People v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 27 May 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 37208,37208 |
| Citation | 190 N.E.2d 793,28 Ill.2d 122 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Cleophus DIXON, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Earle S. Rappaport, Jr., Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
The defendant, Cleophus Dixon, was tried by jury in the criminal court of Cook County and convicted of the crime of rape. He was given a sentence of 25 years in the penitentiary. We have issued a writ of error to review the conviction.
The defendant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt and it will therefore not be necessary to set forth the evidence in detail. The prosecuting witness and her male companion, one Tucson Boyd, testified that they were accosted by the defendant who directed them to proceed down an alley, where he robbed both of them and forced the prosecuting witness to submit to an act of intercourse. It appears that the defendant had previously been tried on the same indictment and at that trial the jury was unable to agree and a mistrial was declared. The defendant contends that he was deprived of the equal protection of the laws by reason of the fact that he was financially unable to purchase a transcript of the evidence at the first trial and the State failed to provide him with a free transcript. It is argued that the defendant needed the transcript to lay a proper foundation for impeachment and also to prepare for trial. The record of the second trial shows that on many occasions during defense counsel's cross-examination of the prosecuting witness and Boyd, he attempted to establish that their testimony at the second trial differed from their testimony at the first trial. However, counsel did not have a transcript of the testimony at the first trial and the court sustained objections to all questions as to whether the witness in question had testified differently at the first trial, on the ground that the only proper method of laying a foundation for impeachment was to read the exact question and answer made at the former trial. It is true that this method is customary and proper (see People v. Williams, 22 Ill.2d 498, 503, 177 N.E.2d 100) but it is not always necessary to repeat the question and answer from the former trial (Math v. Chicago City Railway Co., 243 Ill. 114, 122, 90 N.E. 235; cf. Reisch v. People, 229 Ill. 574, 579, 82 N.E. 321.) The court therefore should have permitted defense counsel to lay a foundation for impeachment without requiring him to repeat the specific questions and answers from the former trial. After laying the foundation, the impeachment could have been completed, in the absence of a transcript, by calling the reporter at the former trial to prove the prior inconsistent testimony. The ruling of the trial court, which unduly restricted defense counsel's attempts to impeach the State's witnesses, requires that the judgment of conviction be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. This holding makes it unnecessary to rule upon the constitutional claim advanced by the defendant, since constitutional questions will not be decided if the cause can be determined on other grounds. (City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill.2d 297, 304, 146 N.E.2d 61.) We also note that after his conviction the defendant applied for and received a free transcript of the evidence at his first trial, which has been incorporated in the record on this writ of error. This transcript will be available for the defendant's use at a subsequent trial.
Since the cause must be remanded for a new trial we believe that it is appropriate to discuss certain other errors alleged by the defendant, since they involve matters which might occur on a subsequent trial. These alleged errors relate to rulings of the trial judge with respect to the testimony of certain witnesses. At the beginning of the defendant's case, counsel attempted to call a doctor as the first witness. Counsel for the State objected to hearing any testimony from the doctor. The objection was discussed by counsel and the court out of the presence of the jury. The State took the position that under no circumstances could any testimony by the doctor be competent since the State had introduced no medical testimony and did not contend that the prosecuting witness had been injured. Defense counsel claimed that the testimony of the doctor might be relevant to establish a lack of force. After further hear the testimony of the doctor out of the hear the testimony of the coctor out of the presence of the jury and decide whether it was competent. The doctor testified that she had examined the prosecuting witness and that her examination disclosed that the hymen was distensible and irregular and that the vagina admitted two fingers with ease. On the basis of this testimony the court decided that the testimony would be damaging to the defendant rather than helpful and announced that he would not let the doctor testify. The proceedings after this statement by the court are confusing. Defense counsel asked if he might just call the doctor, and...
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People v. White
...challenge to special duty doctrine not addressed because, inter alia, it was unnecessary to our disposition); People v. Dixon, 28 Ill.2d 122, 125, 190 N.E.2d 793 (1963); see also Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958) (“In keeping with our duty to avoid dec......
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People v. Robinson
...for impeachment, we are also mindful that "it is not always necessary to repeat the question and answer." People v. Dixon, 28 Ill.2d 122, 124, 190 N.E.2d 793 (1963). On retrial, if defense counsel chooses to pursue this impeachment, counsel is to present the place, circumstances and substan......
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People v. Oehrke
...can be decided on other grounds. People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill.2d 344, 356, 185 Ill.Dec. 528, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (1993); People v. Dixon, 28 Ill.2d 122, 125, 190 N.E.2d 793 (1963). Because we find the trial court erred in admitting Frieda's hearsay statements under the medical diagnosis and/or t......
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Wright v. Denato
...I we need not reach the constitutional questions raised. See City of Des Moines v. Lohner, Iowa, 168 N.W.2d 779, 782; People v. Dixon, 28 Ill.2d 122, 190 N.E.2d 793, 794; State v. Graves, 119 Vt. 205, 122 A.2d 840, 842; State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 142 A.2d 636, 639, 16 C.J.S. Constitutio......