People v. Derror
| Decision Date | 21 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 129364.,Docket No. 129269. |
| Citation | 475 Mich. 316,715 N.W.2d 822 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Delores Marie DERROR, Defendant-Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis Wayne Kurts, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Alan
Schneider, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert A. Cooney, Deputy Civil Counsel, Traverse City, for the prosecution in Derror.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Henry C. Zavislak, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, Jackson, for the prosecution in Kurts.
State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac), Detroit, for Delores M. Derror.
Jerry M. Engle, Jackson, for Dennis W. Kurts.
In these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to determine whether 11-carboxy-THC, a "metabolite" or byproduct of metabolism created when the body breaks down THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), the psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, is a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 of the Public Health Code. We hold that it is. Thus, a person operating a motor vehicle with 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system may be prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8), which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body.
Additionally, in Docket No. 129269, we clarify our decision in People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005), and hold that, in a prosecution under MCL 257.625(8), a prosecutor is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she might be intoxicated. Rather, the prosecutor need only prove that the defendant had any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his or her body. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand both cases to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Docket No. 129269, defendant Delores M. Derror was driving east on snow- and slush-covered M-72 when she crossed into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle, killing the front-seat passenger, paralyzing two children in the rear seat, and injuring a third child. The accident occurred at approximately 6:00 p.m. Derror admitted that she had smoked marijuana, at 2:00 p.m., earlier that day. Two blood samples were taken, one at approximately 8:00 p.m. and one at approximately 11:00 p.m. The first blood sample reflected 38 nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milliliter, and the second contained 31 nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milliliter. Derror was charged with operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in her body, causing death and serious injury, under MCL 257.625(4), (5), and (8). Derror was also charged with possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d).
In Docket No. 129364, defendant Dennis Kurts was stopped at approximately 9:00 p.m. for driving erratically. The officer smelled the odor of alcohol on Kurts. Kurts also had glassy, bloodshot eyes. Kurts admitted consuming two beers. During a pat-down search, the officer found a marijuana pipe in Kurts' pocket. Kurts then admitted that he had smoked marijuana a half-hour earlier. A blood sample was taken at approximately 10:00 p.m. Tests revealed that his blood contained eight nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milliliter and 0.07 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters. Kurts was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625(9); operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body, MCL 257.625(8); and operating a vehicle with a suspended or revoked license, MCL 257.904(3)(a).
Pretrial evidentiary hearings were held in both cases in which expert testimony regarding the characteristics of marijuana, THC, and 11-carboxy-THC was introduced. The Court of Appeals summarized this expert testimony as follows:
The experts agreed that carboxy THC is a "metabolite," or byproduct of metabolism, created in the human body during the body's biological process of converting marijuana into a water-soluble form that can be excreted more easily. Its presence in the blood conclusively proves that a person ingested THC at some point in time. However, carboxy THC itself has no pharmacological effect on the body and its level in the blood correlates poorly, if at all, to an individual's level of THC-related impairment. In fact, carboxy THC could remain in the blood long after all THC has gone, as THC quickly leaves the blood and enters the body's tissues. [People v. Derror (On Reconsideration), 268 Mich. App. 67, 71-72, 706 N.W.2d 451 (2005).]
The prosecution expert in Derror, Dr. Michelle Glinn, further testified, without dispute:
THC is taken up into the brain and into fat cells and into other tissues, and it leaves its effects on the brain and central nervous system for quite a while after it's not detectible in the blood any further.
The effects of—it causes chemical changes in the brain, basically, that persist for quite a while. And you can document defects in lab studies of THC beyond the time when it's no longer detectible in the blood.
In discussing the structural differences between THC and 11-carboxy-THC, Dr. Glinn explained, also without dispute, that THC and 11-carboxy-THC are identical except that in 11-carboxy-THC, two oxygen atoms are added to, and three hydrogen atoms are removed from, the eleventh carbon to make it more water soluble and easier to excrete.
Following the evidentiary hearings, the trial courts in both cases determined that the Legislature did not intend to include 11-carboxy-THC as a schedule 1 controlled substance because it has no pharmacological effect on the human body. The trial courts, however, reached divergent results regarding the effect of this conclusion. In Kurts, the trial court granted Kurts's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in violation of MCL 257.625(8) on the grounds of insufficient evidence. In Derror, however, the trial court ruled that, although 11-carboxy-THC is not itself a schedule 1 controlled substance, evidence of 11-carboxy-THC in Derror's blood at the time of testing may be presented to the jury as circumstantial evidence to establish that Derror had THC in her blood at the time of driving.
The prosecutors in both cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and affirmed the trial courts' rulings that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance.1 In Kurts, the Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's dismissal of the MCL 257.625(8) charge, concluding that although only 11-carboxy-THC was found in Kurts's blood, evidence existed from which a jury could conclude that Kurts had THC in his blood at the time that he was driving.2 The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion because Kurts admitted that he had smoked marijuana one half-hour before he was arrested, and because the expert testimony revealed that the presence of 11-carboxy-THC in a person's body conclusively establishes prior ingestion of THC.
The prosecutors in both cases applied for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals determination that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance within the meaning of MCL 257.625(8). In Docket No. 129269, the prosecutor also sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals determination that, in a prosecution involving MCL 257.625(8), a prosecutor must prove that the defendant knew he or she might be intoxicated. We granted both applications and ordered that the cases be submitted together.3
Whether 11-carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 of the Public Health Code for the purpose of MCL 257.625(8) is a matter of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo. People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005), citing People v. Moore, 470 Mich. 56, 61, 679 N.W.2d 41 (2004), and People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 253, 666 N.W2d 231 (2003). When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by applying the plain language of the statute. People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518, 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002).
Whether, in a prosecution involving MCL 257.625(8), the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she might be intoxicated is also a question of law that we review de novo. Schaefer, supra at 427, 703 N.W.2d 774.
MCL 257.625(8), which both Kurts and Derror were charged with violating, prohibits the operation of a vehicle while a controlled substance is present in the body. It provides, in relevant part:
A person ... shall not operate a vehicle. . . within this state if the person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7212, or a rule promulgated under that section
. . . .
MCL 333.7212(1)(c) specifically lists marijuana as a schedule 1 controlled substance, except for certain exceptions not applicable to these cases.
The term "marijuana" is defined in MCL 333.7106(3) as follows:
"Marihuana" means all parts of the plant Canabis [sic] sativa L., growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin.
In addition to specifically listing marijuana, MCL 333.7212(1)(d) and (e) provide that the following substances also qualify as schedule 1 controlled substances:
(d) Except as provided in subsection (2),...
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