People v. Dollen

Decision Date30 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 44905,44905
Citation53 Ill.2d 280,290 N.E.2d 879
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Chester Harry DOLLEN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Murphy, Griffin & Dixon, Aurora (Eugene G. Griffin, Aurora, of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield (James B. Zagel and E. James Gildea, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for the People.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant was convicted of the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 10 to 12 years. The appellate court affirmed his conviction but remanded the cause for redetermination of sentence. (People v. Dollen, 2 Ill.App.3d 567, 275 N.E.2d 446.) We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

It is undisputed that on February 5, 1969, defendant sold a package which contained morphine to a State narcotics agent for $75. He was arrested on February 19, 1969. Instrumental in effecting this purchase was an informer, Donald Wright, who worked as a cab driver for the company which was managed by defendant.

Agent Norton of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (Narcotics Division) testified that on February 5, 1969, he and Wright went to the cab garage. Defendant met them and then departed. He returned a short time later with a package which was 'about three inches by three inches square.' It contained several small vials of liquid. Norton gave defendant $65 in prerecorded currency. This amount had previously been suggested to him by Wright. However, defendant demanded and received an additional $10. Norton claimed that during the sale he requested other drugs and defendant said he could supply them, although it is apparent that no subsequent purchases were made. He further testified that Wright had told him of his prior stay in a mental institution and that he gave $50 to Wright because the latter wanted to leave town. Norton, who had met Wright only one or two weeks before the sale, also stated that he did not know of his present whereabouts.

Detective Edward Williams of the Aurora Police Department, who was in charge of narcotics, testified that he had known Wright for approximately five days prior to the sale. He described Wright as his informant. On February 5, 1969, he observed Norton and Wright meet defendant at the cab station and enter the building. Williams further testified that several weeks after defendant was arrested, Wright asked him for money but was referred to Norton. The detective stated that he first learned of Wright's past mental history several months later during a telephone conversation with a member of Wright's family. The purpose of his inquiry was to discover where Wright had gone, but he was unable to determine his whereabouts, although he later saw Wright about eight months prior to defendant's trial, which was held in June, 1970.

Defendant testified that Wright had been hired as a cab driver in the latter part of January, 1969. He stated that animosity existed between them because of Wright's improper conduct toward several passengers. Defendant further claimed that he told Wright that he would be discharged if these accusations were true.

He also testified that on or about January 28, 1969, he arrived at the cab garage and saw Wright and another employee, Elmer Davis. A cab dispatcher, who was in the garage office, was the only other person present at that time. During a routine inspection of the garaged vehicles, defendant discovered the package of narcotics in Wright's cab and Wright immediately stated that he could find a buyer. Defendant claimed that for several days after the discovery Wright repeatedly asked him to sell the package but he refused because he believed it would be claimed by a passenger. Finally, he stated that he acceded to these requests when Wright, whom he described as being in an emotional condition, said that he was in trouble and defendant could help him by selling the narcotics to a buyer that Wright could produce. Wright suggested the sale price of $75 which defendant could keep for his services. Defendant also maintained that Wright was aware of his substantial indebtedness.

Elmer Davis testified that he arrived at the garage on the morning defendant discovered the package and saw Wright standing near the vehicles. He corroborated defendant's version of the discovery and Wright's immediate offer to obtain a buyer for the package. He further testified that ill feelings existed between Wright and defendant.

The evidence discloses that Wright was discharged on February 6, 1969. Davis stated that several days later he was present when Wright told defendant that he had received money from the State and he could 'blow the lid off' (presumably quash the matter) if defendant would re-hire him. This offer was refused.

Richard Pass, another employee, testified that on February 6, 1969, the informer told him he had 'fixed' defendant. This witness also substantiated the fact that animosity existed between Wright and defendant. On this day Wright also told defendant's employer that she should find a new manager because defendant, who had worked for her company for about six years, had sold narcotics to a State agent and he would soon be arrested.

At the time of trial Wright was unavailable. Defendant filed a motion to compel the State to produce all documents signed by Wright which pertained to the case and 'all records of the Illinois Division of Narcotics' relative to him. The trial court ruled that it would order disclosure only if Wright testified.

Based upon the aforementioned facts defendant now contends that he...

To continue reading

Request your trial
43 cases
  • People v. Jamieson
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • September 12, 1990
    ......Rodriguez, 474 F.2d [436 MICH 115] 587, 589 (CA 5, 1973); United States v. Dillet, 265 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y., 1966); United States v. Silva, 180 F.Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y., 1959); State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 467 P.2d 740 (1970); People v. Dollen, 53 Ill.2d 280, 282-285, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972); People v. Carmichael, 80 Ill.App.2d 293, 225 N.E.2d 458 (1967); State v. Overmann, 220 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa, 1974); People v. Jones, 73 Ill.App.2d 55, 219 N.E.2d 12 (1966). .         The overwhelming number of cases that have condemned police ......
  • People v. Norks
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 23, 1985
    ...... (People v. Ball (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 1041, 47 Ill.Dec. 466, 415 N.E.2d 471.) In this case, the trial judge was the trier of fact, and once the entrapment defense was raised, it became incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur. (People v. Dollen (1972), 53 Ill.2d 280, 284, 290 N.E.2d 879.) A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and should not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable as to raise ......
  • People v. Dabrowski
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 20, 1987
    ...... We disagree. .         Entrapment is established where law enforcement officers or their agents conceive a criminal enterprise and incite or induce a defendant into committing an offense which he would not have otherwise committed. (People v. Dollen (1972), 53 Ill.2d 280, 283, 290 N.E.2d 879; People v. Norks (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 1078, 1083, 92 Ill.Dec. 406, 484 N.E.2d 1261.) However, where the defendant has the intent to commit the crime and does so merely because an officer, for the purpose of securing evidence, affords the defendant the ......
  • People v. Miszkiewicz
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 5, 1992
    ......[177 Ill.Dec. 153] were all uncorroborated testimony of Agent Lloyd as contrasted to his own corroborated testimony. .         The state does have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur once defendant raises it as a defense. (People v. Dollen (1972), 53 Ill.2d 280, 284, 290 N.E.2d 879.) The issue is a factual determination unless the court can find as a matter of law that entrapment took place. As Justice Clark stated in his dissenting opinion in People v. Tipton, (1980), 78 Ill.2d 477, 489, 36 Ill.Dec. 687, 401 N.E.2d 528, "the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT