People v. Denio
| Citation | 564 N.W.2d 13,454 Mich. 691 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | 103191 and 105328,Nos. 101601,Nos. 4-6,s. 101601,s. 4-6 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kimber Dale DENIO, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert C. BANKS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Tony Tague, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin A. Lynch and Victor A. Fitz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Muskegon, for People in Denio and Banks.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Chris J. VanOosterum, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. Ronald Kaplansky, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, for People in Tucker.
Jeanice Dagher-Margosian, Ann Arbor, for Defendant-Appellee Denio.
Joan Ellerbusch Morgan, Detroit, for Defendant-Appellant Banks.
State Appellate Defender by Anne Yantus, Detroit, for Defendant-Appellant Tucker.
William Forsyth, President, John D. O'Hair, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney , Detroit, amicus curiae, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Robin M. Lerg, Troy, amicus curiae, for Families Against Mandatory Minimums Foundation, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
In People v. Denio, we are asked to construe the conspiracy statute, M.C.L.
§ 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), 1 as it relates to the consecutive sentencing provision of M.C.L. § 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3). 2 The conspiracy statute mandates that a person convicted[454 Mich. 695] of conspiracy "shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit...." The consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) mandates that prison terms for the enumerated drug offenses must run consecutively with sentences imposed for other felonies. The issue is whether the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) falls within the term "penalty" in the conspiracy statute. In People v. Banks and People v. Tucker, we are asked to determine whether consecutive sentences for an enumerated drug offense and for conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense, committed in the same criminal transaction, violates the protection against double jeopardy
We hold that the Legislature intended the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) to fall within the term "penalty" in the conspiracy statute because § 7401(3), like the conspiracy statute, is directed at the sentencing court, the entity that imposes penalties. We further hold that consecutive sentences for an enumerated drug offense and for conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense do not violate double jeopardy, even when the offenses are committed in the same criminal transaction. We base this holding on our conclusion that the Legislature intended multiple punishments at a single trial for persons who commit a drug offense enumerated in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that drug offense. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Denio and affirm the Court of Appeals decisions in People v. Banks and People v. Tucker.
On August 3, 1994, during trial, Kimber Denio pleaded guilty of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), and conspiracy to deliver marijuana, M.C.L. § 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d). 3 On September 7, 1994, pursuant to the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), the trial court sentenced Denio to consecutive terms of three to twenty years in prison on the conspiracy to deliver cocaine conviction and two to four years in prison on the conspiracy to deliver marijuana conviction.
Denio appealed his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals agreed, remanding Denio's case to the trial court directing it to sentence him to concurrent prison terms. 4 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) did not authorize the trial court to sentence Denio to consecutive prison terms because his sentences were not imposed pursuant to a felony enumerated in § 7401(3), but were, instead, imposed pursuant to the conspiracy statute. 5 On May 21, 1996, we granted the people's application for leave to appeal. 6
On April 5, 1993, Gilbert Banks pleaded guilty of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). 7 On May 5, 1993, pursuant to the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), the trial court sentenced Banks to consecutive terms of 3 1/2 to 20 years in prison for each offense.
Banks appealed his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that § 7401(3) mandated consecutive sentences. 8 On May 24, 1996, we granted Banks' application for leave to appeal. 9
On February 14, 1992, following a jury trial, Robert Lee Tucker was convicted of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). On March 17, 1992, pursuant to the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), the trial court sentenced Tucker to consecutive terms of two to twenty years in prison for each offense.
Tucker appealed his sentences, arguing that they violated the principle of proportionality. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the sentences imposed by the trial court. 10 On May 24, 1996, we granted Tucker's application for leave to appeal. 11
People v. Denio
In Denio, we are asked to interpret the conspiracy statute and the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, see St. George Greek Orthodox Church of Southgate v. Laupmanis Associates, P.C., 204 Mich.App. 278, 282, 514 N.W.2d 516 (1994), which we review de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Morris, 450 Mich. 316, 326, 537 N.W.2d 842 (1995). If a statute is clear, we enforce it as plainly written. Id. However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must engage in judicial construction and interpret the statute. Id.; Piper v. Pettibone Corp., 450 Mich. 565, 571, 542 N.W.2d 269 (1995). Furthermore, a statute that is unambiguous on its face can be "rendered ambiguous by its interaction with and its relation to other statutes." People v. Jahner, 433 Mich. 490, 496, 446 N.W.2d 151 (1989), quoting 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.04, pp 86-87.
In interpreting a statute, words are to be given their common, generally accepted meaning. MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1); Hawley v. Snider, 346 Mich. 181, 185, 77 N.W.2d 754 (1956). Furthermore, when terms are not expressly defined by a statute, a court may consult dictionary definitions. See In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 209 Mich.App. 540, 544, 531 N.W.2d 806 (1995).
The "rule of lenity" provides that courts should mitigate punishment when the punishment in a criminal statute is unclear.. Jahner, supra at 499-500, 446 N.W.2d 151. This rule, however, does not apply when construing the consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) because our Legislature mandated in M.C.L. § 333.1111(2); MSA 14.15(1111)(2) that provisions of the Public Health Code, which include § 7401(3), are to be "liberally construed for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state." Morris, supra at 326-327, 537 N.W.2d 842. Furthermore, the "rule of lenity" does not apply in this case, given the penal nature of § 7401(3) and the conspiracy statute. See Morris, supra at 327, 537 N.W.2d 842. 12
Turning to the case now before us, Denio argues that § 7401(3) did not authorize the trial court to impose consecutive sentences because he was not convicted of a drug offense enumerated in that section; rather, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit an enumerated drug offense. We are not persuaded.
Denio was convicted of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. The conspiracy statute provides that a person convicted of conspiracy
shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed. [MCL 750.157a(a); MSA 28.354(1)(a) (emphasis added).]
A person convicted of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine "shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 year nor more than 20 years, and may be fined not more than $25,000.00, or placed on probation for life." 13 At the time of Denio's trial, a person convicted of delivery of marijuana could be punished "by imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or ... fine[d] ... [for] not more than $2,000.00, or both." 14
The trial court sentenced Denio to consecutive terms of imprisonment for his convictions pursuant to § 7401(3), which provides in pertinent part:
A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment...
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