People v. Demagall

Citation114 A.D.3d 189,978 N.Y.S.2d 416,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00143
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William S. DEMAGALL, Appellant.
Decision Date09 January 2014
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

114 A.D.3d 189
978 N.Y.S.2d 416
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00143

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
William S. DEMAGALL, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Jan. 9, 2014.


[978 N.Y.S.2d 417]


Paul Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.

Michael A. Cozzolino, Special Prosecutor, Claverack, for respondent.


Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., STEIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

STEIN, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Nichols, J.), rendered March 22, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree.

On February 9, 2006, defendant escaped from the secure psychiatric unit of Berkshire Medical Center. He had been brought to the facility almost a week earlier by his grandmother due to his aberrant behavior. It was the fourth time in three years that family members had brought him to the psychiatric facility and, at the time of his escape, the facility was in the process of attempting to have him involuntarily committed. Less than two days later, on February 11, 2006, defendant murdered the victim, a man he had met briefly only once before on January 25, 2006.

Defendant was indicted on, among other things, murder in the second degree and a plea bargain was reached between defendant and the People wherein defendant agreed to plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect ( seeCPL 220.15; Penal Law § 40.15). However, the plea was rejected by County Court (Czajka, J.) and the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, rejecting his affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Due to various errors, we reversed on appeal and ordered a new trial before a different judge (63 A.D.3d 34, 876 N.Y.S.2d 541 [2009], lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 924, 884 N.Y.S.2d 705, 912 N.E.2d 1086 [2009] ).

Prior to the second trial, County Court (Nichols, J.) found defendant to be an incapacitated person ( seeCPL 730.10[1] ) and committed him to the Mid–Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center (hereinafter MHFPC) in November 2009. By January 2010, his condition had improved and he was thereafter determined to be competent to stand trial. On the eve of defendant's second trial, the People sought permission

[978 N.Y.S.2d 418]

to introduce at trial the records from defendant's stay at MHFPC, which defendant strenuously opposed. Following argument and assurances from the People that the information in the records would be elicited through the testimony of Quazi Al–Tariq, the psychiatrist who was assigned to defendant during his stay at MHFPC, County Court ruled that the records could be used at trial.1

Following a second jury trial, defendant's affirmative defense was again rejected and he was found guilty of murder in the second degree. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years to life and he now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that various errors once again deprived defendant of a fair trial and, as a result, we reverse.

Initially, we reject defendant's contention that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In cases such as this where a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must, “like the trier of fact below, ‘weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony’ ” and, “[i]f it appears that the trier of fact has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, [we] may set aside the verdict” (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987], quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N.Y. 55, 62, 50 N.E.2d 542 [1943]; see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). Regarding a defendant's sanity, it is well settled that the trier of fact has the right to accept or reject the testimony of any expert, or any portion thereof ( see People v. Stoffel, 17 A.D.3d 992, 993, 794 N.Y.S.2d 230 [2005], lv. denied5 N.Y.3d 795, 801 N.Y.S.2d 816, 835 N.E.2d 676 [2005]; People v. Gilbert, 103 A.D.2d 967, 968, 479 N.Y.S.2d 782 [1984] ). Generally, “where, as here, there is conflicting expert evidence, the issue of a defendant's criminal responsibility is for the jury to resolve” (People v. Tillman, 260 A.D.2d 656, 657, 688 N.Y.S.2d 276 [1999]; see People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44, 187 N.E.2d 116 [1962]; People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340, 110 N.E. 945 [1915]; People v. Stoffel, 17 A.D.3d at 993, 794 N.Y.S.2d 230), and we will intervene only when there is a “ ‘serious flaw’ in the testimony offered by the People's expert” (People v. Tillman, 260 A.D.2d at 657, 688 N.Y.S.2d 276, quoting People v. Enchautegui, 156 A.D.2d 461, 461, 548 N.Y.S.2d 567 [1989], lv. denied76 N.Y.2d 787, 559 N.Y.S.2d 992, 559 N.E.2d 686 [1990]; see People v. Irizarry, 238 A.D.2d 940, 941, 661 N.Y.S.2d 147 [1997], lv. denied90 N.Y.2d 894, 662 N.Y.S.2d 437, 685 N.E.2d 218 [1997]; People v. Justice, 173 A.D.2d 144, 146, 579 N.Y.S.2d 502 [1991]; People v. Mainville, 59 A.D.2d 809, 809–810, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1012 [1977] ).

