People v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 31 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-3369.,1-04-3369.
• Citation: 887 N.E.2d 577
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clinton DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

887 N.E.2d 577

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clinton DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-04-3369.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

March 31, 2008.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Ann B. McLennan, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State's Attorney, Peter Fischer, Assistant State's Attorney, Christopher Petelle, Assistant State's Attorney, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Justice GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Clinton Dixon, contends that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's request to strike juror Emmerson Ratliff for cause and by refusing to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors about their attitudes towards drug abuse and addiction. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to appoint alternate counsel to represent him in his pro se posttrial motion for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of home invasion, residential burglary, armed robbery and first-degree murder. The charges against the defendant arose from the home invasion and stabbing death of James Knight.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging, inter alia, that his oral statement to the police and subsequent videotaped confession were involuntary because he was experiencing heroin withdrawal at the time he gave his statements. The defendant also alleged that his statements were the product of mental and physical abuse by the police. The defendant also alleged that the police promised him drugs in exchange for his videotaped confession. During his videotaped confession, the defendant described himself as "dope sick." The defendant further alleged that the police provided him with heroin at the conclusion of his videotaped confession.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the videotape of the defendant's confession, taken the day after his oral statement,

"does not reflect any of the significant signs of heroin withdrawal * * *. Notably absent is evidence of restlessness, yawning, running of the eyes or nose, increased sensitivity to pain, severe abdominal cramping, nausea and vomiting. Other than defendant's brief episode of contrition, he appears calm, composed and quite normal in appearance. * * * Likewise, his detailed description of the events leading to and culminating in the fatal stabbing of James Knight reflect a keen ability to observe, recall and relate telling aspects and details of the crime."

The court found the defendant's claim that he was experiencing drug withdrawal at the time he gave his statements "dubious" and rejected it. The court concluded that the defendant's statements were given freely and voluntarily and, thus, not subject to suppression.

Before jury selection, Judge Michael Toomin addressed defense counsel: "I don't think, Mr. Conniff, you've tried a jury up here. We'll spend a few minutes in chambers after we [do] the call." The defendant claims that during this conversation in Judge Toomin's chambers, the judge informed counsel for both sides that "back-striking" would not be permitted during voir dire.

Voir dire began with instructions from the court. Twelve potential jurors were then called as a panel for questioning. After counsel for the State questioned the members of the panel, one was removed for cause and another excused by peremptory challenge. The State questioned two substitute members and accepted and tendered the panel to the defense.

Before he began his questioning of the potential jurors, defense counsel requested that the court allow him to ask the potential jurors about their "views toward drug usage or addiction." Defense counsel explained, "`Cause we feel that may bear on some facts in this case. Although it's not a defense, we will just respectfully ask to be allowed to inquire the jury of that." The court asked for clarification as to the type of question defense counsel would ask. Defense counsel clarified:

"[W]hether any particular juror has any belief about drug usage which, based upon that belief, would make them believe that they could not be fair in listening to the evidence in judging this case based upon the evidence in this case."

The court responded:

"Well, it seems to me that to ask that question, you would have to preface it by telling them what there is about this case that they may hear that [could] impact upon drug usage or whatever. I don't know what would you propose. You just can't ask it in a vacuum because they would have no idea what you're talking about."

Defense counsel replied:

"Judge, it would be the mere fact that defendant was using drugs or addicted to drugs. That fact alone would that affect your ability to be fair in judging all the evidence in the case."

After listening to the State's opposition to defense counsel's request, the trial court, in denying the request, stated:

"I have some misgivings of allowing a question like that[,] that seems to single out a particular [aspect] of the case. And to ask for a preview[-]type of an opinion without really knowing how it fit into the entire context of the case. It does not appear to be a question that relates to a defense that's recognized and so I don't think the defendant is prejudiced in that manner that he's being denied the opportunity to know how a juror may vote dependent upon drug usage while it's not a defense. It's just a judgment factor of a defendant. I mean he may or other witnesses may be addict[s] or use drugs or such, but that's not what this [defendant is] on trial for and I don't know what relevance [ ][i]t really has other than to ask for an opinion about how the juror regards drug usage as such when it[']s not really an issue in the case. I'm gonna refuse to allow that."

During the defense's examination of the panel, counsel exercised three peremptory challenges. Three substitute potential jurors were then called and questioned by defense counsel; two were excused by peremptory challenge. Two replacement members of the panel were called forth and questioned, Emmerson Ratliff being one of them. When questioned by the defense, Ratliff testified that the only lawsuits he had been a party to were his divorce proceeding and a traffic case. Defense counsel accepted the panel of jurors, including Ratliff, and tendered the panel to the State.

The State questioned the substitute members of the panel. During the State's questioning of Ratliff, he answered in the affirmative when asked whether he could be fair to both sides. The State then asked Ratliff, "Have you yourself ever been arrested or charged with anything?" Ratliff answered, "No." After questioning the remaining potential jurors, the State asked for a sidebar. During the sidebar, the State informed the court and defense counsel that Ratliff's "rap sheet" indicated that he had been arrested twice for battery, once in 1982 and again in 1985. Additionally, on his jury questionnaire, Ratliff did not admit that he had previously been arrested or accused of a crime. Defense counsel requested that the court remove Ratliff for cause; the court refused defense counsel's request without explanation. The State accepted the panel as constituted when tendered by defense counsel. No further examination of Ratliff occurred. Ratliff became the jury foreperson.

During the trial, the State introduced the defendant's oral statement to the police and his subsequent videotaped confession detailing the events of June 13, 2002. In his oral statement, given on September 23, 2002, the defendant stated that on June 13, he needed money for drugs. The defendant and his friend drove to James Knight's house. The defendant entered Mr. Knight's house by breaking the window on the side door, which he knew allowed easy access because he had repaired it. As the defendant was gathering items from the home, he was confronted by Mr. Knight. Mr. Knight tackled the defendant. When Mr. Knight realized who the defendant was, he told him that he would not keep the incident a secret from the defendant's wife and mother-in-law, Jacqueline Byrd, Mr. Knight's live-in girlfriend. Mr. Knight also told the defendant that he was going to call the police. The defendant then went to the kitchen and got a butcher knife. The defendant picked up a television and radio while holding the knife and attempted to leave the house. The defendant and Mr. Knight began to struggle. The defendant stabbed Mr. Knight several times until he felt him go limp. The defendant left Mr. Knight's house with numerous items, including, jewelry, a television, a VCR, a DVD player, a radio, and two stereos. The defendant pawned Mr. Knight's possessions and used the money to buy drugs. The defendant threw the knife used to stab Mr. Knight over a fence into a wooded area. Later, the defendant assisted the police in recovering the knife.

The defendant's videotaped confession was taken on the day after he gave his oral statement to the police. There were few differences between the defendant's videotaped statement and his oral statement. The only difference of note was that in his videotaped confession, the defendant, for the first time, mentioned that he was "dope sick" during his statements to the police. The videotape was played for the jury.

The jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion, residential burglary, armed robbery, and the first-degree murder of James Knight.

On October 26, 2004, defense counsel filed a motion to vacate the judgment and grant the defendant a new trial. In support of the motion, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his videotaped confession and oral statement. Defense counsel...