People v. Dodge (In re Commitment of Dodge)

Decision Date02 May 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 1–11–3603.
Citation371 Ill.Dec. 231,2013 IL App (1st) 113603,989 N.E.2d 1159
PartiesIn re COMMITMENT OF Reginald DODGE (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Reginald Dodge, Respondent–Appellant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Daniel T. Coyne, Matthew M. Daniels, and Elizabeth D. Leeb, all of Law Offices of Chicago-Kent College of Law, of Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick and John R. Schleppenbach, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[371 Ill.Dec. 235]¶ 1 Following a jury trial, respondent Reginald Dodge was found to be a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)). The trial court immediately conducted a “dispositional hearing” and ordered that respondent be committed to institutional care in a secure facility before the parties had been given the opportunity to present an argument or evidence as to the appropriate disposition. On appeal, respondent challenges numerous instances of counsel's allegedly ineffective assistance both at trial and with regard to the dispositional hearing. We affirm the judgment finding respondent to be a sexually violent person. We also affirm the dispositional order committing respondent to institutional care in a secure facility, albeit somewhat reluctantly given the superficial hearing that occurred in this case.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2007, the State filed a petition to commit respondent to the Department of Human Services (DHS) as a sexually violent person. The State alleged that (1) respondent was serving a 50–year prison term for rape and deviant sexual assault; (2) he suffered from a mental disorder, specifically, paraphilia toward nonconsenting persons; and (3) respondent's mental disorder made it substantially probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence.

¶ 4 Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking, among other things, an order precluding respondent from placing any information regarding the potential commitment options before the jury. The State argued that such information would be improper and tantamount to commenting on sentencing during a criminal trial. Respondent's attorney objected, stating that “there will be cross[-]examination of the experts regarding their opinion as to what is required for his commitment, whether or not it should be in a secure facility.” The trial court granted the State's motion, finding that such information “is for a dispositional hearing,” rather than trial.

¶ 5 At trial, the State presented the expert testimony of Dr. John Arroyo, a licensed psychologist, who testified that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) maintained a list of sex offenders who were subject to parole or discharge. Those individuals were screened to determine whether they were “okay” to be released or whether they were in the 2% of inmates who required further evaluation. Dr. Arroyo evaluated respondent to determine if he was a candidate for commitment under the Act. After reviewing respondent's master file, Dr. Arroyo interviewed respondent on November 30, 2010, and prepared a report. In forming an opinion, he considered respondent's criminal history.

¶ 6 Respondent committed his most recent sexually violent offense in 1982 (case No. 82 CR 9737) while on parole for a prior sex offense. Respondent, then 27 years old, entered the victim's home through a balcony while armed with a knife and forced the victim to engage in oral, anal and vaginal sex. Respondent believed she enjoyed it a little.” Respondent was convicted of rape, deviant sexual assault, armed robbery and home invasion. In addition, respondent was convicted of attempted residential burglary (case No. 82 CR 9766) as well as residential burglary (case No. 82 CR 9765) in 1982. In the latter case, the victim shouted upon finding respondent standing in his kitchen. Respondent fled, leaving behind a knife, pornographic magazines and a dildo.

¶ 7 In 1974, respondent, then 19 years old, was convicted of rape (case No. 74 CR 6032) when he forced a group of college women into a bedroom at gunpoint and assaulted one woman in front of the others. During his interview, respondent said that he picked the prettiest woman and believed that the women “were out for a good time” because they were wearing shorts and bikinis. Respondent also stated, however, that he was not attempting to justify his behavior and it would not have made a difference if they were dressed as goblins. Respondent believed that no one was hurt. In addition, respondent was convicted of another rape and burglary in 1974 (case No. 74 CR 6033). There, respondent, who had a gun, woke the victim and forced her to have sex while two other people ransacked her home. In a third case in 1974, respondent was convicted of burglary, armed robbery and attempted rape (case No. 75 CR 2176). Respondent entered through a window, took the victim's gun and threatened to rape her but she persuaded him to leave. Furthermore, respondent had an additional theft case in 1974. Respondent also reported that when he was 14 years old, he was stabbed while raping a woman and was surprised at her reaction.

¶ 8 Dr. Arroyo testified that he discounted the possibility that the rapes just happened to occur while respondent was breaking into the homes because respondent conducted the rapes prior to taking items. Dr. Arroyo also considered respondent's nonsexual criminal history, including one offense in which he shot at a federal officer. In addition, respondent had more than 125 disciplinary tickets in prison, including tickets for possessing shanks and blocking locks with razor blades. Respondent also failed to successfully complete a prior probation sentence. Furthermore, the IDOC had offered respondent sex offender treatment but he declined. Respondent stated that the authorities had eliminated his sexual feelings toward women by locking him up for so long and that he “didn't feel much sexually anymore.” He was currently in the DHS treatment facility for sex offenders but declined to receive treatment there as well, preferring to wait for the outcome of his trial before deciding if he would participate in treatment.

