno, 195 Mich.App. 91, 98, 489 N.W.2d 152 (1992). An abuse of discretion will be found only if an unprejudiced person would find no justification or excuse for the ruling made. We note that the trial court could have granted defendant a new trial on this basis but, although expressing concern over its earlier ruling regarding venue, refused to do so. See MCR 6.431(B); see also M.C.L. § 770.1; M.S.A. § 28.1098.

Defendant acknowledges the general rule that where potential jurors can swear that they will put aside preexisting knowledge and opinions about the case, neither will be a ground for reversing a denial of a motion for a change of venue. See Passeno, supra at 98-99, 489 N.W.2d 152; see also People v. Furman, 158 Mich.App. 302, 321, 404 N.W.2d 246 (1987). However, he argues, the jury in this case was exposed to defendant's inadmissible "confession" through the media to such a great extent that they could not be expected to set aside such knowledge. We disagree and, after a thorough review of the record, find no reason to disregard the jurors' assurances that they could render a fair and impartial verdict in this case. We reemphasize that when citizens have been sworn to tell the truth, and testify under oath that they can be impartial, the initial presumption is that they are honoring their oath and are being truthful.

Cases where jurors' protestations of impartiality have been disregarded are much more egregious than the present case. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1645, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), for example, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the jury was chosen from a panel where almost ninety percent, 370 out of 420, of the prospective jurors who were asked the question admitted having an opinion about the case. In fact, two-thirds of the jury that convicted the defendant admitted having an opinion that he was guilty but claimed to be able to set it aside and render an impartial verdict. Id. at 727-728, 81 S.Ct. at 1645-46. The Court stated that "[n]o doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight." Id. at 728, 81 S.Ct. at 1645.

Cases where publicity is presumed to have had an effect on the jury are similarly outrageous. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963), the United States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, "without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire," holding that "due process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and heard [the defendant's] televised 'interview.' " InRideau, the defendant's confession was televised three times about two weeks before the arraignment to audiences of twenty-four thousand, fifty-three thousand, and twenty-nine thousand people in a parish with a population of about 150,000. Id. at 724, 83 S.Ct. at 1643. However, only three of the jurors who decided the case admitted having seen the "interview." ¹ Id. at 725, 83 S.Ct. at 1418.

In Rideau, there was no evidence that the defendant's confession was procured through violence or psychological pressure. Id. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. He was, however, "interviewed" by the sheriff without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. The opinion did not discuss the admissibility of the defendant's confession.

In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965), the Supreme Court presumed prejudice and reversed the defendant's conviction where pretrial hearings were carried live on radio and television, there were at least twelve cameramen in the courtroom during the proceedings and cables and wires were snaked everywhere, and the activities of television crews and news photographers created considerable disruption.

In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the defendant's conviction was reversed where the coroner, with the prosecutor and two bailiffs, held a televised three-day inquest of the defendant in a school gymnasium, during which the defendant was publicly searched and the defendant's attorney was not allowed to participate.

Contrary...