People v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 11 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-16-0443,1-16-0443 |
| Citation | 2019 IL App (1st) 160443,139 N.E.3d 8,435 Ill.Dec. 337 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles DIXON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 A self-represented criminal defendant should have access to the same trial materials as his or her counsel, with redactions required by law.That just principle underlies this case.
¶ 2Charles Dixon filed a postconviction petition alleging a long list of constitutional violations that he claimed occurred at his trial.The trial court docketed his petition and appointed counsel.Extensive delay in the proceedings as well as postconviction counsel's decision to raise only two claims on Dixon's behalf eventually led Dixon to reluctantly seek to represent himself, which the trial court allowed.After lengthy litigation about Dixon's access to his trial attorney's file, the State moved to dismiss the petition, and the trial court granted its motion.
¶ 3 Dixon argues that the trial court erred when it allowed him to proceed pro se without access to his trial attorney's file.He contends that the trial court's denial of access rendered his waiver of postconviction counsel invalid.At oral argument, counsel confirmed Dixon's position that the trial court's denial of access to his trial counsel's file, regardless of the sufficiency of his waiver of postconviction counsel, constituted "reason alone for this court to remand for second stage proceedings."Also at oral argument, the State conceded that Dixon's trial counsel's file should be turned over to him after appropriate redactions.Dixon also presses two of the claims from his postconviction petition on the merits, arguing that he has made a substantial showing of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
¶ 4 Given the clarification of the parties' positions at oral argument, we no longer need to determine whether Dixon validly waived the assistance of postconviction counsel.Instead, we find, as the parties now agree, that depriving Dixon of his requested access to his trial counsel's file constitutes error.We reverse and remand for new second-stage proceedings.
¶ 6 Twenty years ago, Charles Dixon went into Iona Feldman's shoe repair shop and beat him with a stick.Dixon took Feldman's wallet and left.About three months later, Feldman died from his injuries.Dixon was charged with, among other offenses, first degree murder and aggravated battery.Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress statements that Dixon had given to police based, in part, on a claim that the statements had been coerced when the police officers involved had "misadministered the dosages" of Dixon's pain medications, rendering the statements involuntary.At the motion hearing, two Chicago police detectives denied that they had given Dixon any medication.Trial counsel presented no witnesses and offered no argument.The trial court denied the motion.
¶ 7The case proceeded to a jury trial.During opening statements, defense counsel made reference to the possibility that witnesses implicated Dixon only after "posters of a reward went up."Counsel presented no evidence of a reward.The jury found Dixon guilty of both murder and aggravated battery.
¶ 8 Trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial.Dissatisfied with trial counsel's representation, Dixon asked that counsel be discharged.The court granted Dixon's request and allowed him to represent himself.
¶ 9 Dixon then filed his own motion for a new trial, repeating many of the allegations in counsel's motion.Attached to Dixon's motion, however, was a document labeled "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief With Memorandum of Law."That document alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including counsel's failure to present evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress statements and counsel's failure to support, with evidence, the claim about a reward.
¶ 10 Because Dixon had yet to be sentenced, the trial court treated Dixon's "Post-Conviction" petition as an addendum to his motion for a new trial.The court held a hearing as provided in People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045(1984), at which trial counsel testified.The trial court denied Dixon's motion for a new trial.
¶ 11The trial court sentenced Dixon to consecutive prison terms of natural life for first degree murder and 30 years for aggravated battery.Dixon appealed.
¶ 12 On direct appeal, Dixon raised several issues, all aimed at the posttrial and sentencing proceedings.We agreed that his natural life and 30-year sentences should be modified to run concurrently, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.People v. Dixon , 366 Ill. App. 3d 848, 856-57, 304 Ill.Dec. 869, 853 N.E.2d 1235(2006).
¶ 13 In September 2005, the direct appeal still pending, Dixon filed the postconviction petition now before us.His initial petition contained seven allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and about 300 pages of exhibits.This petition appears nearly identical to the petition attached to Dixon's pro se motion for a new trial.After the mandate issued in the direct appeal, the trial court docketed the petition and appointed counsel.
¶ 14Counsel first appeared in May 2007, and so began a lengthy series of continuances.By September 2009, counsel had read only the transcripts and indicated "a potential issue" to raise on Dixon's behalf.Counsel explained to the court that she"would like to take a look at [the trial file] before deciding exactly how to proceed with that particular issue" and asked for what became another series of continuances.
¶ 15Counsel reported to the trial court in January 2010 that she had "gone through much of [the trial file]" and spoken with the original investigator on Dixon's case.Based on the conversation with the investigator, counsel needed to examine the trial file in greater depth.
¶ 16 Nothing more happened until April 2010.Counsel explained to the court that, in a phone call with Dixon, he had told her that he filed a motion to proceed pro se .The court had not received it and ordered Dixon to appear.On April 29, Dixon confirmed that he wished to represent himself.
¶ 17 The next day, the trial court allowed Dixon time to speak with his brother about his decision to represent himself and admonished Dixon on the perils of self-representation.The court learned that Dixon, 55 years old, had earned both a GED and associates degree.Dixon said that he was taking blood pressure and pain medications, and neither affected his ability to think clearly.Dixon denied ever receiving treatment or medication for mental health.
¶ 18The trial court told Dixon that the public defender's office would be far better than he would be at navigating postconviction proceedings and conducting investigations.The court warned Dixon that, if he represented himself, it would not appoint investigators, order the Department of Corrections to grant him extra library time, or appoint standby counsel.Dixon, concerned about his access to the trial file and other documents, interjected:
After a brief interruption where the parties discussed the case's procedural history, the court's colloquy with Dixon continued:
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...(work-product privilege in civil proceedings), its reasoning remains cogent in the criminal context. More recently, in People v. Dixon , 2019 IL App (1st) 160443, ¶ 54, 435 Ill.Dec. 337, 139 N.E.3d 8, a divided panel of this court held that a pro se postconviction petitioner was entitled to......
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..."Appellate counsel can only be ineffective for failing to raise issues that were apparent on the face of the record." People v. Dixon, 2019 IL App (1st) 160443, 43. However, appellate counsel "is not obliged to raise every conceivable issue on appeal and it is not incompetence to refrain fr......
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People v. Thackrey
...that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited"); see also People v. Dixon, 2019 IL App (1st) 160443, ¶ 47, 139 N.E.3d 8 ("Appellate counsel can only be ineffective for to raise issues that were apparent on the face of the record."). After taking over defendant's ......