Turning to the evidence adduced at trial, the basic facts of defendant's history and the events surrounding his murder of the victim are undisputed. As various members of defendant's family related at trial, defendant's behavior began to change in 2003, when he was 20 years old. For example, he quit his job and became more “seclusive.” Defendant also began carrying a sword and claiming to be King Arthur, in search of the Holy Grail and “no longer of this world,” and he routinely quoted from the Bible. As a result of this behavior, his parents brought him to the secure psychiatric unit of Berkshire Medical Center in July 2003. Following this

[978 N.Y.S.2d 419]

stay, defendant's behavior deteriorated, leading to his hospitalization at the secure psychiatric unit a second time for a few days in June 2004 and a third time at the beginning of July 2004; the latter stay lasted more than two weeks due to the fact that defendant threatened his mother when she expressed concern over his possible release after a week. Subsequent to his release from the third hospitalization, similar behaviors manifested over the next year and a half, with defendant alternating claims that he was Merlin, King Arthur, the “Bear King” or Jesus. Defendant began wearing all black, got a tattoo on his forehead—which he said was Merlin's marking—fasted for 40 days, stopped sleeping, planned to live in a cave in the woods, was preoccupied with the Bible and Arthurian legends, and talked frequently about the world ending. His family became increasingly troubled by defendant's behavior and concerned for his safety and that of others. Finally, on February 3, 2006, his grandmother took him to be hospitalized once again at the psychiatric unit. While there, the process to have defendant involuntarily committed was begun by the facility's staff.

On February 9, 2006, defendant escaped from the secure psychiatric unit and made his way to his cousin John Hobart's house. As set forth in defendant's written confession, Hobart drove him to Columbia County and dropped him off near the victim's home on the morning of February 11, 2006. Defendant was admitted into the residence by the victim and, after a brief conversation, pulled out a pocket knife and repeatedly stabbed him in the chest. After the victim pleaded for his life, defendant looked into his eyes in order “to see his soul” and told him that “[he was] already dead.” Defendant then took a second weapon—a glass paperweight secured in the toe of a sock—from his pants pocket and bludgeoned the victim until defendant “could see his brain coming out of his ear.” After this, defendant soaked the weapons in the sink while he took various items from around the victim's home—including a sleep apnea machine, a box of harmonicas, car keys, a check, an article of clothing and approximately $270—and proceeded to set the victim's body on fire. Defendant then left the apartment after barricading its back door and locking the front door and walked to the prearranged place where Hobart was to pick him up.

Hobart dropped defendant at a motel in the Town of Schodack, Rensselaer County, where defendant rented a room using Hobart's name. The following day, defendant entered a pharmacy and unsuccessfully attempted to barter some costume jewelry for morphine. Next, he went into a Burger King and filled out an employment application, again using Hobart's name. Defendant then hid in the bathroom when police entered the restaurant but, upon exiting the restaurant shortly thereafter, defendant approached the police with his hands up and asked them if they were looking for him. After a brief exchange in which defendant originally gave Hobart's name and then admitted to his real name, he was detained and a pat down revealed the pocketknife and the paperweight in the sock. Defendant was then arrested, transported to the police station and ultimately placed in the Rensselaer County jail. However, the minor charges on which he was being held were dismissed and he was released from jail on February 15, 2006. Upon exiting the jail, defendant was approached by an investigator with the Columbia County Sheriff's Department and an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Defendant agreed to talk to them and, after brief questioning, confessed to the victim's murder. He later signed a lengthy written confession to what he called “Operation Cobra,” which

[978 N.Y.S.2d 420]

he said was the “premeditated murder of the snake who was [the victim].”

Following the People's undisputed establishment of the elements of second degree murder, the trial moved to defendant's affirmative defense of insanity ( seePenal Law § 40.15). Pursuant to the jury charge ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880...

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