People v. Derrico G. (In re Derrico G.)
| Decision Date | 04 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 114463.,114463. |
| Parties | In re DERRICO G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Derrico G., Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
15 N.E.3d 457
In re DERRICO G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Derrico G., Appellee).
No. 114463.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Aug. 4, 2014.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Annette Collins and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Cook County Public Defender, of Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.
OPINION
Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 At issue in this case is the constitutionality of section 5–615 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–615 (West 2010) ), which, as construed by this court in In re Veronica C., 239 Ill.2d 134, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010), grants a State's Attorney, among others, the authority to object to the entry of an order of continuance under supervision in a juvenile case before a finding of guilt. In this case, the circuit court of Cook County found section 5–615 unconstitutional, facially and as applied, reasoning that it violates separation of powers, equal protection, and due process guarantees. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 603 and 660(a) (Ill. S.Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001)), the State's appeal comes directly to this court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and vacate in part the judgment of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 2 PRINCIPAL STATUTE INVOLVED
¶ 3 At the time of proceedings below, section 5–615 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5–615(1), (2) (West 2010)), provided in pertinent part:
“§ 5–615. Continuance under supervision.
(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the trial, and (b) in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the State's Attorney.
(2) If the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or State's Attorney objects in open court to any continuance and insists upon proceeding to findings and adjudication, the court shall so proceed.”
¶ 4 An amendment to the Act, effective January 1, 2014, while still preventing the circuit court from entering an order of continuance under supervision over the State's Attorney's objection before a finding of delinquency, now allows the court to unilaterally order a continuance under supervision upon a finding of delinquency. See Pub. Act 98–62 (eff. Jan. 15, 2014). The statute now reads:
“Sec. 5–615 Continuance under supervision.
(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony:
(a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before the court makes a finding of delinquency, and in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the State's Attorney; or
(b) upon a finding of delinquency and after considering the circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the minor, if the court is of the opinion that:
(i) the minor is not likely to commit further crimes;
(ii) the minor and the public would be best served if the minor were not to receive a criminal record; and
(iii) in the best interests of justice an order of continuance under supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Act.” (Strikethroughs and underscores omitted.) Pub. Act 98–62 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5–615 (West 2012) ).
¶ 5 BACKGROUND
¶ 6 On January 26, 2012, the attorneys in this case, assistant State's Attorney Jennifer Bruzan, and assistant Public Defender Geraldine Nolfi, appeared before the judge in this cause on a different charge lodged against the respondent-minor—possession of a controlled substance—that predated the unrelated conduct which underlies the felony charge to which respondent ultimately pled guilty herein. The respondent did not appear. At that time, the State proffered the following evidence in support of a request for a juvenile arrest warrant.
¶ 7 On January 5, 2012, Officers Connor and McCarthy were on patrol when, at 2700 West Flournoy Street in Chicago, Illinois, they observed respondent shouting, “rocks, rocks”—a street term for crack cocaine—and passing foot traffic in an attempt to solicit the sale of narcotics. The respondent was placed in custody, and a custodial search of his person revealed one clear, plastic bag containing five mini-
Ziploc bags ultimately determined to contain crack cocaine.
¶ 8 Based on that proffer, the judge found “probable cause” for issuance of a juvenile arrest warrant, and “urgent and immediate necessity”—presumably for detention of the respondent. The court nonetheless decided to “enter and continue” a juvenile arrest warrant, and instructed Ms. Nolfi to contact respondent's mother to advise her of the need to be present, with the respondent, at the next scheduled court date. The court and the assistant State's Attorney also discussed the possibility of a drug treatment program that would result in deferred prosecution upon successful completion. At that juncture, the State appeared to be receptive to the idea of deferred prosecution under appropriate circumstances.
¶ 9 On February 10, 2012, the respondent appeared before the judge on new charges: two counts of aggravated battery and three counts of resisting a peace officer. Respondent's counsel stipulated to probable cause, and the court again found “urgent and immediate necessity.” The court denied the State's request for electronic monitoring, imposed a curfew, and sent the respondent home with his older brother, who apparently had “some history” with the judge as well. As was the case on January 26, respondent's mother did not attend because of an ongoing health issue, represented to be congestive heart failure. When questioned in court, respondent indicated he did not know who his father was.
¶ 10 Respondent did not appear at the next scheduled court date; nor did his mother.
¶ 11 Neither respondent nor his mother timely appeared at the next court date, April 5, 2012, and a juvenile arrest warrant was issued. Thereafter, that same day, respondent and his mother did appear. Counsel for the respondent then announced that the minor would plead guilty in the aggravated battery case, and there would be a recommended sentence. The State confirmed that there was a plea agreement, the principal terms of which included a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated battery on a public way, the nolle prosequi of another aggravated battery count and the striking, on leave to reinstate, of multiple resisting charges involving three police officers, as well as the nolle prosequi of the prior, unrelated felony charge of possession of a controlled substance, and a “recommended” sentence of 18 months' probation. The State indicated before the two arrests for the aggravated battery and possession charges the respondent “had one prior arrest on November 1, 2009, for aggravated battery with a weapon, not a firearm * * * but it looks like nothing came of that.”
¶ 12 The court then advised the respondent of the nature of the charge to which he would plead and the possible punishment. In the latter regard, the court suggested that supervision was possible. The following exchange then took place:
“MS. BRUZAN [Assistant State's Attorney]: For a Class 3 felony, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. BRUZAN: No.
THE COURT: Yes. Or it could be all the way up to five years in jail.
MS. BRUZAN: You're correct in that he could receive supervision but only if it was by agreement of all the parties.
THE COURT: Oh, well, the supreme court has yet to answer that question.”
¶ 13 The court then digressed into a monologue concerning the status of other cases in which it had held the consent provision of section 5–615 unconstitutional, concluding, in the course of that discussion:
“So right now in this courtroom in these four walls, if I want to give supervision,...
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