People v. Denis
Decision Date | 19 November 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 1-15-1892,1-15-1892 |
Citation | 426 Ill.Dec. 263,115 N.E.3d 1185,2018 IL App (1st) 151892 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor DENIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Ross E. Allen, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary L. Boland, and Lisanne P. Puliese, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 During an argument in 2010, M.D., the minor victim in this case, told her mother that she had been raped as a young child. The next day, M.D. identified her rapist as defendant Victor Denis. M.D.'s mother alerted the police, and defendant was arrested for his alleged commission of sexual acts against M.D. on two separate occasions in 1999. Defendant was read his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ) and confessed during a police interview. Six hours later, defendant gave a written confession. Defendant said he raped M.D. on one occasion and placed M.D.'s hand on his penis on another occasion.
¶ 2 Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child ( 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)1 ), three counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-13(a)(2), (a)(3)2 ), and four counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 12-16(c)(1)(i) ).
¶ 3 Before trial, defendant asked the trial court for a fitness determination. The trial court granted his request and found defendant fit to stand trial. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession, which proceeded to a hearing. The trial court heard testimony from defendant's expert witness that he had an IQ of 73 and a limited mental capacity. The State's expert witness testified that, despite his limited mental capacity, defendant understood his Miranda rights and understood his actions in 1999. The trial court denied defendant's motion.
¶ 4 The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-13(a)(2) ) and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 12-16(c)(1)(i)3 ). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve three- and five-year terms of imprisonment, respectively, and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court denied defendant's posttrial motions. As a result of his convictions, defendant was required to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his natural life under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) ( 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2014) ).
¶ 5 Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse ( 720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998) ) and criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-13(a)(2) ) beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew M.D. was unable to understand the nature of his sexual act and unable to give knowing consent to it, (3) the trial court erred when it allowed M.D.'s mother to testify that M.D. had been raped by defendant, (4) the trial court erred when it ordered defendant to serve a longer mandatory supervised release term than was in effect when he committed the sexual act that supported his conviction for criminal sexual assault (id. ), and (5) SORA and related statutes are facially unconstitutional.
¶ 7 M.D. and her mother got into an argument in July 2010. During the argument, M.D. told her mother that she had been raped as a young child. The next day, M.D. revealed the identity of the alleged rapist: her cousin, defendant Victor Denis. M.D.'s mother reported the information to the Cicero Police Department, and Detective Jason Stroud was assigned to investigate the case.
¶ 8 Following an initial interview with M.D. at the police station, Detective Stroud went to M.D.'s home where she identified defendant in a photo array. Detective Stroud and his partner set out to locate defendant and found him at his home. Defendant agreed to speak with the Detectives and accompanied them to the police station for an interview. At the station, Detective Stroud read defendant his Miranda rights and asked defendant if he understood them. Defendant answered in the positive. Defendant proceeded to read his Miranda rights, initialed and signed a preprinted Miranda form, and said he wanted to speak with the police. After Detective Stroud informed defendant of M.D.'s allegations, he wanted to give his side of the story.
¶ 9 Defendant told Detective Stroud that two "incidents" occurred, when he was 18 years old and M.D. was 7, but he could not remember which incident happened first. One of the incidents occurred at M.D's home. Defendant and M.D. were sitting on the couch with a blanket covering them. Defendant stated that M.D. wanted to touch defendant's penis, so he let her. M.D. touched defendant's penis in an up-down motion.
¶ 10 The other incident occurred in M.D's room. Defendant stated that he was with M.D. on her bed when she asked defendant to have sex. Defendant took off his pants, and M.D. took off her pants. Defendant placed his penis in her vagina for five minutes. After defendant made these statements, Detective Stroud contacted Assistant State's Attorney Randall Tyner.
¶ 11 Before interviewing defendant, Tyner reread defendant his Miranda rights with Detective Stroud present. Defendant said he understood his Miranda rights, agreed to speak with Tyner, and further agreed give a written statement. Tyner typed out defendant's five-page written statement on a computer and read the statement aloud. Defendant's statement started with his personal history: he finished the tenth grade, lived on his own in California before moving back to Illinois to live with his mother and grandmother, and worked construction jobs without steady work. Defendant then explained what happened with M.D. on two occasions in 1999.
¶ 12 Defendant stated that in the fall of 1999, when he was 18 years old and M.D. was 7, defendant helped M.D.'s mother move into a new house in Cicero. Defendant would often spend the night there, and on one occasion in the winter of 1999, M.D. asked if she could see his private area and touch his penis. Defendant stated that he allowed M.D. to touch his erect penis and that she grabbed and rubbed it for a couple minutes. Defendant moved her hand away and told her not to tell anyone what happened.
¶ 13 Defendant further stated that on a second occasion in the winter of 1999, he was at M.D.'s house. This time, M.D. and defendant were alone in M.D.'s bedroom. After defendant removed his pants, M.D. removed her pants, and defendant took his penis and put it inside of M.D.'s vagina. Defendant stated that he had an erection, and after about five minutes, removed his penis from M.D. and ejaculated on her bed. He told M.D. not to tell anyone what happened.
¶ 14 Defendant was placed under arrest and charged with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (count I) (id. § 12-14.1(a)(1) ); two counts of criminal sexual assault, which alleged that defendant knew that M.D. was unable to understand the nature of the act and unable to give knowing consent (counts II and III) (id. § 12-13(a)(2) ); one count of criminal sexual assault, which alleged that defendant was M.D.'s family member (count IV) (id. § 12-13(a)(3) ); and four counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (counts V, VI, VII, and VIII) (id. § 12-16(c)(1)(i) ).
¶ 15 Before trial, defendant asked the trial court for an expert to determine whether he (1) was fit to stand trial, (2) understood his Miranda rights, and (3) understood his actions in the winter of 1999. The trial court granted defendant's request. Defendant was examined by Dr. Fidel Echevarria, who submitted a letter to the trial court indicating that, in his opinion, defendant was mentally fit to stand trial, understood his Miranda rights, and would have understood his actions during the time period indicated in the indictment: between August 1999 and December 1999. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession as involuntary, arguing that the police coerced his confession and he was unable to comprehend his Miranda rights. Defendant's motion proceeded to a hearing.
¶ 16 Defendant testified at the hearing and stated that the police made a promise that he could go home. He testified that was he was read his Miranda rights, initialed and signed the Miranda form, and signed his written statement. He was not threatened to give his written statement, and no one told him what to include in his statement. Defendant did, however, testify that he did not understand all of his Miranda rights. Defendant's expert witness, psychologist Theresa Schaeffer, testified next.
¶ 17 Schaeffer interviewed defendant in 2008 when he was 26 years old. Schaeffer testified that she tested defendant's cognitive abilities under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, third edition (WAIS), and the Wide Range Achievement Test, fourth edition (WRAT). The WAIS was an intellectual quotient (IQ) test, while the WRAT assessed and assigned grade levels to academic categories (spelling, math, reading, and sentence comprehension). Schaeffer testified that the WAIS placed defendant's IQ at 73, which indicated that he had borderline intellectual function. Schaeffer testified that an IQ of 69 would indicate a mental deficiency. The results of defendant's WRAT were also low and indicated to Schaeffer that "it would be questionable whether or not [defendant] processes or comprehends things much the way a person in the average range of intelligence would."
¶ 18 The State called Dr. Echevarria, who had previously examined defendant and determined he was fit to stand trial. Dr. Echevarria testified to having reviewed Schaeffer's report and concluded that her...
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