¶ 9 Dr. Arroyo testified that he considered the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–IV–TR) in support of his conclusion that respondent had “paraphilia not otherwise specified, nonconsent and antisocial personality disorder.” Dr. Arroyo explained that paraphilia is a sexual fixation involving recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasy, sexual urges or behaviors involving nonconsenting persons for a period of at least six months. The second criterion of paraphilia was that the urges or fantasies cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social functioning. In respondent's case, he had been engaging in the aforementioned sexual urges and fantasies for years and continued to engage in sexually violent conduct despite having been sanctioned for it. In addition, Dr. Arroyo explained that antisocial personality disorder involved, among other things, a persistent pattern of violating others' rights since age 15 and for a period of years. Dr. Arroyo observed that respondent had failed to conform to social norms regarding lawful behavior, recklessly disregarded the safety of others and lacked remorse, as indicated by rationalizing or indifference to his mistreatment of others. Specifically, respondent had stated that one victim somewhat enjoyed the rape and respondent did not believe he had harmed anyone with respect to the incident with the college students. Dr. Arroyo also stated that although antisocial personality disorder was not sexual in nature, one illness exacerbated the other. Furthermore, Dr. Arroyo lacked sufficient information to form an opinion as to potential substance abuse. Dr. Arroyo opined that respondent's mental disorders affected his emotional or volitional capacity and predisposed him to engage in future acts of sexual violence.

¶ 10 Dr. Arroyo examined actuarial studies in determining respondent's likelihood of committing another sex offense. According to Static–99R, respondent was high risk because he had chosen to engage in offending behavior despite having been sanctioned for it, and declined offers to be treated. Respondent was also in the high risk category according to the Minnesota Sex Offender Screen Tool Revised (MnSOST–R). In addition, respondent scored in the 83rd percentile as compared to other inmates in the Hare Psychopathy Check List Revised (PCLR), which examines antisocial behavior based on a respondent's current state of mind. Dr. Arroyo also considered that respondent had committed offenses both as a juvenile and as an adult, had violated conditional release and had committed a new offense while under community supervision. Furthermore, although age is a protective factor that tends to decease risk, respondent was 56 years old, relatively young and able-bodied, and still able to reoffend. Similarly, although treatment was a protective factor, respondent had declined treatment. Dr. Arroyo opined that respondent was substantially probable to engage in future acts of sexual violence due to his mental disorders. Dr. Arroyo testified that by substantially probable, he meant [m]uch more likely than not.”

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Dr. Arroyo testified that respondent was not of significant age, which would be 15 years or less of remaining life expectancy. Dr. Arroyo also testified, however, that he did not know respondent's life expectancy and that sex offenders over the age of 60 were found to reoffend at the lowest rate. Dr. Arroyo further testified that while in prison, respondent did not receive tickets...

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14 cases
  • People v. Walker (In re Commitment of Walker)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 26, 2014
    ...probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional error. In re Commitment of Dodge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113603, ¶ 20, 371 Ill.Dec. 231, 989 N.E.2d 1159. Both prongs must be satisfied. Id. ¶ 51 Here, respondent fails to show prejudice. H......
  • People v. Garcia
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 22, 2017
    ...shows that despite her concerns, juror Ogrodnik was able to understand English. See 705 ILCS 305/2(3) (West 2008); In re Commitment of Dodge , 2013 IL App (1st) 113603, ¶ 27, 371 Ill.Dec. 231, 989 N.E.2d 1159. The record therefore does not show that the court's conduct in retaining juror Og......
  • People v. Butler (In re Butler)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 23, 2013
    ...here, it is not our intention to approve of the abbreviated nature of the hearing held in this case. Recently, in In re Commitment of Dodge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113603, ¶ 47, 371 Ill.Dec. 231, 989 N.E.2d 1159, a case decided after this matter was heard in the trial court, this court communica......
  • Lieberman v. Scott
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 23, 2014
    ...the age of the offender and offers a three-point score reduction for offenders age 60 and older."); In re Commitment of Dodge, 989 N.E.2d 1159, 1166, 371 Ill.Dec. 231, 238 (1st Dist. 2013) ("The two tests considered essentially the same factors but the latter test also considered age."); In......
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